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Abstract
Healthcare IoT systems are distinguished in that they are designed to serve
human beings, which primarily raises the requirements of security, privacy,
and reliability. Such systems have to provide real-time notifications and re-
sponses concerning the status of patients. Physicians, patients, and other
caregivers demand a reliable system in which the results are accurate and
timely, and the service is reliable and secure. To guarantee these require-
ments, the smart components in the system require a secure and efficient
end-to-end communication method between the end-points (e.g., patients,
caregivers, and medical sensors) of a healthcare IoT system.
The main challenge faced by the existing security solutions is a lack of
secure end-to-end communication. This thesis addresses this challenge by
presenting a novel end-to-end security solution enabling end-points to se-
curely and efficiently communicate with each other. The proposed solution
meets the security requirements of a wide range of healthcare IoT systems
while minimizing the overall hardware overhead of end-to-end communica-
tion. End-to-end communication is enabled by the holistic integration of the
following contributions.
The first contribution is the implementation of two architectures for re-
mote monitoring of bio-signals. The first architecture is based on a low power
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol known as ZigBee. It consists of a set of sensor nodes
to read data from various medical sensors, process the data, and send them
wirelessly over ZigBee to a server node. The second architecture implements
on an IP-based wireless sensor network, using IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local
Area Network (WLAN). The system consists of a IEEE 802.11 based sensor
module to access bio-signals from patients and send them over to a remote
server. In both architectures, the server node collects the health data from
several client nodes and updates a remote database. The remote webserver
accesses the database and updates the webpage in real-time, which can be
accessed remotely.
The second contribution is a novel secure mutual authentication scheme
for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) implant systems. The proposed
scheme relies on the elliptic curve cryptography and the D-Quark lightweight
hash design. The scheme consists of three main phases: (1) reader au-
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thentication and verification, (2) tag identification, and (3) tag verification.
We show that among the existing public-key crypto-systems, elliptic curve
is the optimal choice due to its small key size as well as its efficiency in
computations. The D-Quark lightweight hash design has been tailored for
resource-constrained devices.
The third contribution is proposing a low-latency and secure crypto-
graphic keys generation approach based on Electrocardiogram (ECG) fea-
tures. This is performed by taking advantage of the uniqueness and ran-
domness properties of ECG’s main features comprising of PR, RR, PP, QT,
and ST intervals. This approach achieves low latency due to its reliance on
reference-free ECG’s main features that can be acquired in a short time.
The approach is called Several ECG Features (SEF)-based cryptographic
key generation.
The fourth contribution is devising a novel secure and efficient end-to-end
security scheme for mobility enabled healthcare IoT. The proposed scheme
consists of: (1) a secure and efficient end-user authentication and authoriza-
tion architecture based on the certificate based Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) handshake protocol, (2) a secure end-to-end communica-
tion method based on DTLS session resumption, and (3) support for robust
mobility based on interconnected smart gateways in the fog layer.
Finally, the fifth and the last contribution is the analysis of the per-
formance of the state-of-the-art end-to-end security solutions in healthcare
IoT systems including our end-to-end security solution. In this regard, we
first identify and present the essential requirements of robust security so-
lutions for healthcare IoT systems. We then analyze the performance of
the state-of-the-art end-to-end security solutions (including our scheme) by
developing a prototype healthcare IoT system.
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Tiivistelma¨
Terveydenhuollon ja¨rjestelma¨t eroavat muista Esineiden Internet (Internet
of Things, IoT) -ja¨rjestelmista¨ ka¨ytto¨kohteensa ja tietoturvavaatimustensa
osalta. Kun ja¨rjestelma¨ on tarkoitettu ihmisten hoitamiseen ja ih-
misla¨hto¨isen terveystiedon kera¨a¨miseen, analysointiin ja seurantaan, ovat
ja¨rjestelmien luotettavuus, tietoturva ja yksityisyyden suoja keskeisia¨
vaatimuksia. Terveydenhuollon ja¨rjestelma¨t havainnoivat potilaan tilaa
reaaliaikaisesti ja tarvittaessa antavat ha¨lytyksen hoitohekilo¨kunnalle.
La¨a¨ka¨rit, potilaat ja hoitajat tarvitsevat ja¨rjestelmia¨, jotka ovat luotet-
tavia, tarkkoja, ja turvallisia ka¨ytta¨a¨. Jotta na¨ma¨ vaatimukset voidaan
ta¨ytta¨a¨, ja¨rjestelma¨t tarvitsevat luotettavan, pa¨a¨sta¨ pa¨a¨ha¨n salatun
viestinta¨kanavan ja¨rjestelma¨n eri pa¨a¨telaitteiden va¨lille.
Nykyisten IoT-ja¨rjestelmien tietoturvaratkaisujen keskeinen haaste on
pa¨a¨sta¨ pa¨a¨ha¨n salattujen yhteyksien puuttuminen. Ta¨ssa¨ va¨ito¨skirjassa
esiteta¨a¨n ta¨ha¨n ratkaisuna ja¨rjestelma¨, joka mahdollistaa pa¨a¨telaitteiden
va¨lisen tehokkaan viestinna¨n pa¨a¨sta¨ pa¨a¨ha¨n salatun yhteyden yli. Ta¨ma¨
ja¨rjestelma¨ vastaa terveydenhuollon IoT-laitteiden tietoturvavaatimuksiin
samalla minimoiden laitteistotason resurssikulutuksen. Esitetty ja¨rjestelma¨
koostuu seuraaviin tieteellisissa¨ julkaisuissa esitettyihin tutkimustuloksiin.
Ensimma¨inen va¨ito¨skirjassa esitetty tutkimustulos on kahden eri
arkkitehtuurin laitteistototeutus biosignaalien eta¨tarkkailuun. En-
simma¨inen toteutus perustuu matalavirrankulutuksiseen IEEE 802.15.4
Zigbee-protokollaan, jota ka¨ytta¨va¨t sensorit lukevat signaaleita erilaisista
antureista, prosessoivat signaalit ja la¨hetta¨va¨t ne palvelimelle. Toinen
arkkitehtuuritoteutus ka¨ytta¨a¨ IP-pohjaista langatonta sensoriverkkoa
hyo¨dynta¨en langattoman la¨hiverkon IEEE 802.11 -standardia. Ja¨rjestelma¨
koostuu sensorimoduulista, joka lukee potilaasta tarvittavat biosignaalit ja
la¨hetta¨a¨ ne eta¨palvelimelle. Molemmissa arkkitehtuureissa palvelin kera¨a¨
useiden potilaiden terveystietoja yhta¨ aikaa ja pa¨ivitta¨a¨ kera¨tyt tiedot
tietokantaan. Terveystietoja voidaan tarkastella web-palvelimen, joka lukee
tiedot reaaliajassa tietokannasta, avulla.
Toisena tuloksena esiteta¨a¨n uusi yhteisautentikointimenetelma¨ RFID-
implanteille. Ja¨rjestelma¨n turvallisuus perustuu elliptisten ka¨yrien
kryptografiaan ja laskennallisesti kevyeen D-Quark -hajautusfunktioon.
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Ja¨rjestelma¨n toiminta on kolmivaiheinen: (1) lukijan autentikointi ja veri-
fiointi, (2) RFID-tagin tunnistus, ja (3) tagin verifiointi. Tutkimustuloksena
esiteta¨a¨n, etta¨ elliptisiin ka¨yriin perustuvat kryptoja¨rjestelma¨t ovat muihin
vastaaviin verrattuna optimaalinen valinta johtuen pienesta¨ avaimen koosta
ja laskennan tehokkuudesta. D-Quark -hajautusfunktio on vastaavasti
ra¨a¨ta¨lo¨ity laskennallisesti rajoittuneille laitteille.
Kolmantena tuloksena esiteta¨a¨n elektrokardiogrammiin (EKG) perus-
tuva nopea ja turvallinen kryptografisten avaimien generointimenetelma¨.
Ta¨ssa¨ hyo¨dynneta¨a¨n EKG:a satunnaisuuden la¨hteena¨ seka¨ EKG:n PR-,
RR-, RR-, PP-, QT- ja ST-va¨lien yksilo¨llisyytta¨. Koska na¨ma¨ piirteet ovat
nopeasti eroteltavissa EKG-signaalista, esitelty useisiin EKG-piirteisiin
perustuva (Several ECG Features, SEF) kryptografisten avainten generoin-
timenetelma¨ on nopea.
Nelja¨ntena¨ tuloksena va¨ito¨skirjassa esiteta¨a¨n uusi turvallinen pa¨a¨sta¨
pa¨a¨ha¨n salattu ja ka¨ytta¨jien mobiiliutta tukeva tietoturvakokonaisuus-
ratkaisu IoT-pohjaisille terveydenhuollon diagnostiikka- ja analyysilaitteille.
Ratkaisu koostuu (1) turvallisesta ja tehokkaasta loppuka¨ytta¨ja¨n tun-
nistamisesta ja ka¨ytto¨oikeuksien hallinta-arkkitehtuurista, joka hyo¨dynta¨a¨
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) -protokollan sertifikaatteja
ja ka¨ttelya¨, (2) turvallisesta DTLS-istunnon jatkamiseen perustuvasta
pa¨a¨sta¨ pa¨a¨ha¨n salatusta viestinta¨kanavasta, ja (3) usvalaskentakerrokseen
sijoittuvista keskena¨a¨n verkottuneista a¨lykka¨ista¨ porttilaitteista, jotka
mahdollistavat pa¨a¨telaitteiden liikkuvuuden.
Viidentena¨ ja viimeisena¨ tuloksena va¨ito¨skirjassa vertaillaan uusimpien
pa¨a¨sta¨ pa¨a¨ha¨n salattujen terveydenhuollon ja¨rjestelmien tietoturvaratkaisu-
jen suorituskykya¨ va¨ito¨skirjassa esitettyyn uuteen ratkaisuun. Vertailun
aluksi tunnistetaan ja esitella¨a¨n ta¨ma¨n kaltaisiin ja¨rjestelmiin kohdistuvat
keskeiset vaatimukset. Ta¨ma¨n ja¨lkeen kehitella¨a¨n prototyyppi uudesta IoT-
terveydenhuoltosovelluksesta, jonka avulla vertailtavien ratkaisujen suori-
tuskykya¨ voidaan analysoida.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent advances in information and communication technologies have given
rise to a new technology: the Internet of Things (IoT) [1, 2, 3]. IoT enables
people and objects in the physical world, as well as data and virtual envi-
ronments to interact with each other, hence realizing smart environments
such as smart transport systems, smart cities, smart healthcare, and smart
energy. The concept of IoT provides a solid framework for interconnect-
ing edge computing devices, sensors, smartphones, and cloud computing
platforms for seamless interactions. IoT is on the revolutionary road, re-
modeling the healthcare sector along the way in terms of social benefits and
penetration as well as economics. Enabled by ubiquitous computing and
communication, all the healthcare system entities, such as individuals, ap-
pliances, and medicine, can be monitored and managed continuously. The
IoT’s connectivity provides a new way to monitor, store, and utilize health
and wellbeing related data (that is, diagnosis, treatment, recovery, medica-
tion, finance, and even daily activity) on a 24/7 basis. The rising cost of
healthcare and the prevalence of chronic diseases around the world urgently
demand the transformation of healthcare from a hospital-centered system to
a person-centered environment, with a focus on citizens’ disease management
as well as their well-being [4]. It has been predicted that in the following
decades, the way healthcare is currently provided will be transformed from
hospital-centered, first to hospital-home-balanced in the 2020s, and then ul-
timately to home-centered in the 2030s [5]. This essential transformation
necessitates the fact that the convergence and overlap of the IoT architec-
tures and technologies for smart spaces and healthcare domains should be
more actively considered [4, 6, 7, 8].
Healthcare IoT systems are distinct in that they are built to serve hu-
man beings, which inherently raises the requirements of safety, security,
and reliability. In such systems, improving a patient’s quality of life is im-
portant to mitigate the negative effects of being hospitalized. Providing
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patients with the possibility to walk around the medical environments and
knowing that the monitoring of their health conditions is not interrupted
is an important feature. Moreover, healthcare IoT systems have to provide
real-time notifications and responses regarding the status of patients. The
development of personal mobile devices, such as smartphones and tablets,
is helping to establish a model of mobile health that can facilitate a con-
tinuum of person-centered care. The care can be done by relying on these
mobile devices as a medium of sensing, interaction, and communication.
Smartphones are embedded with an array of sensors that can track a user’s
motion, location, activity, and so forth. However, these devices still can-
not collect detailed information for a user’s bodily health. A wide array of
wearable devices has recently been developed to extend the capabilities of
mobile devices, especially in the area of body and behavior sensing. Wear-
able devices encompass a variety of functions, including data collection from
on-body sensors, preprocessing of data, temporary data storage, and data
transfer to internet-connected immediate neighbors. These devices also of-
fer significant advantages to healthcare by automating remote healthcare
interventions that include diagnostic monitoring, treatments, and interop-
erability between patients and physicians.
Healthcare IoT systems raise important questions and introduce new
challenges for the security of systems and processes and the privacy of indi-
viduals. One of the main problems in IoT systems is the significant number
of devices that are getting connected to the Internet. Connecting more
devices causes the available resources, such as bandwidth and computing
power, to be shared by more nodes leading to quality and performance
degradation. However, this degraded infrastructure is unacceptable because
of the critical application domain. Also, a large portion of these devices are
resource constrained. This shortage of resources adds more design limita-
tions to the architecture design. To guarantee these requirements, the smart
components in the healthcare IoT system require a reliable communication
architecture. Wearable IoT (WIoT) is defined as technological infrastruc-
ture. WIoT interconnects wearable sensors to enable monitoring human
factors, including health, wellness, and behaviors to enhance individuals’
everyday quality of life. Wearable sensors offer significant advantages to
healthcare by automating remote healthcare interventions that include di-
agnostic monitoring, treatments, and interoperability between patients and
physicians. In a typical WIoT system, the system has to ensure the safety of
patients by monitoring patients’ activities and vital signs. Also, physicians,
patients, and other caregivers demand a reliable system in which the results
are accurate and timely, and the service is secure and dependable.
Due to the direct involvement of humans in WIoT, providing robust and
secure communication among medical sensors, actuators, and caregivers is
crucial. Although collected from innocuous wearable sensors, such data is
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vulnerable to top privacy concerns [9, 10, 11, 12]. For example, some wear-
able devices collect sensitive information, such as the user’s absolute location
and movement activities. If this information is not safeguarded during the
process of storage or communication, the patient’s privacy may be com-
promised. Misuse or privacy concerns may restrict people benefiting from
WIoT technology. There may also be a possibility of severe social unrest due
to the fear that government or private organizations are using such devices
for monitoring and tracking individuals [13]. Internet Protocol (IP) enabled
sensors in a Medical Sensor Network (MSN) can transmit medical data of
patients to remote healthcare services.In such scenarios, the conveyed med-
ical data may be routed through an untrusted network infrastructure, such
as the Internet. Misuse or privacy concerns restrict societies from utilizing
IoT-based healthcare applications. Robust techniques and methodologies
are needed to control and limit attacks against these networks.
Although there is a rich body of literature in the field of communication
security for healthcare IoT systems, a significant gap in this area still exist.
The main challenge encountered by the existing security solutions is how
to provide End-to-End security in a way that end-points in these systems
would be able to securely and efficiently communicate with each other be-
yond the local network boundaries. End-to-end security philosophy takes
a holistic, start-to-finish approach to security design. The idea is to secure
all communication from the preliminary source to the end destination using
relevant security schemes/protocols to eliminate all potential for third party
intrusion. To achieve this, security should be built in where applicable, and
enhanced via additional layers of security that start protecting communica-
tions upon initial establishment. Taking an end-to-end security approach
to healthcare IoT security can help solve common problems with healthcare
IoT including data tampering, snooping, and device take-over attacks that
often occur in healthcare IoT environments.
In the paradigms of healthcare IoT, not only data can be collected by
smart devices (medical sensors) and transmitted to end-users (caregivers),
but end-users can also access, control, and manage medical sensors through
the Internet. Since patients’ health data is the basis for enabling appli-
cations and services in healthcare IoT, it becomes imperative to provide
secure end-to-end communication between end-users, medical sensors, and
health caregivers to protect the exchange of health data. To enable the
secure end-to-end communication, mutual authentication and authorization
of end-users and healthcare IoT devices/services is a crucial task. This is to
block eavesdropping on sensitive medical data as well as malicious activities
at the entrance to the healthcare IoT. Medical sensors rely on cryptography
to secure their end-to-end communications. Proper application of cryptog-
raphy requires the use of secure keys and key generation methods. Cryp-
tographic Key generations relying on physiological features/parameters of
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individuals’ body are proper solutions for tiny medical sensors as those so-
lutions are lightweight and require low resources. Cryptographic keys can
be generated within the network on the fly via the usage of information col-
lected by medical sensors when and as needed. The generated keys can be
employed in end-to-end communications to securely encrypt/decrypt mes-
sages (e.g., patients’ medical data) transmitted between medical sensors and
health caregivers. The keys can also be used for authentication and autho-
rization of peers in healthcare IoT systems. Mobility support is also one
of the most important issues in healthcare IoT systems. Enabling mobil-
ity for healthcare IoT systems offers a high quality of medical service, as
it allows patients to move around freely within the premises. Patients do
not need to be worried about moving around because the system can enable
mobility while continuously monitoring vital signs. The mobility support
can be provided to the healthcare IoT ubiquitously without compromising
the end-to-end security.
For these reasons, this thesis focuses on proposing an end-to-end security
solution for healthcare IoT systems through specifying and developing a
novel distributed architecture considering resource constraints, as well as
security levels of IoT devices and services, supports mobility of individuals,
and offers a low-latency solution for personalized unique cryptographic key
generation. The proposed solution is not just limited to a specific healthcare
environment, it can be applied to any environment of healthcare IoT that
requires a secure end-to-end communication.
1.1 Objectives and Research Questions
In this thesis, we explore, identify, examine, and provide research-based
solutions and suggestions for the challenges concerning the security of the
healthcare IoT systems. In summary, the following objectives and research
questions have been delineated.
• Creating an efficient standards-based communication architecture for
healthcare IoT systems. The architecture ensures security and seam-
less availability of medical IoT devices and services, as well as ubiqui-
tous mobility.
• Creating the building blocks of secure end-to-end communication for
healthcare IoT systems. The created blocks offer peer authentication
and authorization to highly resource constrained IoT devices. The
authentication and authorization of the healthcare IoT peers are done
using personalized unique cryptographic keys.
The following research questions (RQs) are addressed to achieve the
objectives of end-to-end security in healthcare IoT systems.
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• RQ1: How to design a reliable and robust communication architecture
that considers the constrained nature of healthcare IoT devices?
The architecture of a system provides information about the com-
ponents, the organization of the parts, and the interactions. It is
one of the critical elements for achieving graceful scaling and perfor-
mance. Among the non-functional requirements that constrain the
system architecture design, few of these are scalability, usability, and
performance. In most healthcare IoT applications, especially in smart
homes and hospitals, there exists a bridging point, which is a gateway
between a sensor network and the Internet that often performs essen-
tial functions such as translating between the protocols utilized in the
Internet and sensor networks [14,15].
• RQ2: How to design a secure healthcare IoT architecture such a way
that it ensures seamless availability of IoT devices/services and ubiq-
uitous mobility?
Healthcare IoT services are supposed to be offered to patients in a
seamlessly and continuously way when the patients are moving. An
essential feature is giving patients the ability to walk around the hos-
pital wards knowing their health condition is being monitored without
interruption. In a case that a moving sensor loses its connection with
one of the smart gateways, health caregivers will stop monitoring the
patients. This condition is not favorable in situations where real-time
and continuous monitoring is necessary. Distributed smart e-health
gateways can provide seamless availability and ubiquitous mobility of
healthcare IoT systems. By exploiting smart e-health gateways in a
distributed fashion, the tasks of a centralized gateway can be broke
down to be handled by distributed smart gateways.
• RQ3: How unauthorized access and intrusion attempts can be pre-
vented in healthcare IoT systems?
In a healthcare IoT system, security and privacy of patients are among
significant areas of concern, as most devices and their communications
are wireless. Performing mutual authentication and authorization,
trustworthy communication of healthcare IoT devices and services can
barricade unauthorized access and intrusion attempts. With mutual
authentication and authorization, trustworthy communication can oc-
cur when one device trusts the other devices. Therefore, eavesdropping
on sensitive medical data or malicious triggering of specific tasks can
be prevented, and any malicious activity can be blocked before enter-
ing a medical constrained domain.
• RQ4: How to enable the end-points of a healthcare IoT system to
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communicate beyond the independent network securely?
End-to-end security is one of the significant requirements in health-
care IoT systems. This feature enables the end-points of a healthcare
IoT system to communicate securely. Designing a handshake delega-
tion architecture using a session resumption technique can efficiently
achieve a secure end-to-end communication. The main idea to employ
session resumption is to perform heavy-weight operations only once,
during an initial handshake connection phase. Thus, the peers need to
keep a minimal session state, even after the session is terminated. The
session resumption enables the peers to resume the secure connection
without the need for running expensive operations and transmitting
long certificates.
• RQ5: How to exploit the human body as the authentication iden-
tity and the means of generating and managing cryptographic keys to
secure Body Area Networks (BANs)?
Given the constrained nature of medical sensors used in BSNs, con-
ventional key generation approaches may potentially involve reason-
able computations, as well as latency during network or any subse-
quent adjustments, due to their need for pre-deployment. Biometrics
are generally regarded as the only solution that is lightweight, re-
quires low resources, and, indeed, can identify authorized subjects in
BANs [16, 17, 18, 19]. The choice of a biometric to be used for gen-
erating cryptographic keys relies on the capability of medical sensor
nodes on extracting an individual’s relevant biometric information. It
has been found that the next generation of biometrics (also known as
physiological or bio-signals) are the best candidates to be employed for
the authentication and generating cryptographic keys. Because cryp-
tographic keys generated using humans’ physiological signals have the
following specifications. First, they are different for different subjects
at any time. Second, they are different for the same person at different
time intervals. Third, they are cryptographically random to provide
security. Finally, they are measurable from each subject.
1.2 Research Contributions
This thesis comprised of five main contributions. These contributions are
presented in detail in the original publications in Part II of the thesis. A
brief overview of the main contributions is presented in the following:
1. Pervasive Health Monitoring Based on Internet of Things:
The IoT-based pervasive healthcare system has the potential to offer an
error-free alerting system, as well as medical data, in critical conditions
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with continuous monitoring. Such a system minimizes the need for dedi-
cated medical personnel for patient monitoring and helps the patient lead
a normal life in addition to providing high-quality medical service. In this
thesis, our first contribution is to provide the implementation of IoT-based
architectures for remote health monitoring based on two popular wireless
technologies, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
802.11 Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) and IEEE 802.15.4 (ZigBee).
We present a health monitoring wireless sensor network architecture and
assess the usability of two wireless communication technologies in the pre-
sented context. The aim is to identify the advantages and shortcomings of
these architectures and find application domains in which these architec-
tures can be properly utilized. ZigBee exploits mesh topology, which has
different advantages over point to point networks in terms of scalability, re-
liability, and addressing interference issues by the structure. IEEE 802.11
WLAN offers all the benefits of IP standards such as compatibility, hetero-
geneity, flexibility, speed, efficiency, security, and accuracy. To provide a
proof of concept, the experimental setup to compare both architectures was
developed. The scenario was comprised of a hospital room with 20 patient
nodes reading patient’s medical data from different sensors. The sensors
are two-lead Electrocardiogram (ECG), Blood Oxygen Saturation (SpO2),
Blood Pressure, Heart Rate, Temperature, Respiration, and Glucose level.
We observed that the power consumption in the ZigBee based network was
less than the IEEE 802.11 WLAN based network for the same experimental
setup. The IEEE 802.11 WLAN based network consumed more power than
ZigBee for lower data-rate. While, with an increase in data rate, power
consumption in ZigBee increased rapidly when compared to IEEE 802.11
WLAN. In the case of a star topology, the network can support up to 18
nodes. Whereas in the case of mesh topology using multi-hopping, each
node can route data of up to 17 other nodes apart from transmitting the
data acquired, thus increasing the scalability to a higher number. At the
present data rate, scalability is not an issue in the case of IEEE 802.11
WLAN and the system can be scaled to a large number of nodes using a
single access-point.
2. Mutual Authentication Scheme for RFID Implant Systems:
The IoT is emerging as an attractive future networking paradigm. The
IoT consists of smart objects and low-power networks, such as Radio Fre-
quency Identification (RFID) networks, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs),
BANs, and actuators. The second contribution of this thesis is a novel
secure mutual authentication scheme for RFID implant systems. An inse-
cure communication channel between a tag and a reader makes the RFID
implant system vulnerable to attacks and endangers the user’s safety and
privacy. The proposed scheme relies on elliptic curve cryptography and the
D-Quark lightweight hash design. The D-Quark lightweight hash design is
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tailored for resource- constrained pervasive devices, cost, and performance.
The proposed scheme consists of three phases: (1) the reader authentica-
tion and verification phase, (2) the tag identification phase, and (3) the tag
verification phase. In the proposed scheme, we suppose the communication
between the reader and the back-end database server is done through a se-
cure channel while communication between the RFID implant tag and the
reader is not secure. We proved that the proposed scheme is secure against
the relevant attacks and also ensures a higher security level than related
work found in the literature. Also, we carried out a computational perfor-
mance analysis of the proposed scheme. The analysis results show that the
elliptic curve-based mutual authentication scheme has less communication
overhead than similar available schemes. It also requires less total memory
compared to existing schemes.
3. Low latency approach for ECG feature-based cryptographic
key generation: The third contribution of this thesis is a novel ECG fea-
ture based cryptographic key generation approach that has a low-latency key
generation time and offers a high-security level [20]. The approach uses Sev-
eral ECG Features (SEF) in addition to the Interpulse Interval (IPI) feature
of an ECG signal. SEF consists of (1) detecting the arrival time of the ECG’s
fiducial points using a Daubechies wavelet transform to compute the ECG’s
main features accordingly; (2) using a dynamic technique to specify the op-
timum number of bits that can be extracted from each main ECG feature;
(3) generating cryptographic keys by exploiting the above-mentioned ECG
features; and (4) consolidating and strengthening the SEF approach with
a cryptographically secure Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG). Fi-
bonacci Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) algorithms are implemented as the PRNG to enhance the
security level of the generated cryptographic keys. We mainly investigated
the property of randomness of the main ECG features, including PR, PP,
QT, and ST intervals. The investigation was done to ensure that they can
be used along with IPI for generating cryptographic keys. The approach
was applied to normal and abnormal ECG signals. The main contributions
of this work are comprised of four main phases. The approach was applied
to the ECG signals of 239 subjects; the signals were comprised of Normal
Sinus Rhythm, Arrhythmia, Atrial Fibrillation, and Myocardial Infarction.
We investigated the security of the generated keys in terms of distinctive-
ness, a test of randomness, temporal variance, as well as using the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) benchmark. We also inves-
tigated the efficiency of the approach in terms of key generation execution
latency.
4. End-to-end security for mobility-enabled healthcare IoT:
The fourth contribution of this thesis is a novel secure end-to-end commu-
nication scheme for the healthcare IoT system, which significantly alleviates
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some burden of medical sensors. The proposed scheme consists of (1) a se-
cure and efficient peer authentication and authorization architecture based
on the certificate based DTLS handshake, (2) secure end-to-end commu-
nication based on session resumption, and (3) robust mobility based on
interconnected smart gateways. In [21], we presented a secure and efficient
authentication and authorization architecture for the healthcare IoT sys-
tem using smart e-health gateways called SEA. In [22], we introduced a
comprehensive end-to-end security scheme for healthcare IoT systems using
the session resumption technique. The architecture relies on the certificate-
based DTLS handshake protocol as it is the primary transport layer security
solution for IoT systems. The proposed end-to-end security scheme enables
end-users and medical sensors to communicate without need to perform
heavy computations. To provide end-to-end security, the DTLS session
resumption technique without the server-side state is used. This form of
session resumption oﬄoads the encrypted session states of DTLS toward
non-resource-constrained end-users for the subsequent communication uti-
lized. The main motivation to employ the DTLS session resumption was to
mitigate the overhead on resource-constrained sensors.
We exploited the concept of Fog Computing in IoT for realizing efficient
and seamless mobility since fog extends the cloud paradigm to the edge of
the network [23, 24, 25]. Mobility support can be ubiquitously provided to
the medical sensors from the fog layer. Thus, no more reconfiguration is
needed in the resource-constrained device layer. To enable seamless transi-
tions of medical sensors, we provided an efficient and robust data handover
mechanism among smart gateways, considering the limitations of sensors.
The mobility scenario comprises of three main phases. The first phase in-
cludes message exchange in the patient’s base MSN. This phase presents
the initial state of the medical sensors, where each sensor is connected to its
base MSN via smart e-health gateway and exchanges the required messages.
The second phase is when a patient moves out of his or her base MSN to
a new medical subnetwork. In this case, the sensor detects if the quality of
the connection with the associated smart gateway is reduced below a pre-
defined threshold. We propose to provide mobility support to the sensors
from the fog layer to alleviate the processing and computation burden of the
sensors. To enable mobility for healthcare IoT systems, neighbor solicitation
and data handover functions are performed in the fog layer between smart
gateways. The third phase is when the patient returns back to his or her
base network. In this case, the medical sensor sends a reassociation request
to inform the smart gateway regarding its new location.
We evaluated our end-to-end security scheme in terms of security and
energy performance analysis. We also proved that the work fulfills the re-
quirements of full end-to-end security and ensures a higher security level
compared to the existing solutions. The analysis of the implementation
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revealed that the handover latency caused by mobility is low. Also, the
handover process does not incur any processing or communication overhead
on the sensors.
5. Performance Analysis of End-to-End Security in Healthcare
IoT: The fifth contribution of this thesis is to analyze the performance of
the state-of-the-art end-to-end security schemes in healthcare IoT systems.
We identified that the essential requirements of robust security solutions for
healthcare IoT systems comprised of (1) a low-latency secure key generation
approach using patients’ ECG signals, (2) secure and efficient authentication
and authorization for healthcare IoT devices based on the certificate-based
DTLS, and (3) robust and secure mobility-enabled end-to-end communi-
cation based on DTLS session resumption. The performance of the state-
of-the-art security solutions, including the end-to-end security scheme, was
tested by developing a prototype healthcare IoT system. We found out
that our solution had the most extensive set of performance features in
comparison to related approaches found in the literature. The performance
evaluation results show that the proposed cryptographic key generation ap-
proach was faster than existing key generation approaches while being more
energy-efficient. In addition, the scheme reduced the communication over-
head and the communication latency between smart gateways and end users.
The scheme is also faster than certificate based and faster that symmetric
key-based DTLS. On the other hand, the Read Only Memory (ROM) and
Random Access Memory (RAM) requirements of our scheme were almost
as low as those in symmetric key-based DTLS.
1.3 Research Methodology
The research methodologies in this thesis are summarized below:
• Design a pervasive health monitoring wireless sensor network archi-
tecture and assess the usability of two wireless communication tech-
nologies in the presented context. For the health monitoring platform,
we used IEEE 802.11 WLAN and ZigBee wireless technologies. The
experimental setup to compare both architectures consisted of a hospi-
tal room with 20 patient nodes reading a patient’s medical data from
various sensors. The employed sensors were a two-lead ECG, SpO2,
Blood Pressure, Heart Rate, Temperature, Respiration, and Glucose
level. There was one sink node for the ZigBee based architecture or an
IEEE 802.11 WLAN access point for the IEEE 802.11 WLAN based
architecture to collect data from all the patient nodes in the respec-
tive setup. The distance between the adjacent patient nodes in the
same column was two meters, and the distance between the adjacent
patient nodes in the different columns was six meters. Every patient
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node transmitted approximately 8.7 kbits of data per second.
• Evaluate the proposed secure elliptic curve-based mutual authentica-
tion scheme for RFID implant systems that are used in healthcare
IoT applications. In this work, we mainly focused on the performance
analysis of implantable tags because RFID readers are known to be ro-
bust devices [26]. As a common cryptographic primitive, we exploited
standardized 163-bit elliptic curve domain parameters recommended
by NIST. The parameters were defined over the binary finite field
F(2163). We utilized the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA) algorithm having the coordinate (x, y). As a reminder, the
elliptic curve domain parameters over F(2m) were specified by the tu-
ple T = (m, f(x), a, b,G, n, h), where m = 163 and the representation
of F(2163) is defined by f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 [27]. As an
environment to measure the computational time for the mentioned
cryptography algorithms, we used an Intel Core2 CPU T5500 1.66
GHz having 1GB RAM. In the proposed scheme, we outlined the stor-
age requirement by considering the tag’s memory, including its public
key and private key. The private key is denoted as the tag’s secret
keys s1 and s2 and the public key is the tag’s public key IDt. In the
proposed scheme, the required memory consists of (IDt,s1,s2).
• Evaluate the security level and performance of the proposed ECG-
based cryptographic key generation approaches in terms of distinc-
tiveness, a test of randomness, temporal variance, and key generation
execution time. We conducted the experiments on both normal and
abnormal ECG signals obtained from the publicly available and widely
used database, that is, Physiobank [28]. PhysioBank is comprised
of databases of multi-parameter neural, cardiopulmonary, and other
biomedical signals from patients and healthy subjects with a variety
of conditions. Subject conditions may include sudden cardiac death,
irregular heartbeat (arrhythmia), congestive heart failure, sleep ap-
nea, and epilepsy. The experiments were carried out on both normal
and abnormal. ECG signals which, were obtained from 239 subjects
studied by the Beth Israel Hospital Laboratory in Boston and the Na-
tional Metrology Institute of Germany (Physikalisch-Technische Bun-
desanstalt (PTB)).
The employed ECG signals included: (1) ECG signals of 18 subjects
(five men, aged 26 to 45; 13 women, aged 20 to 50) with Normal Sinus
Rhythm. The recordings were digitized at 128 samples per second
with a 11-bit resolution over a 10 mV range. (2) ECG signals of 48
subjects with Arrhythmia (22 women aged 23 to 89; 26 men aged
32 to 89) were recorded using two-channel ambulatory ECG system.
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The recordings are digitized at 360 samples per second with an 11-bit
resolution over a 10 mV range per patient. (3) ECG signals of 25
men with Atrial Fibrillation were recorded for 10 hours and contained
two ECG signals, each digitized at 250 samples per second with 12-
bit resolution over a range of 10 mV. (4) ECG signals of 148 subjects
with Myocardial Infarction (89 men aged 17 to 87; 59 women aged 19
to 83). Each signal was digitized at 1000 samples per second, with
16-bit resolution over a range of 16 mV. We captured 100 different
samples of 5-minute long ECG data for each subject and evaluated
the efficiency of the approach. The collected ECG signals were filtered
using a low-pass filter with a 30 Hz threshold frequency. Such a filter
reduces environmental noise and provides a smoother signal for further
analysis. For the experiment, we generated 128-bit cryptographic keys
using the approaches mentioned above. We implemented and analyzed
the key generation approaches utilizing MATLAB [29].
• The system architecture of distributed end-to-end communication sup-
porting mobility was implemented for experimental evaluation. To
Implement the architecture, we set up a platform that consisted of
medical sensors, UT-GATE smart e-health gateways, a remote server,
and end-users. A UT-GATE was constructed from the combination of
a PandaBoard [30] and a Texas Instruments (TI) SmartRF06 board
that was integrated with a CC2538 module [31]. The PandaBoard is
a low-power and low-cost single-board computer development plat-
form based on the TI OMAP4430 System-on-chip (SoC) following
the OMAP architecture and fabricated using 45 nm technology. The
OMAP4430 processor is composed of a Cortex-A9 Microprocessor Unit
(MPU) subsystem including dual-core ARM cores with symmetric
multiprocessing at up to 1.2 GHz each. In the configuration, UT-
GATE used 8GB of external memory and was powered by Ubuntu OS,
which allowed for controlling devices and services, such as local storage
and notification. To investigate the feasibility of the proposed architec-
ture, the Wismote [32] platform, which is a common resource-limited
sensor, was utilized in Contiki’s network simulation tool Cooja [33].
Wismote is equipped with a 16MHz MSP430 micro-controller, an IEEE
802.15.4 radio transceiver, 128KB of ROM, 16KB of RAM, and sup-
ports 20-bit addressing. For the evaluation, we used the open source
tool OpenSSL version 1.0.1.j to create elliptic curve public and pri-
vate keys from the NIST P-256 (prime256v1) and X.509 certificates.
The prevailing form of certificates are X.509 and are employed in the
certificate-based mode of DTLS [34]. The server association to the
end-user was created using Open Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Appli-
cation Programming Interface (API). It provided all necessary func-
12
tions related to end-users, including configuration, certificate, hand-
shake, session state, and cipher suites to support session resumption.
TinyDTLS [35] was used as the code-base of the proposed scheme,
in this work. TinyDTLS is an open-source implementation of DTLS
in symmetric key-based mode. We extended it with support for the
certificate-based DTLS as well as session resumption. For the public-
key functions, we utilized the Relic-toolkit [36] that is an open source
cryptography library tailored for specific security levels with an empha-
sis on efficiency and flexibility. The My Structured Query Language
(SQL) database was set up for static and non-static records. Static
records that are managed by system administrators include white ta-
bles, essential data required by the DTLS handshake, and an end-user
authentication mechanism. Non-static records store up-to-date bio-
signals that are synchronized between the PandaBoard database and
a cloud server database. The cloud server database was processed
using xSQL Lite, which is a third party tool for data synchroniza-
tion. Concerning the cryptographic primitives and to make a fair
comparison, we followed similar cipher suites as employed in the most
recently proposed authentication and authorization architecture for
IP-based IoT [36]. In this regard, we utilized elliptic curve NIST-256
for public-key operations, AES 128 CCM 8 (with an IV of 8 bytes)
for symmetric-key, and SHA256 for hashing operations.
1.4 Thesis Organization
The thesis consists of two main parts. Part I provides a research summary,
while Part II presents the original publications. Part I consists of the fol-
lowing chapters:
• Chapter 1 introduces the motivation for this work and presents the
research questions and a brief overview of the research contributions.
• Chapter 2 provides the background and discusses important topics
related to the works.
• Chapter 3 presents a summary of the main contributions while focusing
on the challenges that they address.
• Chapter 4 provides a description and organization of the original pub-
lications and provides a mapping between the publications and the
RQs.
• Chapter 5 presents conclusions, future research directions, and our
approach to validate the research work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related
Work
In this chapter, we first provide a brief overview of the necessary background
concepts and technologies on which this thesis is based. These include IoT,
healthcare (medical) IoT, and healthcare IoT communication architectures.
Then, we present the most important related works on authentication and
authorization, end-to-end security, mobility management, and cryptography
and constrained devices in healthcare IoT systems.
2.1 Resource-Constrained Network Environments
Resource-constrained networks comprise of constrained devices that are
equipped with confined memory, power resources, and CPU. These devices
can enable physical world objects to become smart via communication,
sensing, and actuating functionalities. Exemplary application scenarios
include collecting sensing information about automated monitoring or
management of factories, natural ecosystems, healthcare monitoring, and
home automation. We briefly present the specifications of such devices and
the networks in which they operate.
Constrained Nodes: Resource-constrained devices can be everyday
”dumb” objects that are capable of network communication and they can
interact with the physical world. The communication with the physical
world is, for instance, feasible via sensors and actuators. This can be done
by attaching a Micro Controller Unit (MCU) to a dumb object or using
tiny sensors or actuators as standalone devices. Constrained devices have
low-power Central Processing Units (CPUs) with few kilobytes of memory
for code and data. In addition, the devices may be battery-powered, which
makes energy efficiency an essential requirement. These devices are mostly
communicated wirelessly, whereas border routers and Gateways (GWs) con-
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nect a WSN to another network, like the Internet, are communicated over
wire [37]. A prevalent link-layer technology for WSNs is IEEE 802.15.4 [38].
The platforms for evaluation and implementation objectives rely on IEEE
802.15.4. There are also other low-power radio technologies available, like
Low-Power IEEE 802.11 [39] and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) [40].
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) proposes a classification of
constrained sensor nodes considered the capabilities of these devices, as well
as memory limitations [33]. This classification comprises of three classes
of constrained sensor devices. Class 0, these devices are highly resource-
constrained and have memory sizes of below 10 (i.e., data memory e.g.,
RAM) to 100 (i.e., program memory e.g., Flash) kbyte. These devices per-
form sensing functionality, but they cannot communicate directly with the
Internet nodes. Class 1, these devices are more powerful and offer memory
resources within the order of 10 (i.e., data memory) to 100 (i.e., program
memory) kbyte. Such devices present a tailored IP stack and can participate
in Internet communication. Compared to class 0 sensor devices, class 1 de-
vices are capable of establishing secure end-to-end communications. Class
2, these devices offer memory resources within the order of 50 (i.e., data
memory) to 250 (i.e., program memory) kbyte. These sensor devices do not
need modified stacks and are tailored for efficiency purposes. This thesis
mainly focuses on class 1 devices, while dividing these devices further into
two sub-classes. (1) The highly resource-constrained class 1 devices cannot
perform Public Key Cryptography (PKC) operations, due to expensive com-
putations and high memory requirements. (2) The less resource-constrained
class 1 devices can at least meet memory requirements for PKC primitives.
Constrained Node Networks: Resource-constrained devices gener-
ally operate in low-power IP networks. This is due to the constrained na-
ture of these embedded devices with limited resources. The limited resources
account for smaller packet queueing possibilities in a resource-constrained
sensor node that originates the ”lossy” nature of Low power and Lossy
Networks (LLNs). In addition, the prices of sensor nodes should be kept
as low as possible due to economies of scales. Using cheap radio chips
in constrained networks has the drawback that they cause high bit error
probabilities as well as high packet loss rates. As a result, links among sen-
sor nodes in these constrained network environments are not reliable and
cause packet losses. Moreover, radio communication in constrained net-
works is more energy consuming than in-node computations. It is basically
due to the mentioned network characteristics and the higher current draw
of the radio chip. Thus, alleviating conveyed bytes via in-node computa-
tion is a common measure to make constrained network applications more
energy efficient [41]. The IEEE 802.15.4 communication standard defines
the Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical layers for these resource-
constrained networks [38]. The data rate in constrained networks is quite
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low, that is, 250 kbit/s for IEEE 802.15.4-based networks. In addition, for
link layer frames in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the Maximum Transmis-
sion Unit (MTU) is 127 bytes. This reduces the probability of collisions
and interference and offers the transmission of full frames in short period
of times. Further significant features offered by the standard are collision
avoidance through integrated security support and Carrier Sense Multiple
Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA).
2.2 IoT: Definition, Applications, and IP Adapta-
tion
The IoT is the network of physical devices embedded with actuators, sen-
sors, electronics, software, and connectivity which, enables these objects to
connect and exchange data. Each device is uniquely noticeable through its
embedded computing system but can interoperate within the current Inter-
net infrastructure. IoT realizes the interconnection of resource-constrained
devices with the Internet. IoT builds an infrastructure that expedites the
realization of future technologies. The vision of the IoT brings the connectiv-
ity of all ”things” to the Internet. One of the provocative forces of rendering
IoT devices IP-enabled is the connectivity prerequisite. IP-enabled IoT net-
works are more effective with respect to maintenance. This is due to the
broad experience of IP networks. The utilization of a popular protocol stack,
for example IP, also offers the interoperability of heterogeneous devices from
various producers.
Shelby et al. [42] presented definition for the IoT: ”As the Internet of
routers, servers and personal computers have been maturing, another In-
ternet revolution has been going on- The Internet of Things. The vision
behind the Internet of Things is that embedded devices, also called smart
objects, are universally becoming IP enabled, and an integral part of the In-
ternet. Examples of embedded devices and systems using IP today range from
mobile phones, personal health devices and home automation, to industrial
automation, smart metering, and environmental monitoring systems. The
scale of the Internet of Things is already estimated to be immense, with the
potential of trillions of devices becoming IP-enabled. The impact of the In-
ternet of Things will be significant, with the promise of better environmental
monitoring, energy savings, smart grids, more efficient factories, logistics,
healthcare, and smart homes.”
Constrained IoT networks are becoming IP-enabled and therefore mov-
ing away from isolated WSNs into interoperable and interconnected net-
works. This necessitates an IP adaptation layer that adapts IP packets in
such a way that they can be routed in constrained networks, for example,
IEEE 802.15.4-based networks. This adaptation layer for IEEE 802.15.4-
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based networks is called IPv6 over Low-power Wireless Personal Area Net-
work (6LoWPAN) [43, 44]. It is located between the Data Link Layer and
the Network Layer. 6LoWPAN is relevant to this thesis, as its performance
affects the connectivity and, therefore, the secure end-to-end communica-
tion. IEEE 802.15.4 offers an MTU of 127 bytes. Subtracting the maximum
MAC protocol overhead from the MTU leaves 102 bytes available for the up-
per layers. If link layer security using AES-Cipher Block Chaining-Message
Authentication Code (CCM)-128 is enabled, then just 81 bytes are left. Af-
ter subtracting the 40 bytes of Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) header,
just 41 bytes are left, from which the transport-layer protocol header needs
to be deducted. In the case of User Datagram Protocol (UDP), 8 bytes that
causes a very short payload length for the actual application-layer data,
while IPv6 needs the support of a maximum MTU of 1280 bytes which
signifies IPv6 packets with maximum MTU length cannot be conveyed over
IEEE 802.15.4-based networks without fragmentation. These overheads and
requirements are coped with the 6LoWPAN adaptation layer.
The 6LoWPAN offers the functionality of mapping between IEEE
802.15.4-based networks and the traditional IP networks through (1)
encapsulation of IP packets into IEEE 802.15.4 frames and vice versa, (2)
fragmentation mechanism because of the adaptation of the packet sizes, (3)
header compression mechanisms to reduce the overhead caused by large
IPv6 headers [45]. The 6LoWPAN header compression systems [46, 47]
reduce the UDP and IPv6 header sizes. The 6LoWPAN encodes the
IPv6 header in the best case in only 2 bytes, which represents the whole
information from the header in a compressed way. Based on the above
definition, the IoT is creating new revenue models, driving a new industrial
revolution, and unprecedented levels of innovation. Today’s challenge is
not only to deliver massive, secure connectivity for the IoT but to ensure
new technology experiences and business opportunities. The ability to
network embedded devices with limited power resources and memory means
that the IoT finds applications in nearly every field. The applications for
internet connected devices are very extensive. From building automation,
smart cities, smart factories, smart energy to smart healthcare, the IoT
touches every facet of our lives. While these applications are limitless,
several key vertical markets are emerging as areas where it is likely to
scale. These foundational IoT markets serve as proving grounds where
companies, research organizations, and individual developers can explore
the possibilities of what the IoT can deliver.
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2.3 IoT in Healthcare Environments
Healthcare represents one of the most remarkable application areas for the
IoT. Medical IoT, sometimes called Healthcare IoT, refers to a rising number
of IoT exploits in the medical industry. These produce a wide range of IoT
devices and applications specifically designed for healthcare environments,
such as sensors and apps for consultation, remote healthcare monitoring, and
delivery. The IoT has the potential to give rise to many medical applications
such as remote health monitoring, chronic diseases, fitness programs, and
elderly care. It also offers life-changing improvements to traditional medical
devices, for example the smart inhaler for people with asthma. Compliance
with medication and treatment at home by healthcare providers is another
important application. Hence, medical devices, sensors, and imaging and
diagnostic devices can be viewed as smart devices or objects constituting a
core part of the healthcare IoT.
IoT-based healthcare services are expected to reduce the costs of health-
care, increase the quality of life, and enrich individuals’ experiences. Ease of
cost-effective interactions through seamless and secure connectivity across
individual patients, clinics, homes, and healthcare organizations is an im-
portant trend. From the perspective of healthcare providers, the IoT has
the potential to reduce device downtime through remote provision. This
can precisely identify optimum times for replenishing supplies for medical
devices for their smooth and continuous operation. Up-to-date healthcare
systems driven by IoT technology are expected to support early diagnoses,
real-time monitoring, chronic diseases, and medical emergencies. Medical
servers, smart gateways, and health databases play crucial roles in creating
health records and delivering on-demand health services to authorized health
caregivers. Personalized healthcare is based on an individual’s exclusive bi-
ological, behavioral, and social characteristics. This leads to premiere out-
comes by making healthcare cost-effective. High quality healthcare service
focuses on home care and early disease detection, rather than the exclusive
clinical one.
IoT and healthcare can bring each other a lot of profit. The IoT enables
handling of the care personalization services as well as preserving a digi-
tal identification for every individual. Various equipment are employed in
healthcare, to communicate, and to make the omnipresent system-of-system.
Thus, an efficient categorization of the IoT based on personalized healthcare
systems includes remote monitoring, and clinical care systems as follows: (1)
Remote Monitoring System: this system allows access to health monitoring
by using wireless solutions that are connected using IoT technology in order
to monitor patients. Various algorithms and IoT devices are employed for
data analysis and then share this information remotely with the medical
professionals through wireless connectivity. (2) Hospitalized Care System:
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this system uses both invasive and non-invasive monitoring IoT systems for
the hospitalized subjects. This clinical care system employs medical sensors
for collecting physiological information that is stored in the cloud for fur-
ther analysis. This improves the quality of healthcrae with lower cost. The
general framework for the IoT includes different architectures for the health
monitoring system. (3) Wearables: there are a lot of devices that patients
can wear every day, for example blood pressure, fitness bands, and heart
rate monitoring cuffs, etc. These gadgets monitor not only the user’s daily
activity but also collect data about taken steps, burnt calories, etc. These
devices change the patients’ lives, especially elderly people as they allow con-
stantly tracking their health conditions. Wearables can send notifications
to the family members about changes in the routine activities or any other
condition variation of the user. (4) Medication Management: to produce
and manage medicines, a lot of money are spent. In this regard, IoT devices
can provide an opportunity to follow all safety standards of the pharmaceu-
tical market. One of the best examples is the smart vaccine fridge. It is able
to prevent vaccines from spoiling and monitor their conditions 24/7.
The common features of the IoT-based health monitoring system include
health data that are collected from sensors using MSNs, user displays and
interfaces, and network connectivity to access infrastructure services. In
such a system, patient health-related information is recorded by body-worn
or implanted sensors, with which the patient is equipped for personal mon-
itoring of multiple parameters. This data can also be supplemented with
context information such as, date, time, location, and temperature. This
feature enables to identify unusual patterns and make more precise infer-
ences about the situation. Followings are some advantages of Healthcare
IoT. (1) Lower Expenses: there are many gadgets that can track health
condition which enable medical employees to monitor patients’ health in
real-time mode. People do not need to visit doctors regularly which leads to
fewer expenses. Also, people can stay at home, if they are not critically ill
and doctors will see every change using telemedicine. (2) Better Treatment
Results: These technologies as Fog/Cloud computing and medical devices
connectivity enable doctors to see real-time data about patients using the
healthcare IoT monitoring system. Therefore, doctors are able to analyze
the symptoms faster and give proper treatment which leads to better care
results. (3) Better disease control: receiving new data every day, doctors
are able to find out disease earlier and start a proper treatment faster. (4)
Maintenance of Medical Devices: medical devices are high-priced and any
medical equipment requires a suitable maintenance to function normally.
IoT plays a key role here as this technology can calculate all possible is-
sues with any device. (5) Fewer Mistakes: These automated processes as
data segmentation, data receiving, and data-driven decisions can decrease
diagnosis errors.
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The system architecture includes the following components:
1. MSNs: Enabled by the ubiquitous identification, sensing, and com-
munication capacity, biomedical, and context signals are captured from the
body or room which is used for treatment and diagnosis of medical states.
The signal is then transmitted to the gateway via wireless or wired communi-
cation protocols such as Serial, Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), Bluetooth
Low Energy, IEEE 802.11 WLAN, or IEEE 802.15.4.
2. Gateway: The gateway supports different communication protocols,
acts as a touching point between the MSN and the local switch/Internet.
It receives data from different sub-networks, performs protocol conversion,
and provides other higher level services such as data aggregation, filtering,
and dimensionality reduction [4].
3. Back-End System: The back-end of the system consists of the re-
maining components, a local switch (in in-hospital domains), a cloud com-
puting platform that includes broadcasting, data warehouse and big data
analytic servers, and hospital local Database (DB) that periodically per-
forms data synchronization with the remote healthcare DB server at the
cloud to continuously synchronize patients’ health data over time. In the
cloud computing platform accessibility to patient-related health data is clas-
sified as public data such as, a patient’s Identity Document (ID) or blood
type, and private, data such as Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), based on the
relevance.
4. Web Clients: These clients are considered the graphical user in-
terface for final visualization and apprehension. The collected health and
context information represents a vital source of big data for the statistical
and epidemiological medical research such as, detecting approaching dis-
eases. The evolution in medical devices, electronics, and computer science
has led to significant technological progress in the form of IoT realization.
Nowadays, multiple sensor nodes can be connected to the Internet from
in-home monitoring devices to hospital-based imaging. Thus, IoT-based
healthcare systems offer enhanced care by systematizing the processes to
securely facilitate the collaboration of the transferred information.
Intelligent systems provide physicians with efficient and easy access to
health information to improve the patient experience. The followings are
a few examples of applications of the IoT for healthcare. (1) Heart Rate
Monitoring : In such a system, the biometrics of each subject are inde-
pendently monitored using specific threshold settings. Such a monitoring
system records the ECG Heart rate variability and reliability, the activity
level of the heart, and respiration rate. In addition, supplementary devices
used in conjunction can also monitor other vital signs, such as blood pres-
sure. Generally, the heart rate monitoring system reports the rhythm to
realize the cardiac role of impenetrable symptoms. (2) Elderly Monitoring :
In such a system, IoT-based elderly monitoring is employed as a person-
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alized home care solution for tracking and locating individuals’ activities.
Emergency calls can be managed in an actual cost system for wide area
communication interface. This system comprises of wearable sensors that
can be programmed in order to send reports to healthcare professionals.
2.4 Healthcare IoT Communication Architecture
For the discussion of healthcare IoT communication architecture, we rec-
ognize five main research directions: (1) pervasive health monitoring, (2)
authentication and authorization of healthcare IoT components, (3) cryp-
tographic keys and constrained IoT medical devices, (4) secure end-to-end
communication of healthcare IoT systems, and (5) mobility management.
The state-of-the-art related approaches for healthcare IoT communication
architecture are discussed in the following section.
2.4.1 Pervasive Health Monitoring Based on the IoT
The IoT offers enormous opportunities to revolutionize healthcare in the
near future. It can play a vital role in a wide range of healthcare devices
that, for example, enable remote vital sign monitoring in hospitals and more
importantly, at home. Indeed, remote monitoring offers tremendous possi-
bilities to decrease the costs of healthcare, and, at the same time, to increase
healthcare quality by identifying and preventing diseases. In many cases,
health care is becoming increasingly costly, as patients are required to stay
in the hospital for the entire duration of their treatments due to the lack of
devices with the capability of remotely providing patients’ health informa-
tion to authorized health professionals. Using the IoT, gathering patient’s
health information and transferring it in real time to healthcare profession-
als will not only reduce the cost of healthcare services but also enable the
treatment of health issues before they become critical. It is predicted that
the number of devices with Internet capability will be around 50 billion by
2020 [48].
There have been many efforts in the field of IoT based remote patient
monitoring systems. Piccini et al. [49] discuss wireless systems based on
Bluetooth for acquiring bio-medical signals, such as ECG, Electromyography
(EMG), Electroencephalography (EEG) and Electrooculography (EOG).
The architecture consists of two operational units: one to acquire single-
lead ECG signal and the other a Digital Signal Processing (DSP) system to
clean the acquired signal from the first unit. More research is required for
integrating the associated sensors with a hardware board and miniaturizing
the system to make it wearable. She et al. [50] presented a wireless sensor
network architecture based on the ZigBee and 3G networks for healthcare
applications for home or hospital. The system reads signals, including ECG,
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EMG, EEG and EOG, heart rate, breathing, and blood pressure; processes
it; and sends it to a remote server or displays it on an LCD screen. The
system implements priority scheduling and data compression, which reduces
the transmission delays of critical signals and saves bandwidth and power.
Lo et al. [51] explained the BSN based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard which
not only monitors and processes medical data such as ECG and SpO2 but
also implements context-aware sensing with the help of context sensors (for
example, temperature, accelerometer, and humidity). The BSN is power ef-
ficient requiring only 0.01 mA in active mode and 1.3 mA for computations
such as Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). A flash BSN card displays the col-
lected and processed data for Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). A PDA
also works as an access point to send the processed data to a central server.
Istepanian et al. [52] proposed the m-IoT (Internet of M-Health Things), an
IP based wireless sensor network architecture based on 6LoWPAN, which
is used to measure medical data, such as the glucose level in blood and
blood pressure. A central access point collects data from the sensor nodes
and sends to IP based medical server, from where it can be accessed and
analyzed. Our motivation is to compare the implementation of health mon-
itoring wireless sensor network architectures based on two popular wireless
technologies, which are IEEE 802.11 WLAN and ZigBee, and analyze the
suitability of these technologies for different medical applications.
2.4.2 Healthcare IoT Authentication and Authorization Ap-
proaches
This section deals with related research approaches for authentication and
authorization of peers to be used for secure end-to-end communication in
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), the healthcare IoT. The authentication
and authorization of peers are a critical requirement for a secure end-to-
end communication as eavesdropping on sensitive medical data or malicious
triggering of specific tasks can be prevented. We identify four main research
directions: (1) Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based approaches, (2)
centralized approaches, (3) delegation-based approaches, and (4) alternative
delegation solutions that require special purpose hardware modules. In the
following, we discuss important works of each of these directions in more
detail.
1. Elliptic Curve-based Authentication and Authorization Ap-
proaches: In 2006, Tuyls et al. [53] proposed an ECC-based RFID iden-
tification scheme using the Schnorr identification protocol. They claimed
that their scheme was resistant against tag counterfeiting. However, in 2008
Lee et al. [54] presented that this scheme suffered from a location tracking
attack, as well as forward security. In such a scheme when an adversary can
compute the public key X(= −t.P ) of a tag, it can benefit from X in order
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to get access to other information related to the tag. Lack of scalability is
another problem of Tuyls et al.’s scheme because, at each time a tag needs to
be identified, the reader should fetch the tag’s public key from the database
server to verify it. This means that the reader requires to perform a linear
search to identify each tag. By doing so, a considerable computational cost
will be imposed on the whole system.
In 2007, Batina et al. [55] proposed an ECC-based RFID identifica-
tion scheme based on Okamoto’s authentication algorithm. Although they
claimed that their scheme was resisant against active attacks, Lee et al. [56]
asserted in 2008 that this scheme suffers from tracking as well as a for-
ward secrecy problem. In 2010, Lee et al. [54], proposed an ECC-based
RFID authentication scheme in order to address the existing tracking prob-
lems [53, 55]. Nevertheless, in the mentioned schemes, the authors merely
considered tag to reader identification, excluding the reader to tag authen-
tication [26]. This causes tags to reply to any malicious query being sent
by an adversary. The major reason is that tags are not capable of con-
firming to whom they are talking to. In 2011, Zhang et al. [57] proposed
an ECC-based randomized key scheme in order to improve the schemes by
Tuyls et al. and Lee et al. Although their scheme is secure against relevant
attacks concerning the RFID systems, it still not capable of performing mu-
tual authentication. In 2013, Liao et al. [26] proposed a secure ECC-based
authentication scheme integrated with the ID-verifier transfer protocol. Sim-
ilar to Zhang et al.’s work, Lial et al.’s scheme achieved the required security
level of RFID systems. However, their tag identification scheme lacked per-
formance efficiency in terms of the tag’s computation time and its memory
requirement.
2. Centralized Authentication and Authorization Approaches:
Symmetric key-based authentication and authorization approaches are con-
sidered suitable and efficient solutions for constrained networks. However,
a common issue hereby is the scalability of these approaches. A constrained
node must be pre-configured with shared keys of all entities before deploy-
ment. To counter this scalability issue, several approaches have been in-
troduced. A centralized server or a certificate authority serves as the key
distributor and constrained nodes are pre-configured with a shared key for
secure communication. This requires trusting the server or the certificate
authority, which is applicable for small domains. In the intra-domain com-
munication however, it is challenging to establish trust between the servers
of different domains. This requires further non-trivial infrastructure, for ex-
ample, by means of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), between the servers.
Perrig et al. presented SPINS [58], a centralized architecture for secur-
ing unicast and multicast communication in constrained networks. SPINS
is comprised of two security protocols, the Micro Timed Efficient Stream
Loss-tolerant Authentication (µTESLA) and the Secure Network Encryp-
24
tion Protocol (SNEP). The µTESLA provides authenticated broadcast for
constrained environments, whereas SNEP provides data confidentiality and
with integrity of the unicast communication. In the bootstrapping phase,
each constrained device acquires a master secret from the domain manager
that could be the sink node or the Gateway (GW). Encryption keys between
peers are derived from this master secret using the Pseudorandom Function
(PRF). The µTESLA relies on the concept of delayed key disclosure, where
the key is employed to authenticate the message mi along with the message
mi+1. The receiver can verify the accuracy of each key by performing a
hash function. The µTESLA needs time-synchronization in the constrained
network because keys are bound to time. Garcia-Morchon et. al. [59] pre-
sented a polynomial-based approach as an alternative to public key-based
primitives in DTLS to provide secure authentication and authorization in
the IoT.
Polynomial-based schemes aim at simplifying the key agreement pro-
cess in sensor networks. The principal idea in the polynomial scheme is
to allocate every node n a polynomial share F (n, y) derived from a secret
symmetric bi-variate polynomial F (x, y). This enables any possible pair of
nodes with a polynomial share to establish a common secret [60]. The pro-
cedure of using polynomial schemes in the DTLS handshake is presented
in the following. While assuming every sensor node is pre-configured with
a Pre-shared Key (PSK), the sensor nodes authenticate themselves to the
domain manager upon joining a network. During this phase, sensor nodes
retrieve their polynomial share from the bi-variate polynomial. Afterward,
any two nodes N1 and N2 can perform an extended version of the DTLS
handshake in the PSK mode, during which they exchange their identifiers
ID1 and ID2 in the ClientHello and ServerHello messages. This approach
offers an alternative to PKC-based modes in DTLS. In this approach, the
domain manager is a central entity that distributes polynomial shares in a
domain. To allow secure communication across two domains, supporting
inter-domain communication needs non-trivial coordination among two ad-
ministrative domains. In contrast, we focus on enabling public key-based
authentication and authorization for the healthcare IoT systems which does
not need a central entity for the authentication and authorization process
and instead, relies on public keys.
3. Delegation-based Authentication and Authorization Ap-
proaches: Delegation-based authentication and authorization approaches
introduce solutions to delegate computationally expensive tasks, such as
public key-based operations involved in session establishments, to more pow-
erful devices. One such delegation-based approach is the Server-based Cer-
tificate Validation Protocol (SCVP) [61]. SCVP enables a client to delegate
the complex task of certificate path construction or certificate validation to
a trusted server. By oﬄoading certificate validation, clients do not need to
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perform specific tasks for certificate validation and can consequently have a
simplified logic. Nevertheless, this requires that the SCVP server be as much
trusted as the reliable local software. In the case of untrusted SCVP servers,
the client can delegate less critical tasks, for instance, fetching revocation
information. SCVP needs integrity protection of the queries and responses
through a digital signature or MAC. The key utilized to generate the MAC
is derived from a key agreement protocol, such as Diffie-Hellman (DH). This
means that clients are still required to perform expensive public key-based
operations. In addition, this approach increases the per-handshake commu-
nication overhead within constrained networks, specifically considering the
length of certificates which causes the highest transmission overhead during
a handshake.
Another delegation approach with regards to the IoT is presented by
Bonetto et. al. [62]. The authors proposed an approach to delegate the
public key-based operations to a more powerful device, such as the GW.
They explain the process for the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) session es-
tablishment, where the GW intercepts session establishment and pretends
to be the end-point. After the calculation of the session key, this key is
handed over to the constrained sensor node. Afterward, both peers can di-
rectly communicate and protect their communication using the session key.
This approach necessitates a strong trust in the GW. Then, the GW, as
an on-path entity in possession of the session key, has access to the com-
munication in plaintext. Hence, GW can modify messages unnoticed. This,
however, breaks the end-to-end security. An alternative delegation-based ar-
chitecture is Tiny 3 Transport Layer Security (TLS) that requires a strong
trust level between the GW and the constrained device [63]. Tiny 3-TLS
oﬄoads expensive public key-based operations to the GW. The constrained
device trusts the GW and the non-constrained device authenticates itself to
the GW and hence, the GW trusts the non-constrained device.
As a result, Tiny 3-TLS assumes that by using a transitive trust, the
constrained device could trust the non-constrained device. Tiny 3-TLS dis-
tinguishes between fully and partially trusted GWs. In the fully trusted
scenario, the non-constrained client performs a server-side certificate-based
authentication and authorization with the GW. After a successful hand-
shake, the GW conveys the session keys to the constrained device. The
partially trusted GW performs all PKI-based tasks, except the key agree-
ment. For the key agreement task, the constrained device offers its Elliptic
Curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) public key to the GW. Hence, both end-points
derive a shared key that remains unknown to the GW. Similar to the pre-
vious approach, in Tiny 3-TLS, a strong trust-level needs to exist between
the constrained device and the GW. This is because a malicious GW can
launch a Man-In-the-Middle (MITM) attack by replacing the ECDH public
keys.
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Sizzle [64] implements an SSL-secured HTTP web server for constrained
devices with support for ECC-based authentication and authorization.
Compared to the previous delegation-based architectures, this approach
delegates only the task of adapting the underlying transport layer protocol.
This is performed by terminating the incoming TCP connection at the GW
and sending the payload through a UDP-based reliable protocol to the
constrained device. Sizzle only performs certificate-based authentication
and authorization towards non-resource constrained clients and does not
perform certificate handling for constrained devices. While the authors give
remarkable insights into certificate transmission in constrained networks,
they do not consider the impact of the DH key agreement and the certificate
verification in constrained networks. In addition, with DTLS a UPD-based
variant of SSL-TLS has been introduced, therefore, the need for a UDP-
TCP proxy has become obsolete [65]. Hummen et al. [33] presented an
implementation of a delegation architecture based on an off-path delegation
server. Their proposed delegation-based architecture relied on a centralized
delegation server. However, their proposed architecture lacks scalability
and reliability. More precisely, their architecture cannot be extended
to be employed for multi-domain infrastructures, such as large in-home
or hospital domains. Also, their proposed architecture suffers from a
considerable network transmission overhead resulting in a long transmission
latency. Moreover, if an adversary performs a DoS attack or compromises
the delegation server, a large quantity of stored security context of a
constrained domain can be retrieved. More precisely, in multi-domain
networks, a DoS attack can disrupt all the available constrained medical
domains as the functionality of the IoT-based healthcare still depends on
the centralized delegation server.
4. Hardware-based Authentication and Authorization Ap-
proaches: A class of security solutions relies on hardware security modules,
such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM). A TPM is tamper-proof hardware
that offers support for cryptographic computations, more specifically for
public key-based cryptographic primitives. TPM have the possibility to
hold private keys, such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) private keys in a
protected memory area. Moreover, the cryptographic accelerator of TPMs
can compute the cryptographic computations with higher performance.
TPMs are finding their ways into commodity hardware, including desktops
and notebooks. This allows for a better performing disk encryption, remote
attestation of various software modules, and key protection [66]. Hence,
researchers in the area of WSNs have currently studying the feasibility and
applicability of TPMs on constrained devices [67]. Kothmayr et al. [68]
presented a TPM-enabled architecture with support for RSA-based cipher
suites of DTLS. They implemented their approach in Tiny Operation Sys-
tem (OS) with a memory footprint of approximately 63 kbyte of ROM and
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18 kbyte of RAM. The evaluation of the mutual DTLS handshake with 2048-
bit RSA keys and the cipher suit TLS RSA with AES 128 CBC SHA
provides suitable handshake times of a few seconds. The use of this
special purpose hardware may be reasonable in some sensitive application
scenarios. Nevertheless, the IoT vision comprises of highly resource-
constrained devices, where specific purpose hardware modules including
the TPM, are neither feasible nor economical. In addition, RSA keys and
RSA-based certificates impose a high transmission overhead. This is crucial
in resource-constrained environments due to expensive radio communication
and lossy links with respects to energy consumption, while ECC offers a
similar security level with considerably smaller footprint. Thus, ECC is
recommended and preferred for constrained environments. One of the main
purposes of this thesis is to allow highly resource-constrained IoT devices
that have no special purpose hardware, to participate in secure end-to-end
communication.
2.4.3 Cryptographic Keys and Constrained Health IoT De-
vices
One of the main objectives of secure communication in the healthcare IoT
system is to generate robust cryptographic keys for medical sensors. This
enables medical sensors to encrypt and decrypt messages that need to be
conveyed between the sensors and health caregivers. This section is orga-
nized as follows. First, an overview of biometric-based cryptographic keys
in healthcare IoT systems is presented. Then, we present the most well-
known approaches proposed regarding the generation of cryptographic keys
for constrained IoT devices.
Biometrics are generally regarded as the only solution that is lightweight,
requires low resources, and indeed can identify authorized subjects in BANs
[16, 17, 18, 19]. Key generation techniques relying on humans’ biometric
systems are best suited for resource-constrained medical sensors as those
solutions are lightweight and require low resources [19], and medical sensors
rely on cryptography to secure their communications [17]. The proper ap-
plication of cryptography requires the use of secure keys and key generation
methods. Key generation approaches that are proposed for generic wireless
sensors are not directly applicable to tiny sensors used in BANs as they
are highly resource-constrained and demand a higher security level [69].
Key generation in sensor networks generally requires some form of pre-
deployment. Nevertheless, given the constrained nature of medical sensors
used in BSNs, conventional key generation approaches may potentially in-
volve reasonable computations as well as latency during network or any
subsequent adjustments, due to their need for pre-deployment.
In [70,71,72,73,74], fuzzy vault-based bio-cryptographic key generation
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protocols are proposed for BANs. In each of these protocols, frequency do-
main characteristics of PPG and ECG signals are used as the physiological
parameters. Bao et al. [75] presented an entity authentication protocol and
a fuzzy commitment-based key distribution protocol, in which the IPI val-
ues generated from the Photoplethysmogram (PPG) signals are employed
as the physiological parameters. In their work, adaptive segmentation was
used to divide the value range of the IPI into segments. The main drawback
of the above-mentioned approaches is that they are not applicable enough to
be used for generating cryptographic keys for medical sensors. This is due
to the required heavy-weight computations. Poon et al. [17] and Zhang et
al. [18] further evaluated the performance of Bao et al.’s [75] approach using
both PPG and ECG signals with respect to their error rates. In another
study by Bao et al. [76], seperate solution is proposed for which physiologi-
cal parameter generation is utilized in a bio-cryptographic security protocol.
The authors claimed that the physiological parameters which are generated
utilizing the individual and multi-level IPI sequences have comparable dis-
tinctiveness and randomness. Nevertheless, the latency of these approaches
is very high as 256 IPIs are required in order to generate a 64-bit crypto-
graphic key. In a cryptographic security infrastructure designed for BANs,
for the cryptographic keys to be generated from the captured bio-signals in
real-time, the delay of the key generation process should be kept as mini-
mum as possible. Altop et al. [69] and Xu at al. [77] proposed key generation
approaches in which the IPI values generated from ECG signals are utilized.
In both of these works, the authors employed Gray encoding to map each
IPI value to a 4-bit binary number using a uniform quantization method.
According to the authors, the generated physiological parameters pass the
randomness measurement tests presented by the NIST test benchmark [78].
They also stated that the generated physiological parameters pass both tem-
poral variance and distinctiveness tests. However, in [69] and [77], no related
numerical information for experimental performance evaluation in terms of
key generation execution time is provided. In addition, compared to the
approach in this study, these works have failed to provide as high a secu-
rity level in terms of distinctiveness, the test of randomness, and temporal
variance. Zhang et al. [18], Poon et al. [17] and Bao et al. [76] evaluated
the performance of the physiological parameter generation, utilizing both
PPG and ECG signals. The authors developed physiological parameter
generation techniques that can be utilized in bio-cryptographic key gener-
ation approaches. In their work, these authors claimed that physiological
parameters generated utilizing IPI sequences offer promising features to be
exploited for cryptographic key generation approaches.
Zheng et al. [79] proposed a time-domain physiological parameter gen-
eration method. They used the time distances between the R peaks as the
”Reference Points” and other peak values of an ECG signal from one heart-
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beat cycle. The authors claimed that their solution was faster than the
conventional IPI-based methods and it ensures the property of randomness.
However, their proposed approach lacks reliability as it was only applicable
to ECG records collected from subjects with normal ECG rhythm or sub-
jects with no severe cardiovascular diseases. In healthcare systems, subjects
often suffer from Cardiovascular Diseases (CVDs) such as Cardiac Arrhyth-
mia, Poor R-wave Progression, Myocardial infarction and Anterior Wall MI
in which the R peaks are not easily detectable, or might be even missing
within one heartbeat cycle. Choosing the R peak as the reference for cal-
culation of all the other features is not always reliable enough to be used
for the binary sequence generation. In addition, as the main focus of the
approach present in [79] is on rapid key generation, distinctiveness and tem-
poral variance properties were not analyzed and reported in their approach.
In this context, we claim that a robust ECG-based cryptographic key gener-
ation approach needs to cover both healthy and unhealthy human subjects.
This necessitates ECG features selection to becoming independent of any
reference point.
2.4.4 End-to-End Communication of Healthcare IoT Sys-
tems
Over the past few years, researchers have conducted several studies toward
designing secure and efficient end-to-end communication for IoT systems.
However, many of the existing studies proposing the secure end-to-end com-
munication system are still based on centralized architecture and do not
provide comprehensive end-to-end security. Instead, their solutions are con-
sidered semi end-to-end security. In this section, we first provide a broad
overview of secure end-to-end communication in IoT systems. We then dis-
cuss the well-known approaches proposed for end-to-end security and the
challenges associated with each of them. Secure end-to-end communication
between constrained devices and Internet hosts with the goal of providing
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity is an important requirement of a
secure IoT. Existing end-to-end communication approaches are focused on
PSKs on both ends, ,that is, client and server. In addition, certificate-based
approaches is generally considered infeasible for constrained IoT devices.
DTLS is the demanded and de facto favorable security solution to perform
secure end-to-end communication [80]. To this end, this thesis focuses on
DTLS as the main transport layer security to provide secure end-to-end
communication.
Implementation is needed to quantify overheads and the required re-
sources for end-to-end communication approaches using DTLS. This imple-
mentation must be as lightweight as possible, to fit the available resources
of constrained IoT devices. When developing such an implementation, over-
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heads can be detected and efficient solutions to reduce them can be de-
signed. As described in the previous section, highly constrained devices
cannot provide enough resources to deploy expensive public key-based op-
erations; hence they require a delegation architecture. A delegation-based
architecture allows constrained IoT devices that cannot cope with expen-
sive public key-based operations to efficiently perform secure end-to-end
communication. This allows one to take advantage of public key-based op-
erations, such as key agreement without prior knowledge as well as key
revocation. More importantly, authentication and authorization of IoT com-
ponents based on certificates can be performed in such a way that the heavy
public key-based operations are delegated to a more powerful off-path en-
tity that fulfills the minimum required level of trust. CodeBlue is one of the
most popular healthcare research projects developed at the Harvard sensor
network Lab [81]. In this approach, several medical sensors are placed on a
patient’s body. The authors of CodeBlue admit the necessity of end-to-end
security for IoT-based medical applications. However, the security aspects
of CodeBlue are still left as the future work.
Lorincz et al. [82] suggest that elliptic curve cryptography [27] and Tiny-
Sec [83] are efficient solutions to be used for key generation and symmet-
ric encryption in the CodeBlue project, respectively. Kambourakis et al.
discuss some attack models and security threats concerning the CodeBlue
project: denial-of-service attack, snooping attack, grey-hole attack, Sybil
attack, and masquerading attacks [84]. Johns Hopkins University developed
an in-hospital patient monitoring system called MEDiSN [85]. It consists of
multiple physiological motes that are battery powered and equipped with
medical sensors in order to collect patients’ medical and physiological health
information. The MEDiSN architecture focuses on reliable communication,
routing, data rate, and Quality of Service (QoS) [85]. In their proposed
architecture, the authors of MEDiSN acknowledged the necessity of having
encryption for the physiological monitors. However, they did not mention
which cryptosystems have been used for data confidentiality and integrity.
Although the authors claim that security is provided by the MEDiSN ar-
chitecture, their study did not reveal much information regarding security
implementation.
An architecture called Sensor Network for Assessment of Patients
(SNAP) [13] has been proposed to address the security challenges concern-
ing the wireless health monitoring systems. However, the main problem of
the aforementioned architecture is that it does not authenticate users when
providing medical data. Furthermore, the data collected from medical sen-
sors are conveyed to a controller in a plaintext format. Hence, the medical
data of the patients can be modified or intercepted by a malicious user.
In [86], the researchers proposed a lightweight identity-based cryptography
solution called IBE-Lite. The basic idea of IBE-Lite is to balance security
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and privacy with availability. Nevertheless, security and privacy issues, as
well as efficiency problems, are recognized in IBE-Lite. First, in their work,
Tan et al. do not consider sensor to the base station and end-user data
authentication. Therefore, falsified medical information can be introduced
or treated as authentic due to the lack of authentication schemes. Second,
IBE-Lite cannot resist replication attacks. Consequently, an adversary can
insert malicious medical sensors into the network.
To establish interoperable network security between end-peers from in-
dependent network domains, researchers have recently proposed variants of
conventional end-to-end security protocols, among which DTLS is one of the
most relevant protocols [80]. In this regard, Hummen et al. [33] presented an
implementation of a delegation architecture based on an off-path delegation
server. Their proposed delegation-based architecture relies on a centralized
delegation server. Due to this, their proposed architecture lacks scalabil-
ity and reliability. More precisely, their architecture cannot be extended
to be employed for multi-domain infrastructures, such as large in-home or
hospital domains. Also, their proposed architecture suffers from a consider-
able network transmission overhead resulting in a long transmission latency.
Moreover, if an adversary performs a DoS attack or compromises the dele-
gation server, a large quantity of the stored security context of a constrained
domain can be retrieved.
Hummen et al. [33], Granjal et al. [87], and Kang et al. [88] presented
the state-of-the-art end-to-end security approaches proposed for IoT. How-
ever, we distinguish the following major advantages offered by our scheme
compared to their approaches. We believe that the approaches presented
by Granjal et al. [87] and Kang et al. [88] do not provide comprehensive
end-to-end security. Rather, they can be considered semi end-to-end secu-
rity. The main reason is that in these works, the 6LoWPAN Border Router
(6LBR) acts as an intermediary node located between the sensor and the
end-user. Every time these two end-points try to communicate with each
other, all the secret information related to the communication needs to pass
through the 6LBR. However, the smart gateway utilized in our work is only
used during the initialization phase and then, both end-points directly com-
municate with each other through a channel secured by the DTLS session
resumption. Therefore, end-to-end security is guaranteed in our work.
2.4.5 Healthcare IoT Mobility Management
Mobility support is one of the most important issues in healthcare IoT sys-
tems. In such systems, improving patients’ quality of life is essential.It is
essential to provide patients with the possibility of walking around the hos-
pital wards with the knowledge that the monitoring of their health condition
is not interrupted. Researchers have completed several studies over the past
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few years to design efficient mobility management approaches. In this sec-
tion, we first give a broad overview of mobility management in healthcare
IoT systems. Then, we present the most important related works on for
mobility management. Using a portable patient monitoring system offers
a high quality of medical service by providing patients with a freedom of
movement. Mobility enables patients to go for a walk around the medical
domains while they are monitored. In addition, mobility allows the patients
to move from their base MSN to other rooms for medical tests without los-
ing the continuous monitoring. This scenario can also be extended to other
environments, such as a nursing house or in-home patient monitoring. The
main goal of the continuous monitoring in the healthcare IoT systems is
to achieve a knowledge base from the patient and this enables the remote
server and the Knowledge Base System (KBS) to detect symptoms, predict,
and manage the illnesses.
Mobility can be categorized into two main topics denoted as macro-
mobility and micro-mobility. The movement of medical sensors between
various medical network domains distinguishes the macro-mobility. Micro-
mobility assumes that medical sensors move between different MSNs within
the same domain. To achieve a continuous monitoring of patients consid-
ering the mobility support, it is essential to develop self-configuration or
handover mechanisms that are capable of handling secure and efficient data
transfers among different MSNs. A data handover mechanism is defined as
the process of changing or updating the registration of a mobile sensor from
its associated base MSN to the visited MSN, for example, when moving
across the hospital’s wards. Data handover solutions should enable ubiquity
when they need to work autonomously without human intervention. The
handover mechanism should also offer medical sensors continuous connec-
tivity if several gateways existin the hospital or nursing environments.
Valenzuela et al. proposed a solution to support mobility for in-home
health monitoring systems using wearable sensors [89]. This approach uti-
lizes a coordinator sensor attached to the patients’ bodies that is responsible
for all communications between wearable sensors and network Access Points
(APs). Jara et al. proposed a solution to support the mobility of sensors
employed to monitor patients in hospital environments [90,91,92]. This ap-
proach supports micro-mobility exploiting elements such as sink nodes and
gateways in their proposed architecture. This proposal supposes that each
mobile node has a base network and can move into other networks. Fotouhi
et al. [93] presented a handover approach for mobility support in WSN that
can be easily employed for BSN [94, 95]. In their work, different parame-
ters are utilized to specify the time for handover, but the most important
ones are the Received Signal Strength (RSS) and the sensor velocity. If the
RSS connection with the current AP is under the pre-defined threshold, the
handover mechanism begins. To acknowledge the received signal strength
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between the sensor and the access point, the sensor periodically sends probe
queries. To verify the quality of the link, as well as to decide on the han-
dover mechanism, this solution requires a continuous exchange of probe
or acknowledge messages between the sensor and the corresponding access
point. However, this continuous message exchange weakens the network in
terms of transmission overhead, memory, and energy consumption.
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Chapter 3
Contributions of the Thesis
In healthcare IoT systems, improving patients’ quality of life is important
to mitigate the negative effects of being hospitalized. It is crucial to provide
patients with the possibility of walking around the medical environments
with the knowledge that the monitoring of their health condition is not in-
terrupted [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Patients do not need to be worried about moving
around, as the system can enable mobility while continuously monitoring
their vital signs. In IoT-based healthcare applications, security and privacy
are among major areas of concern, as most devices and their communica-
tions are wireless in nature [9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. An IP-enabled sensor in a
healthcare IoT, can transmit patients’ medical data to remote healthcare
service. However, in such scenarios, the conveyed medical data may be
routed through an untrusted network infrastructure, which is the Internet.
Misuse or privacy concerns may restrict people utilizing IoT-based health-
care applications. In this regard, the authentication and authorization of
healthcare IoT components, robust cryptographic key generation, and se-
cure end-to-end communication are critical requirements as eavesdropping
on sensitive medical data or malicious triggering of specific tasks can be
prevented [33]. Medical sensor nodes rely on cryptographic keys to secure
their communications.
Due to the constrained nature of these sensors, establishing or main-
taining the security of exchanged medical data is not a trivial task. There
are significant cryptographic key generation solutions for generic wireless
sensors that are not directly applicable to medical sensors. This is because
medical sensors are highly resource-constrained and demand a higher secu-
rity level. Key generation solutions relying on humans’ biometric systems
are best suited for tiny medical sensors as those solutions are lightweight
and require a low resource [19]. By developing a robust and efficient key
generation using biometric systems, the security of medical sensors can be
offered in a plug-n-play manner where neither a network establishment nor a
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key pre-distribution mechanism is required. In this thesis, we investigate the
challenge of designing, implementing, and evaluating a scalable architecture
for secure end-to-end communication in healthcare IoT systems. We did this
to identify the advantages and shortcomings of the designed architecture and
to find application domains in which this architecture can be properly uti-
lized. For the presented healthcare IoT architecture, we propose a novel
secure and efficient authentication and authorization approach, as well as
a session resumption-based end-to-end communication scheme [21,22]. Our
proposed architecture exploits the smart gateways’ advantageous property
of being non-resource constrained for outsourcing the heavy-weight process-
ing burdens from tiny medical sensors. In [21], the main focus was on the
analysis and development of authentication and authorization between peers
rather than end-to-end security. In [22], we proposed a session resumption-
based end-to-end security scheme for healthcare IoT systems to securely and
efficiently manage the communication between medical sensors and remote
healthcare centers/caregivers. To provide end-to-end security, the session
resumption technique without a server-side state is utilized. To improve
the mobility of the proposed architecture, we carried out a further study
in which we developed an end-to-end security scheme for mobility enabled
healthcare IoT [96].
We present two different ECG-based cryptographic key generation ap-
proaches for which the IPI feature of ECG underlays both of the proposed
approaches. We also propose a new approach, called Several ECG Feature
(SEF) based cryptographic key generation. The SEF approach alleviates
the key generation execution overhead of the existing and our previous ap-
proaches [96], while preserving the achieved high-security levels. We ap-
plied the proposed approach to both normal and abnormal ECG signals.
The generated keys are employed in end-to-end communications to securely
encrypt/decrypt patients’ medical data transmitted between medical sen-
sors and health caregivers. Also, we used the keys in mutual authentication
and authorization of peers in our healthcare IoT architecture. Finally, we
extended our previous works by analyzing the performance of the state-
of-the-art security solutions including the holistic integration of our recent
works [20, 22, 96, 97, 98] in terms of energy-performance on a prototype of a
healthcare IoT system through the simulation and hardware/software pro-
totype. We present the contribution of this thesis in detail in the original
publications in Part II of the thesis. This chapter presents a summary of
the main contributions while also providing a brief overview of some of the
most important challenges that they addressed.
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3.1 Pervasive Health Monitoring Based on IoT
Our first contribution in this thesis is to discuss the implementation of two
architectures for remote monitoring of biomedical signals. We present wire-
less systems for remote monitoring of biomedical signals to alleviate issues
in traditional health monitoring systems and to improve the quality of med-
ical care. Medical applications have a certain nature and requirements that
usually have life or death consequences when data are not successfully trans-
ferred. However, requirements and concerns are mostly financial in other ap-
plications. The IEEE 1073 group defined these requirements, such as data
rate and delay. In the case of a 3-lead ECG system, a patient node generates
2.4 kbps of data. In the implementations, the sensors used to collect med-
ical data include Blood Pressure, Heart Rate, Temperature, Respiration,
Glucose, SpO2, and ECG. We implemented two variants of the wireless
health monitoring architectures to remotely monitor patients: (1) The first
architecture is a wireless sensor network based on a low power ZigBee that
consists of a set of sensor nodes to read data from various medical sen-
sors, process them, and send them wirelessly over ZigBee to a server node.
(2) The other architecture implements an IP-based wireless sensor network
using IEEE 802.11 WLAN.
1. ZigBee-Based Architecture: In the implementation, ZigBee is
based on a low-rate IEEE 802.15.4 standard, designed for supporting
low-power, low-cost, and low-data rate applications. The ZigBee-
based architecture consists of several patient nodes and a sink node.
The system is implemented with ZigduinoR2 [11] hardware platform,
which is an Arduino compatible microcontroller platform. The Con-
tiki operating system is used to implement WSN. The ZigBee-based
architecture is divided into four sections; sensor interface, WSN
implementation, database application, and webserver application.
(1) Sensor interface: The sensor interface is implemented using an
Arduino-compatible E-health shield on top of the Zigduino hardware.
The E-health shield is a gateway between the medical sensors and
the Zigduino board. The Zigduino collects data measured from
various sensors via the E-health shield. (2) WSN implementation:
The Zigduino’s microcontroller contains an on-chip 2.4 GHz IEEE
802.15.4 radio. The implemented WSN consists of several patient
nodes and a sink node. Patient nodes collect data from various
sensors and send them wirelessly over ZigBee to the sink node. (3)
Database application: The sink node is connected to a local PC
(Personal computer) where a Python code is executed to collect
data from the serial terminal and save it into a remote database.
(4) Webserver Application: Web-server application written with
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Figure 3.1: Experimental setup to compare the architectures [99]
a Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) that accesses the database and
updates the web page in real time. The data from the webpage can
be accessed remotely by the patient’s caregivers through their laptops
or smartphones using any browser.
2. IEEE 802.11 WLAN-Based Architecture: The IEEE 802.11
WLAN based architecture consists of IEEE 802.11 WLAN enabled
sensor nodes to access patients’ medical data and IEEE 802.11
WLAN access point. The sensor nodes are designed using an Analog
Front-End (AFE) and IEEE 802.11 WLAN module (RTX4140). The
RTX module is provided with a proprietary operating system. The
architecture is divided into four sections; sensor interface, WSN
implementation, database application, and webserver application.
(1) Sensor interface: The sensor interface is implemented using the
AFE to read data from the medical sensors and to perform analog
to digital conversion. The digital data from the output of AFE are
read by RTX4140 through SPI. (2) WSN implementation: A UDP
client application running on the RTX4140 sends the UDP data
packet to a remote server through IEEE 802.11 WLAN once the
connection to the IEEE 802.11 WLAN access point is established.
(3) Database application: A UDP server application (running on a
remote system), written in python, continuously listens to the UDP
port, collects the incoming data and updates a remote database. (4)
Webserver application: Webserver application is the same as that of
the ZigBee-based architecture.
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Figure 3.2: Implementation of WSN [99]
Figure 3.1 shows the experimental setup to compare both architectures.
The scenario consists of a hospital room with twenty patient nodes reading
patients’ medical data from various sensors. There is one sink node to col-
lect data from all the patient nodes in their respective setup. The distance
between the adjacent patient nodes in the same column is two meters, and
the distance between the adjacent patient nodes in the different columns
is six meters. Every patient node transmits about 8.7 kilobits of data per
second. Results show that the power consumption in the ZigBee based net-
work is almost six to seven times less (seven times for 802.11g and six times
for 802.11b/n) when compared with the IEEE 802.11 WLAN based network
for the same experimental setup. The IEEE 802.11 WLAN based network
consumes more power than ZigBee for a lower data-rate. Nevertheless, with
an increase in data rate, power consumption in ZigBee increases rapidly
when compared to IEEE 802.11 WLAN. In practice, the maximum data-
rate achieved for transmitting sensor data with ZigBee using Contiki OS
is 160 kbps, when the nodes are placed at a distance of around 10 meters.
In the case of a star topology, the network can support up to 18 nodes.
However, in the case of a mesh topology using multi-hopping, each node
can route data of up to 17 other nodes apart from transmitting the data
acquired, thus increasing the scalability to a higher number.
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3.2 Authentication Scheme for RFID Implant Sys-
tems
This section presents an ECC-based mutual authentication scheme that sat-
isfies the security requirements in an RFID implant system. The proposed
scheme consists of three phases: (1) the reader authentication and verifi-
cation phase, (2) the tag identification phase, and (3) the tag verification
phase. In the proposed scheme, we suppose that the communication between
the reader and the back-end database server is done through a secure chan-
nel, while communication between the RFID implant tag and the reader
is not secure. Our scheme will provide a secure channel between the tag
and the reader in such a way that they can communicate with each other
securely and efficiently. Before describing the three mentioned phases, we
first introduce parameters and notations used in our proposed scheme.
• G: a group of order q on an elliptic curve having the order n,
• P : a primitive element or the base point of G,
• s1, s2: each tag keeps two secret points s1, s2 ∈ E(Fg), which will
change over time. These secret points will vary each time the tag is
successfully identified, item IDt: the tag’s identification number or
ID,
• s3: each reader keeps a secret point s3 ∈ Zn, which will change over
time. This secret point will vary each time the reader is successfully
authenticated,
• IDr = s3.P : the reader’s public key,
• rs, i1, i2: random numbers in Zn,
• h: a lightweight hash function,
• (d, c): a signature generated by the tag in its identification phase.
1. Reader Authentication and Verification (Phase 1): The reader
authentication and verification phase of our proposed scheme relies on
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [27]. In this
phase, the reader chooses a random number r1 ∈ Zn and computes
R1 = r1.P as its public key. Next, it initializes its counter value i1
to one and sends both R1 and i1 to the tag. It then increments the
value i1 by r1. Upon receiving the message, the tag checks whether
i2 (which is initialized to zero) is greater than i1. If the condition
holds, it replaces i2 by i1 and selects a random number r2 ∈ Zn.
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Then, the tag computes r3 = X(r2.P ) ∗ Y (R1) where * is a non-
algebraic operation over the abscissa of (r2.P ) and the ordinate of
R1 and it sends the value r3 to the reader. After receiving r3, the
reader computes R2 = r1.IDt + r3.s3 and sends the value R2 to the
tag. Finally, the tag checks whether (R2− r1.IDt)r−13 .P = IDr holds.
Then, the tag verifies that the reader is authentic.
2. Tag Identification (Phase 2): In the tag identification phase of
the proposed scheme, the tag’s initial secret point is s1 ∈ E(Fg) from
which the next secret point s2 and IDt will be computed. To generate
the second secret point, the tag computes s2 = f(X(s1)).P . For the
sake of efficiency, the function f should be selected in a manner that
avoids large Hamming weights for s2, assuring that the computation
of s2.P will be fast without compromising security [100]. Once the
generation of the second secret point s2 is done, the tag selects a
random integer k ∈ Zg and computes a curve point (x, y) = k.G. In
order to send its digital signed message (d, c) to the reader, the tag
computes d = x mod n. If d = 0, the tag starts to select another
random number k ∈ Zg and computes the next curve point. The tag
computes its IDt = Mb(X(s1)) ∗Mb(X(s2)).P where Mb will output
some middle bits of the input values. The operand * is a non-algebraic
operation ∈ Fg done over the abscissa of the first and the second
secret points. Then, the tag computes c = k(hash(IDt) + X(s1).d).
Here again, if the computed c = 0, the tag will start the algorithm
by selecting another random integer k. Finally, the tag sends the
computed values (d, c) and (IDt) to the reader.
3. Tag Verification (Phase 3): In this phase, to verify the tag is
authentic, the reader selects a random integer rs ∈ Zn and it computes
its public key pr = rs.P . For j ∈ [1, n− 1], the reader checks whether
d, c ∈ Zn. If the result is valid, the reader calculates h = Hash(IDt),
where Hash is the same Quark lightweight hash function that is used
in the previous phase to generate the tag’s signature. Once the hash
value of (IDt) is computed, the reader selects the leftmost bit of h
and denotes it as z. Then, the reader calculates the values w, u1, u2.
Based on the calculated values, the reader computes the curve point
(x, y) = u1.P + pr. Finally, the reader will accept the tag’s signature
as a valid one if the equation r = x mod n holds.
To the best of our knowledge, the previously proposed elliptic curve-
based authentication schemes, concerning RFID systems in general, cannot
fully fulfill the essential security and performance requirements of RFID im-
plant systems. Most of the earlier proposed solutions were not secure against
the most relevant attacks of the RFID systems. Also, they were not capable
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Figure 3.3: Communication between the RFID implant and the back-end
database [101]
of performing mutual authentication between a tag and a reader. The pro-
posed ECC-based mutual authentication scheme provides a secure channel
between the tag and the reader in such a way that they can communicate
with each other securely and efficiently. The proposed scheme relies on el-
liptic curve cryptography. An elliptic curve cryptosystem is more efficient in
terms of key sizes and required computations than conventional public key
cryptosystems.
We show that the scheme is secure against different types of relevant at-
tacks in order to ensure a higher security level than the related work found
in the literature. Also, we present that our scheme provides better efficiency
in terms of computational cost, total memory required, and communica-
tion overhead. Based on the results presented, we prove that the proposed
scheme has the appropriate features for use in RFID implant systems. We
believe that the scheme is not just limited to RFID implant systems. It can
also be applied to any application of IoT that requires secure and efficient
authentication.
3.3 ECG Feature Based Cryptographic Key Gen-
eration
Our third contribution in this thesis is a low-latency approach for generating
secure ECG feature based cryptographic keys. Most existing key generation
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Figure 3.4: An ideal raw ECG signal and the filtered ECG signal with the
main fiducial points indicated [20]
approaches are not directly applicable to BANs. Current ECG-based cryp-
tographic keys are mostly generated using Inter Pulse Interval IPI feature
of an ECG signal [18, 69, 77, 102, 103, 104, 105]. IPI is measured from two
consecutive R peak points, where the R peaks are the tallest and most con-
spicuous peaks in an ECG signal. In [97], we demonstrated that existing
IPI-based key generation approaches suffer from a low level of security in
terms of distinctiveness, the test of randomness, and temporal variance. In
the IPI-based approach, our main focus was to enhance the security of the
generated cryptographic keys while realizing a clear trade-off between the
security level and key generation execution time. To address this problem,
we present a novel robust key generation approach employing several ECG
feature, called Several ECG Feature (SEF). The SEF approach alleviates
the key generation execution overhead of the existing and the previous ap-
proaches while preserving the achieved high security levels. The first step to
generate ECG-based cryptographic keys is raw ECG data acquisition from
subjects. The collected ECG data includes information about the heart rate,
morphology, and rhythm being recorded by placing a set of electrodes on
body surfaces such as neck, chest, legs, and arms. Once collected, raw ECG
data need to be prepared for further analysis. Analysis of the ECG signal
can be split into two principal steps by functionality: ECG signal prepro-
cessing and feature extraction. The proposed approach is applied to both
normal and abnormal ECG signals. The main contribution of this work is
as follows:
1. ECG Feature Selection: The SEF approach uses four main
reference-free 1 features of the ECG signal along with consecutive IPI
1In this context, reference-free property indicates a dynamic technique in which no
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Figure 3.5: The normal distribution of PR, PP, QT, and ST intervals [20]
sequences to generate ECG-based cryptographic keys. The utilized
main features include PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST intervals. This is
based on the fact that these features are highly reliable and ensure
the randomness property.
2. Optimum Binary Sequence Generation: A dynamic technique is
used to specify the optimum number of bits that can be extracted from
each main ECG feature. The used technique ensures the randomness
property as the binary sequence is produced based on the real-time
variation of the measured ECG signal [79]. The utilized technique to
determine the number of optimum bits (M) can be defined as:
µ(FXi) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
xi (3.1)
SD(FXi) = σ(FXi) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − µ)2 (3.2)
Cv =
σ(FXi)
µ(FXi)
(3.3)
M =
ln (σ(FXi))
ln(2)
+ Cv (3.4)
where FXi represents a set of any one of the PR, PP, QT, and ST
features from one sampled ECG dataset in the ith heartbeat, xi repre-
sents each value in the dataset, µ is the mean value of the dataset, σ is
ECG fiducial point is fixed as reference.
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the summation, N is defined as the number of values in the dataset, σ
indicates the standard deviation of a dataset, and Cv is the coefficient
of variation which is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean value. As can be seen from Figure 3.5, similar to the RR
interval, the distribution of PR, PP, QT, and ST intervals also fits
into the normal distribution. Hence, these ECG features also fulfill
the property of randomness.
3. ECG-based Cryptographic Key Generation: In the SEF key
generation approach, depending on the length of the cryptographic
key n that needs to be generated, approximately n16 consecutive ECG
heartbeat cycles need to be detected. From the detected heatbeats,
all of the main ECG features from a t-second segment of a patient’s
ECG data need to be computed. To achieve this goal, the following
tasks must be performed: (1) for a specified period of time t, the main
fiducial points or peaks of a sensed ECG signal should be extracted
utilizing a generic feature extraction function; (2) from the detected
fiducial points, the required x consecutive ECG features should be
computed; (3) from the computed main ECG features, the amount
of optimum binary values per ECG feature must be calculated; and
(4) the produced mi-bit binary sequences from each ECG feature then
need to be concatenated in order to form an n-bit binary sequence.
The generated n-bit binary sequence is considered the main crypto-
graphic key.
4. Strengthening ECG Feature-based Key generation: To rein-
force and enhance the security level of the approach, we consolidate
the SEF key generation approach with two different cryptographi-
cally secured pseudo- random number generators: (1) SEF-PRNG:
we strengthened the security level of the SEF approach by exploiting
the Fibonacci-LFSR pseudo-random number generator (2) SEF-AES:
the SEF approach is also strengthened by utilizing the AES algorithm
in counter mode. This technique exploits our SEF key generation ap-
proach as the seed generator for the AES algorithm.
The security evaluation of the generated keys was made in terms of dis-
tinctiveness, a test of randomness, temporal variance, and the NIST bench-
mark. The results show that the strengthened key generation approach offers
a higher security level in comparison to existing approaches that rely only
on singleton ECG features. The analyses also reveal that the normal ECG
signals have slightly better randomness compared to the abnormal ones.
Cryptographic keys that are generated from normal ECG signals using the
SEF approach have an entropy of about 0.98 on average. Cryptographic
keys that are produced using the strengthened SEF approach offer the en-
45
Figure 3.6: The architecture of a healthcare IoT system with secure end-to-
end communication [96]
tropy of ∼ 1. In addition, the reinforced key generation approach also has
better P-value NIST pass rates compared to state-of-the-art approaches that
rely only on singleton ECG features. We also found out that our approach
is approximately faster than existing IPI-based key generation approaches.
Future work includes investigating and analyzing other physiological signals
within a BAN. The purpose is to realize how the generated cryptographic
keys can also be used by other bio-sensors to provide intra-BAN communi-
cation security.
3.4 End-to-End Security for Healthcare IoT
The fourth contribution in this thesis is a novel secure and efficient end-to-
end security scheme for mobility enabled healthcare IoT. In [21], we pre-
sented a secure and efficient authentication and authorization architecture
for healthcare IoT system. The proposed architecture, called SEA, exploits
the unique role of smart e-health gateways in the fog layer. SEA performs
the authentication and authorization of remote end-users securely and ef-
ficiently on behalf of the medical sensors [21] (lower black arrow shown in
Figure 3.6). The three-tier system architecture of the healthcare IoT system
on which we apply the end-to-end security scheme is shown in Figure 3.7.
The functionality of each layer in this architecture is as follows.
1. Device Layer: The lowest layer consists of several physical devices
(including implantable or wearable medical sensors) that are inte-
grated into a tiny wireless module to collect contextual and medical
data.
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Figure 3.7: The three-tier system architecture of the healthcare IoT system
[96] (SN and DB stand for Sensor Node and Database, respectively)
2. Fog Layer: The middle layer consists of a network of interconnected
smart gateways. A smart gateway receives data from different sub-
networks, performs protocol conversion, and provides other higher
level services. It acts as a repository (local database) to temporarily
store sensors’ and users’ information and provides intelligence at the
edge of the network. In addition, by taking responsibility for handling
some computational and processing burdens of the sensors and the
cloud, a smart gateway at the fog layer can cope with many challenges
such as energy efficiency, scalability, and reliability issues [106].
3. Cloud Layer: This layer includes broadcasting, data warehousing,
and big data analysis servers, and a local hospital database that
periodically performs data synchronization with the remote health-
care database server in the cloud. In the cloud layer, accessibility
to patient-related health data is classified as public data (such as
patients’ ID or blood type) and private data (such as DNA).
In [22], we presented a comprehensive end-to-end security scheme for
healthcare IoT systems. The scheme uses the session resumption technique
which oﬄoads the encrypted session states of DTLS towards a non-resource-
constrained end-user (upper black arrow shown in Figure 3.6). The main
motivation to employ the DTLS session resumption is to mitigate the over-
head on resource-constrained sensors. Because transmitting and processing
of messages in the certificate-based DTLS handshake are resource intensive
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Figure 3.8: The proposed session resumption based end-to-end security for
healthcare Internet of Things [96]
tasks. The session resumption technique is an extended form of the DTLS
handshake, which enables a client or server to continue the communication
with a previously established session state without compromising the secu-
rity properties. The protocol flow for the SEA architecture as well as the
DTLS session resumption is shown in Figure 3.8. In the end-to-end security
scheme, the fog layer facilitates ubiquitous mobility without requiring any
reconfiguration at the device layer. To achieve continuous monitoring of
patients considering the mobility support, we develop self-configuration or
handover mechanisms that are capable of handling secure and efficient data
transfers among different MSNs.
Figure 3.9 presents the mobility scenario where a patient wearing med-
ical sensors decides to move from his or her room (base network) to other
rooms (visited networks). We assumed a mobility scenario that consists of
several MSNs for remote patient monitoring in a hospital or nursing/home
environment. In the considered scenario, patients may roam through the
hospital wards or move to other rooms due to some medical tests (e.g., Lab-
oratory or X-ray). In the case that a moving sensor loses its connection
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Figure 3.9: Mobility Scenario [96]
with one of the smart gateways, he or she will stop being monitored by
the caregivers. This condition is not favorable in situations where real-time
and continuous monitoring is necessary. To enable seamless transitions of
medical sensors and considering the limitations of sensors, providing an ef-
ficient and robust data handover mechanism among smart gateways is of
essential importance. The mobility scenario is discussed in three phases in
the following subsections.
1. Message Exchange in patients’ base MSN: This phase presents
the initial state of the medical sensors where each sensor is connected
to its base MSN via a smart e-health gateway and exchange the re-
quired messages. These messages may consist of data frames requests,
responses, and acknowledgments of data transmission between the
medical sensors and the smart gateways. The data frames include:
(1) information regarding the DTLS session states for the subsequent
DTLS session resumption and (2) information about the validity of
remote caregivers. Information is exchanged between both peers us-
ing the aforementioned AES-CCM algorithm. Request messages are
queries to the medical sensor to either get or change some values.
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Response messages include replies to the request messages where the
results of the operation can be obtained. In addition, the request and
response messages include information that needs to be transmitted
between the sensor and the gateway during the DTLS handshake to
perform mutual authentication.
2. Entering a new medical subnetwork: Healthcare IoT services are
supposed to be offered to patients in a seamless and continuous way as
the patients move. When a patient moves out of his or her base MSN,
the sensor detects that the quality of its connection with the associated
smart gateway is reduced below a pre-defined threshold. We propose to
provide mobility support to the sensors from the fog layer to alleviate
the processing and computation burden of the sensors. To do so, the
smart gateway located in the base network needs to check, through the
fog layer, whether the medical sensor is accessible from other gateways.
This type of mobility (micro-mobility) is just provided to those sensors
that are in the same domain or sub-network and their IP addresses do
not change. This type of scenario is desirable for MSNs of a hospital
as the entire network relies on the same domain.
To provide continuous monitoring of patients, efficient and seamless
data handover mechanisms between smart e-health gateways are
needed. These mechanisms should consider the following features: (1)
Data handover between smart gateways should be quick and seamless,
considering that the connection to the sensor needs to be preserved
during the whole process; (2) after a successful data handover, the
changes of routes to the moving medical senor should be spread
quickly by the entire healthcare IoT system; and (3) the number of
messages that need to be exchanged among gateways should be kept
minimal (transmission overhead).
3. Returning back to the base MSN: When the patient returns back
to the base network, the medical sensor sends a reassociation request
to inform the smart gateway regarding its new location. Mobility
is enabled in our proposed end-to-end security scheme using the fog
concept. It is shown that by exploiting the fog layer, the mobility
support can be ubiquitously provided to the medical sensors without
compromising the end-to-end security.
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Figure 3.10: The system architecture of our healthcare IoT system with
secure end-to-end communication [107]
3.5 End-to-End Security Scheme Performance
Analysis
As the fifth contribution in this thesis, we analyzed the performance of the
state-of-the-art end-to-end security schemes in healthcare IoT systems. The
system architecture illustrated in Figure 3.10 was implemented for experi-
mental evaluation for two different scenarios: in-home and hospital room(s).
The main contributions of this work which is the holistic integration of our
recent published works [20,22,96,97,98], are twofold. First, we identified and
present the essential requirements of robust security solutions for healthcare
IoT systems, which include (1) secure ECG-based cryptographic key gen-
eration, (2) authentication and authorization of each healthcare IoT com-
ponent based on certificate-based DTLS, and (3) secure mobility-enabled
end-to-end communication based on the session resumption technique, as
well as the concept of fog layer in the IoT for realizing efficient and seamless
mobility. Second, we analyze the performance of the state-of-the-art secu-
rity solutions, including the end-to-end security scheme, which is tested by
developing a prototype healthcare IoT system.
To Implement the proposed healthcare IoT system architecture, we setup
a platform that consists of medical sensor nodes, UT-GATE smart e-health
gateways, a remote server, and end-users. UT-GATE is constructed from
the combination of a Pandaboard and a Texas Instruments (TI) SmartRF06
board that is integrated with a CC2538 module [31]. In our configuration,
UT-GATE uses 8GB of external memory and is powered by Ubuntu OS
which allows to control devices and services such as local storage and no-
tification. To investigate the feasibility of our proposed architecture, the
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Wismote [32] platform, which is a common resource-limited sensor nodes,
is utilized in Contiki’s network simulation tool Cooja [33]. For the evalua-
tion, we use the open source tool OpenSSL version 1.0.1.j to create elliptic
curve public and private keys from the NIST P-256 and X.509 certificates.
TinyDTLS [35] is used as the code-base of the proposed scheme. For the
public-key functions, we utilize the Relic-toolkit [36] that is an open source
cryptography library tailored for specific security levels with emphasis on
efficiency and flexibility. The MySQL database is set up for static and
non-static records. The cloud server database is processed using xSQL Lite
which is the third party tool for data synchronization. With respect to the
cryptographic primitives and to make a fair comparison, we followed similar
cipher suites as employed in the most recently proposed authentication and
authorization architecture for IP-based IoT [36]. In this regard, we utilize
elliptic curve NIST-256 for public-key operations, AES 128 CCM 8 (with
an IV of 8 bytes) for symmetric-key, and SHA256 for hashing operations. To
asses the performance of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approaches in terms of execution time, we conduct the experiments on ECG
signals of 48 subjects with Arrhythmia obtained from the publicly available
database, that is, Physiobank [28]. The recordings are digitized at 360 sam-
ples per second with 11-bit resolution over a 10 mV range per patient with
16 bit resolution over a range of 16 mV. We have captured 100 different
samples of 5 minute long ECG data for each subject. We have implemented
the key generation approaches utilizing MATLAB.
Based on the analysis, we found out that our solution has the most exten-
sive set of performance features in comparison to related approaches found in
the literature. Our end-to-end security scheme was designed by generating
ECG-based cryptographic keys for medical sensor devices, certificate-based
DTLS handshake between end-users and smart gateways as well as employ-
ing the session resumption technique for the communications between medi-
cal sensor devices and end-users. Our performance evaluation revealed that,
the ECG signal based cryptographic key generation method that is employed
in our end-to-end security scheme is on average 1.8 times faster than existing
similar key generation approaches while being more energy-efficient. Com-
pared to existing end-to-end security approaches, our scheme reduces the
communication overhead by 26% and the communication latency between
smart gateways and end users by 16%. Our scheme performed approxi-
mately 97% faster than certificate-based and 10% faster than symmetric
key-based DTLS. In terms of memory requirements, certificate-based DTLS
needs about 2.9 times more ROM and 2.2 times more RAM resources than
our approach. In fact, the ROM and RAM requirements of our scheme are
almost as low as insymmetric key-based DTLS. Our scheme is a very promis-
ing solution for ensuring secure end-to-end communications for healthcare
IoT systems with low overhead.
52
Chapter 4
Overview of Original
Publications
This chapter presents a summary of the original publications presented in
Part II of this thesis, along with a description of the authors’ contributions to
each publication. It also provides a correlation between the RQs presented
in Section 1.1 and the individual publications in Part II. Finally, it discusses
how the original publications relate to one another.
4.1 Overview of Original Publications
This thesis is a collection of five original publications, which are referred to
in the text by their Roman numerals. In this section, we present a summary
of the individual publications while highlighting the authors’ contributions
to each publication.
4.1.1 Publication I: Pervasive Health Monitoring Based on
Internet of Things: Two Case Studies
Publication I presents our health monitoring wireless sensor network archi-
tecture for remote monitoring of biomedical signals to alleviate issues in
traditional health monitoring systems and to improve the quality of medical
care. Two variants of the wireless health monitoring system are implemented
to monitor patients remotely. One system implements a wireless sensor net-
work based on low power ZigBee. The system consists of a set of sensor
nodes (clients) to read, process, and send data from various medical sensors
wirelessly over ZigBee to a server node. The other system implements an
IP-based wireless sensor network, using IEEE 802.11 WLAN. The system
consists of IEEE 802.11 WLAN based sensor modules to access biomedi-
cal signals from patients and send these to a remote server which updates
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the database in real-time. Our developed architectures are analyzed with
the aim of identifying their pros and cons and discussing the suitability of
mentioned wireless communication technologies for different healthcare ap-
plication domains. In both implementations, the server node collects the
medical data from several client nodes and updates a remote database. The
webserver application accesses the database and updates the webpage in
real-time, which can be accessed remotely. We observed that the power
consumption in a ZigBee based network is almost six to seven times less
(seven times for 802.11g and six times for 802.11b/n) when compared with
the IEEE 802.11 WLAN based network for the same experimental setup.
The IEEE 802.11 WLAN based network consumes more power than ZigBee
for a lower data-rate. However, when data rate increases, power consump-
tion in ZigBee enhances rapidly when compared to IEEE 802.11 WLAN.
In practice the maximum data-rate achieved for transmitting sensor data
with ZigBee using Contiki OS is 160 kbps, when the nodes are placed at a
distance of approximately 10 meters.
To evaluate the efficiency of our health monitoring architectures, imple-
mentations were performed on the Contiki OS and Cooja simulator.
Author’s contribution: The main idea presented in this paper was
developed jointly by co-authors Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi and Anurag. Sanaz
Rahimi Moosavi developed the implementation of the IoT-based architecture
for remote health monitoring based on ZigBee. The paper was written jointly
by co-authors Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi and Anurag under the guidance of
Amir-Mohammad Rahmani, Tomi Westerlund, Geng Yang, Pasi Liljeberg,
and Hannu Tenhunen.
4.1.2 Publication II: An Elliptic Curve-based Mutual Au-
thentication Scheme for RFID Implant Systems
Publication II presents our novel secure elliptic curve-based mutual authen-
tication scheme for RFID implant systems. To the best of our knowledge,
previously presented elliptic curve-based authentication schemes, concern-
ing RFID systems in general, cannot fully fulfill the essential security and
performance requirements of RFID implant systems. The proposed mutual
authentication scheme relies on elliptic curve cryptography. An elliptic curve
cryptosystem is more efficient in terms of key sizes and required computa-
tions than conventional public key cryptosystems. In the proposed scheme,
reader authentication and verification is performed based on ECDLP, while
tag identification and tag verification phases rely on ECDSA using Quark
lightweight hash. We proved that our proposed scheme is secure against the
relevant attacks and also ensures a higher security level than related work
found in the literature. In addition, we carried out a computational perfor-
mance analysis of our proposed scheme. The analysis results show that our
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elliptic curve-based mutual authentication scheme has less communication
overhead than similar available schemes. It also requires less total memory
than existing schemes. Based on the results presented in this paper, we
conclude that the proposed scheme has the appropriate features for use in
RFID implant systems. We believe that our scheme is not just limited to
RFID implant systems; it can also be applied to any application of the IoT
that requires secure and efficient authentication.
Author’s contribution: The author Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi developed
the main idea presented in this paper under the guidance of Ethiopia Ni-
gussie, Seppo Virtnane, and Jouni Isoaho. Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi is the
main author of this paper.
4.1.3 Publication III: Low-latency Approach for Secure ECG
Feature Based Cryptographic Key Generation
Publication III presents our low-latency approach for generating secure ECG
feature based cryptographic keys. The approach is done by taking advan-
tage of the uniqueness and randomness properties of ECG’s main features.
This approach achieves low-latency since the key generation relies on four
reference-free ECG main features that can be acquired in a short time. We
call the approach Several ECG Feature (SEF) based cryptographic key gen-
eration. SEF consists of (1) detecting the arrival time of ECG’s fiducial
points using a Daubechies wavelet transform to compute ECG’s main fea-
tures accordingly; (2) using a dynamic technique to specify the optimum
number of bits that can be extracted from each main ECG feature, com-
prising of PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST intervals; (3) generating cryptographic
keys by exploiting the above-mentioned ECG features; and (4) consolidating
and strengthening the SEF approach with cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generators. The Fibonacci linear feedback shift register
and AES algorithms are implemented as the pseudo-random number gener-
ator to enhance the security level of the generated cryptographic keys. Our
approach is applied to different subjects’ ECG signals. The security anal-
yses of the proposed approach are carried out in terms of distinctiveness,
the test of randomness, temporal variance, and using the NIST benchmark.
The analyses reveal that the normal ECG rhythms have slightly better ran-
domness compared to the abnormal ones. The analyses also show that the
strengthened SEF key generation approach provides a higher security level
in comparison to existing approaches that rely only on singleton ECG fea-
tures. For the normal ECG rhythms, the SEF approach has in average the
entropy of about 0.98 while cryptographic keys that are generated utilizing
the strengthened SEF approach offer an entropy of about 1. The execution
time required to generate the cryptographic keys on different processors is
also examined. The results reveal that our SEF approach is on average
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faster than existing key generation approaches that only utilize the IPI fea-
ture of ECG. To evaluate the efficiency of our cryptographic key generation
approach implementations have been performed using MATLAB platform
and NIST benchmark.
Author’s contribution: The author Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi developed
the main idea presented in this paper under the guidance of Ethiopia Ni-
gussie, Marco Levorato, Seppo Virtanen, and Jouni Isoaho. Sanaz Rahimi
Moosavi is the main author of this paper.
4.1.4 Publication IV: End-to-End Security Scheme for Mo-
bility Enabled Healthcare Internet of Things
Publication IV presents our end-to-end security scheme for mobility en-
abled healthcare IoT systems. The presented scheme consists of (1) a secure
and efficient end-user authentication and authorization architecture based
on the certificate based DTLS handshake, (2) secure end-to-end commu-
nication based on session resumption, and (3) robust mobility based on
interconnected smart gateways. The smart gateways act as an intermediate
processing layer (called fog layer) between IoT devices and sensors (device
layer) and cloud services (cloud layer). In our scheme, the fog layer facili-
tates ubiquitous mobility without requiring any reconfiguration at the device
layer. The scheme is demonstrated by simulation and a full hardware and
software prototype. Based on our analysis, our scheme has the most exten-
sive set of security features in comparison to related approaches found in
the literature. Energy-performance evaluation results show that compared
to existing approaches, our scheme reduces the communication overhead, as
well as the communication latency, between smart gateways and end users.
In addition, our scheme is faster than certificate-based and symmetric key
based DTLS. Compared to our scheme, certificate based DTLS consumes
more RAM and ROM resources. On the other hand, the RAM and ROM
requirements of our scheme are almost as low as those in symmetric key-
based DTLS. Analysis of our implementation revealed that the handover
latency caused by mobility is low, and the handover process does not incur
any processing or communication overhead on the sensors.
To evaluate the efficiency of our end-to-end security scheme implemen-
tations were performed on the Contiki OS and Cooja simulator using Relic
toolkit.
Author’s contribution: The main idea presented in this paper was
developed by the author Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi in a close collaboration with
co-authors Tuan Nguyen Gia, Ethiopia Nigussie, Amir M. Rahmani, Seppo
Virtnane, and Jouni Isoaho. The implementation of the proposed end-to-end
security scheme is done by Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi. Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi
is the main author of this paper.
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4.1.5 Publication V: Performance Analysis of End-to-End
Security Schemes in Healthcare IoT
Publication V presents our performance analysis of the state-of-the-art end-
to-end security schemes in healthcare IoT systems. We identified that the
essential requirements of robust security solutions for healthcare IoT sys-
tems are comprised of (1) low-latency secure key generation approach using
patients’ Electrocardiogram (ECG) signals, (2) secure and efficient authenti-
cation and authorization for healthcare IoT devices based on the certificate-
based datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), and (3) robust and secure
mobility-enabled end-to-end communication based on DTLS session resump-
tion. The performance of the state-of-the-art security solutions, including
our end-to-end security scheme is tested by developing a prototype health-
care IoT system. The prototype is built of a PandaBoard, a TI SmartRF06
board and WiSMotes. The PandaBoard along with the CC2538 module acts
as a smart gateway and the WisMotes act as medical sensor nodes. Based
on the analysis, we found out that our solution has the most extensive set of
performance features in comparison to related approaches found in the liter-
ature. The performance evaluation results show that the cryptographic key
generation approach proposed in our end-to-end security scheme is faster
than existing key generation approaches while being more energy-efficient.
In addition, the scheme reduces the communication overhead and the com-
munication latency between smart gateways and end users. Our scheme is
also faster than the certificate-based and the symmetric key-based DTLS.
The certificate based DTLS requires more ROM and RAM resources. On
the other hand, the ROM and RAM requirements of our scheme are almost
as low as in symmetric key-based DTLS.
To evaluate the performance analysis of our end-to-end security scheme
implementations were performed utilizing the MATLAB platform, Contiki
OS, Cooja simulator, and Relic toolkit.
Author’s contribution: The author Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi developed
the main idea presented in this paper under the guidance of Ethiopia Ni-
gussie, Marco Levorato, Seppo Virtanen, and Jouni Isoaho. Sanaz Rahimi
Moosavi is the main author of this paper.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this final chapter, we outline the main achievements put forward in this
dissertation, as well as point out future research directions. In this disser-
tation, we identified and provided research-based solutions and suggestions
for the problems related to the standards-based communication architecture,
as well as building blocks, concerning secure end-to-end communications for
the healthcare IoT systems. Healthcare IoT systems are distinct in that
they are built to serve human beings, which inherently raises the require-
ments of security, privacy, and reliability. Moreover, the systems have to
provide real-time notifications and responses regarding the statuses of pa-
tients. We presented wireless system architectures for remote monitoring of
biomedical signals to alleviate issues in traditional health monitoring sys-
tems and to improve the quality of medical care. Two variants of the wireless
health monitoring system architectures are implemented in this dissertation
to monitor patients remotely. One system implements the WSN based on
low power ZigBee and the other system implements the WSN based on
the IEEE 802.11 WLAN. In both implementations, the sink node collects
the medical data from several medical sensor nodes and updates a remote
database. In a typical healthcare IoT system, the system has to ensure
the safety of patients by monitoring patients’ activities and vital signs. To
guarantee these requirements, the smart components in the system require
a predictable latency and reliable communication with the upper computing
layer. The conventional cloud-based approaches cannot assure low-latency
and high-availability requirements of healthcare IoT systems, as the connec-
tion to the cloud is less reliable and may incur additional latency.
In this dissertation, we discussed and introduced Fog computing as a
means of enhancing the end-to-end security in an IoT-based healthcare sys-
tem. Fog devices are heterogeneous in nature, ranging from end-user devices
and access points to edge routers and switches, allowing their use in a wide
variety of environments. Through the system implementation and verifica-
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tion in health monitoring case studies, this dissertation demonstrated that
Fog computing is an appropriate solution, in particular, for improving IoT-
based remote health monitoring and enhancing the quality of healthcare.
The proposed solutions consist of (1) a low-latency approach for generat-
ing secure ECG feature-based cryptographic keys, (2) a secure and efficient
end-user authentication and authorization architecture based on the elliptic
curve cryptography and the certificate based DTLS handshake, (3) secure
end-to-end communication based on session resumption, and (4) robust mo-
bility based on interconnected smart gateways.
Medical sensors rely on cryptography to secure their communications.
The proper application of cryptography requires the use of secure keys and
key generation methods. Key generation in sensor networks generally re-
quires some form of pre-deployment. Given the constrained nature of med-
ical sensors used in BSNs, conventional key generation approaches may po-
tentially involve reasonable computations, as well as latency, during net-
work or any subsequent adjustments, due to their need for pre-deployment.
Key generation solutions relying on humans’ biometric systems best suit for
tiny medical sensors, as those solutions are lightweight and require low re-
sources. By developing robust and efficient key generation using biometric
systems, the security of medical sensors can be provided in a plug-n-play
manner where neither a network establishment nor a key pre-distribution
mechanism is required. Cryptographic keys can be generated, renewed, and
revoked within the network on the fly by using the information collected
by medical sensors when and as needed. To alleviate these limitations, we
proposed a robust key generation approach employing several ECG features,
called SEF. Our SEF approach utilizes four main reference-free ECG fea-
tures comprising of PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST. A dynamic technique is used
to specify the optimum number of bits that can be extracted from each
main ECG feature. We consolidated and strengthened the SEF approach
with cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator techniques.
The Fibonacci linear feedback shift register and the AES algorithm are im-
plemented as pseudo-random generators to enhance the security level of our
approach. These keys can be employed in end-to-end communications to
securely encrypt or decrypt messages transmitted between medical sensors
and health caregivers. The keys can also be used for authentication and
authorization of peers in MSNs.
We also leveraged the strategic position and the distributed nature of
smart gateways in fog computing to provide a seamless authentication and
authorization architecture, secure end-to-end communication, and mobility
for healthcare IoT systems. The proposed authentication and authorization
solution relied on the elliptic curve cryptography and the certificate-based
DTLS handshake protocol. The solution reduces the overhead imposed on
the medical sensors without compromising the security. Our end-to-end se-
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curity scheme enables end-users and medical sensors to communicate with-
out the need of performing heavy computations directly. The scheme relies
on a certificate-based DTLS handshake between non-resource-constrained
smart gateways and end-users at the start of the communication. To pro-
vide end-to-end security, DTLS session resumption without a server-side
state is utilized. The session resumption technique has an abbreviated form
of DTLS and neither requires heavy-weight certificate-related nor public-key
operations as it relies on the previously established DTLS connection. In our
scheme, ubiquitous mobility is feasible without requiring any reconfiguration
at the device layer.
Results from the test-bed platform demonstration of our end-to-end se-
curity show that the ECG-based cryptographic key generation method that
is employed in our end-to-end security scheme is faster than existing sim-
ilar key generation approaches while being more energy-efficient. The se-
curity evaluation of the generated keys was performed in terms of distinc-
tiveness, the test of randomness, and temporal variance by using the NIST
benchmark. Our approach is applied to normal and abnormal ECG signals.
The analysis showed that the strengthened key generation approach offers
a higher security level in comparison to existing approaches that rely only
on singleton ECG features. Our analyses also reveal that the normal ECG
signals have slightly better randomness compared to the abnormal ones.
Cryptographic keys that are generated from normal ECG signals using the
SEF approach demonstrate lower entropy compared to cryptographic keys
that are produced using the strengthened SEF approach. In addition, the
reinforced key generation approach also has a better P-value NIST pass
rate compared to state-of-the-art approaches, which rely only on singleton
ECG features. Compared to the existing end-to-end security solutions, our
scheme reduces the communication overhead, as well as the communication
latency, between smart gateways and end users. Our scheme is faster than
the certificate-based DTLS and the symmetric key-based DTLS. In terms
of memory requirements, certificate-based DTLS consumes more RAM and
ROM resources than our approach. In fact, the RAM and ROM require-
ments of our scheme are almost as low as in symmetric key-based DTLS.
Taking into account that the handover latency caused by mobility is low and
the handover process does not incur any processing or communication over-
head on the sensors, we summarize that our scheme is a promising solution
for ensuring end-to-end security and secure ubiquitous sensor-level mobility
for healthcare IoT systems.
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5.1 Future Work
This research will be extended by improving our communication architec-
ture that securely monitors the end-to-end communications in healthcare
IoT systems over the time and provides a finer performance of the end-to-
end security scheme. Our future work focuses on the trade-off analysis be-
tween the security level and performance of the end-to-end security scheme
in terms of latency and energy consumption. For this purpose, we are im-
proving the latency and energy consumption of our scheme, while preserving
the achieved high-security levels. We published the promising preliminary
results in the Elsevier Ambient Systems, Networks and Technologies (ANT-
2018) conference [107]. One of the main future goals is to conduct a more
realistic experiment in order to fully realize the benefits and limitations of
the proposed approaches. To validate our developed end-to-end communi-
cation architecture in Finland, we have chosen an application of healthcare
as a case-study to be demonstrated in the experimental test-bed. The case
study is on pain assessment with the collaboration of the Department of
Nursing Science at the University of Turku and Turku University Hospital
(TYKS). In addition, we are planning to consider device interoperability
and data interoperability in our healthcare IoT architecture and investigate
the security and privacy issues that result.
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Abstract—With the continuous evolution of wireless sensor 
networks and Internet of Things (IoT) various aspects of life will 
benefit. IoT based pervasive healthcare system has potential to 
provide error free medical data and alerting system in critical 
conditions with continuous monitoring. The system will minimize 
the need of dedicated medical personnel for patient monitoring 
and help the patients to lead a normal life besides providing them 
with high quality medical service. In this paper, we provide the 
implementation of IoT-based architectures for remote health 
monitoring based on two popular wireless technologies, Wi-Fi 
and ZigBee. We analyse the two architectures with the aim of 
identifying their pros and cons and discuss suitability of 
mentioned wireless communication technologies for different 
healthcare application domains.  
Abstract—Internet of Things, e-Health, ZigBee , Wi-Fi, 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Remote Patient Monitoring. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) is enabling and revolutionising the 
way in which physical objects are communicating with each other. 
IoT can be utilised in several application domains such as: smart 
homes and cities, food safety and security and healthcare. The 
possibilities that IoT provides will innovate novel applications and 
devices whose communication capability will create new markets 
and a new economy. It is predicted that number of devices with the 
internet capability (connected to internet) will be around 25 billion 
by 2015 and 50 billion by 2020 [1].  
IoT offers enormous opportunities to revolutionise healthcare 
in the near future. It can play a vital role in a wide range of 
healthcare devices that, for example, enable remote vital sign 
monitoring in hospitals and more importantly at home. Indeed, 
remote monitoring offers tremendous possibilities to decrease the 
costs of healthcare, and, at the same time, to increase healthcare 
quality by identifying and preventing diseases. In many cases 
health care is becoming increasingly costly, as patients are 
required to stay in hospital for the entire duration of their treatment 
due to the lack of devices with a capability to remotely provide 
patient’s health information to authorised health professionals. 
Using IoT, gathering patient’s health information and transferring 
it in real time to healthcare professionals will not only reduce the 
cost of healthcare services but also enable the treatment of health 
issues before they become critical.  
In this paper, we present a health monitoring wireless sensor 
network architecture and assess the usability of two wireless 
communication technologies in the presented context. The aim is 
to identify the advantages and shortcomings of these architectures 
and find application domains in which these architectures can be 
properly utilized.   
There exist several wireless communication technologies such 
as Bluetooth, ZigBee, 6LoWPAN or Wi-Fi that can be used to 
implement wireless network systems. Every technology has its 
own advantages and drawbacks. The most suitable technology 
strongly depends on the application requirements. For our health 
monitoring platform, we use Wi-Fi and ZigBee wireless 
technologies. For example, if a ZigBee based sensor network is 
supposed to transfer data to smart phones or tablets, which 
normally does not support IEEE 802.15.4 standard, a translation 
gateway is needed to transform ZigBee to another protocol such as 
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. To avoid transforming protocols, 
interoperability should be an intrinsic feature of a sensor based 
wireless network. For this purpose, Wi-Fi is one of the most 
popular choices for wireless communication protocol. 
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION 
There have been many efforts in the field of IoT based remote 
patient monitoring systems. Piccini et al. [2] discuss wireless 
system based on Bluetooth for acquiring bio-medical signals such 
as Electrocardiography (ECG), Electromyography (EMG), 
Electroencephalography (EEG) and Electrooculography (EOG). 
The architecture consists of two operational units: one to acquire 
single lead ECG signal and the other a DSP system to clean the 
acquired signal from the first unit. More research is required for 
integrating the associated sensors with a hardware board and 
miniaturising the system to make it wearable. She et al. [3] present 
a wireless sensor network architecture based on the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard (ZigBee) and 3G networks for healthcare applications for 
home or hospital. The system reads signals including ECG, EMG, 
EEG and EOG, heart rate, breathing and blood pressure, processes 
it and sends it to a remote server or displays it over LCD screen. 
The system implements priority scheduling and data compression, 
which reduces the transmission delays of critical signals and saves 
bandwidth and power. Lo et al. [4] explain body sensor network 
(BSN) based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard which not only 
monitors and process medical data such as ECG and SpO2 but also 
implements context aware sensing with the help of context sensors 
(e.g. temperature, accelerometer, and humidity). The BSN is 
power efficient requiring only 0.01 mA in active mode and 1.3 mA 
for computations such as fast Fourier transform (FFT). The 
collected and processed data is displayed by a flash BSN card for 
PDAs. A PDA also works as an access point to send the processed 
data to a central server. Istepanian et al. [5] propose m-IoT 
(Internet of M-Health Things), an IP based wireless sensor 
network architecture based on 6LoWPAN, which is used to 
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measure medical data such as glucose level in blood and blood 
pressure. A central access point collects data from the sensor nodes 
and send to IP based medical server, from where it can be accessed 
and analysed. Our motivation in this paper is to compare the 
implementation of health monitoring wireless sensor network 
architectures based on two popular wireless technologies (Wi-Fi 
and ZigBee) and analyse the suitability of these technologies for 
different medical applications. 
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES FOR HEALTH MONITORING 
 In this section, we discuss the implementation of two 
architectures for remote monitoring of bio-medical signals. 
Medical applications have certain nature and requirements that 
usually have life or death consequences when data is not 
successfully transferred (e.g. lost, corrupted, delayed, etc.) as 
opposed to most other applications where requirements and 
concerns are mostly financial. These requirements such as data 
rate and delay have been defined by the IEEE 1073 group. For 
example, in case of 3-lead ECG system, a patient node (i.e., a 
wireless electrode) generates 2.4 Kbits/s of data [6]. In our 
implementations, the sensors used to collect medical data include 
Blood Pressure, Heart Rate, Temperature, Respiration, Glucose, 
SpO2, and ECG. Data rate for bio-medical signal varies 
significantly. The data rates of various signals are presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Data rate of various bio-medical signals  
Bio-medical Signal Latency Data Rate 
Blood pressure < 3 s 80 - 800 bps 
Pulse / Heart Rate < 3 s 80 - 800 bps 
Glucose < 3 s 80 - 800 bps 
Temperature < 3 s 80 - 800 bps 
Respiration < 300 ms 50 - 120 bps 
SpO2 < 300 ms 50 - 120 bps 
ECG < 300 ms 
3-lead (2.4 kbps), 5-lead (10 
kbps), 12-lead (72 kbps),  
 The first architecture implements wireless sensor network 
based on low-power ZigBee, while the second architecture 
implements IP-based wireless sensor network using Wi-Fi.  
A. ZigBee-Based Architecture 
ZigBee is based on low-rate IEEE 802.15.4 standard, designed 
for supporting low-power, low-cost, and low-data rate 
applications. The ZigBee based architecture consists of several 
patient nodes and a sink node. The system is implemented with 
ZigduinoR2 [7] hardware platform, which is an Arduino 
compatible microcontroller platform (ATmega128RFA1). contiki 
operating system is used to implement WSN. ZigBee based 
architecture as shown in Figure 1 can be divided into four sections; 
sensor interface, WSN implementation, database application and 
webserver application. 
Sensor interface: The sensor interface is implemented using an 
Arduino-compatible E-health shield on top of the Zigduino 
hardware. The E-health shield is basically a gateway between the 
medical sensors and Zigduino board. Data measured from various 
sensors are collected by the Zigduino board via the E-health shield. 
WSN implementation: The Zigduino’s microcontroller contains 
an on-chip 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 radio. The implemented WSN 
consists of several patient (client) nodes and a sink (server) node. 
Patient nodes collect data from various sensors and send wirelessly 
over ZigBee to the sink (server) node. The code architecture of 
sink and patient nodes are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2: Code architecture of sink and patient node 
Server (sink) node architecture 
ZigBeeServer Send and receive data over ZigBee 
ServiceServer 
Add and remove nodes in the network and assign 
ID to them 
 MACServer Grants permission to the nodes to access media. 
Client (Patient) node architecture 
ZigBeeServer Send and receive data over ZigBee 
MeasurementServer Collect data and store them in FIFO 
ServiceServer 
Add and remove nodes in the network and assign 
ID to them 
MACServer Grants permission to the nodes to access media 
 
Database application: The sink (server) node is connected to a 
local PC (Personal computer) where a Python code executes to 
collect data from the serial terminal and save it into a remote 
database.  
Webserver Application: Web-server application written with 
PHP accesses the database and updates the web page in real time. 
The data from the webpage can be accessed remotely by patient’s 
caregivers through their laptops or smart phones using any 
browser. 
B. Wi-Fi-Based Architecture 
The Wi-Fi based architecture consists of Wi-Fi enabled sensor 
nodes (Patient node) to access patient’s medical data and Wi-Fi 
access point (Wi-Fi router). The sensor nodes (Patient node) are 
designed using an Analog Front-End (AFE, ADS1192 from Texas 
Instruments, [8]) and Wi-Fi module (RTX4140 Wi-Fi module, 
[9]). The RTX module is provided with proprietary operating 
system (ROS). Processor used in the Wi-Fi module is 
EFM32GG230F1024. The architecture (Figure 2) can be divided 
into four sections; sensor interface, WSN implementation, 
database application and webserver application.  
Sensor interface: The sensor interface is implemented using 
the AFE to read data from the medical sensors and perform analog 
to digital conversion. The digital data from the output of AFE is 
read by RTX4140 through SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface). 
Local 
Workstation
Internet
Patient’s Caregivers Remote Healthcare 
Center
Patient Node
Patient Node Patient Node
Patient Node
Sink Node
ZigBee-Based WSN
 
Figure 1: ZigBee Based Health Monitoring System 
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WSN implementation: A UDP (User Datagram Protocol) client 
application running on the RTX4140 sends the UDP data packet to 
a remote server through Wi-Fi, once the connection to the Wi-Fi 
access point is established.  
Database application: A UDP server application (running on a 
remote system), written in python, continuously listens to the UDP 
port, collects the incoming data and updates a remote database. 
Webserver application: Webserver application is same as that 
of the ZigBee-based architecture. 
Wi-Fi Router/AP
Patient’s Caregivers
Remote Healthcare 
Center
Patient Node
Patient Node Patient Node
Patient Node
Internet
Wi-Fi-Based 
WSN
 
Figure 2: Wi-Fi Based Health Monitoring System 
Figure 3 shows the implemented WSN. The patient (client) 
node collects medical (ECG) data from patient and transmits to the 
sink (server) node over ZigBee. The sink (server) node is 
connected to a local PC (Personal computer). The webserver 
application displays the ECG data on the webpage. In Figure 3, the 
ECG graph is displayed on a local PC, but it can be accessed from 
any remote location. 
 
Figure 3: Implementation of WSN 
C. Comparison  
Both of the communication technologies, Wi-Fi and ZigBee, 
have their advantages and drawbacks. In this section, we discuss 
some features that influence the selection of the communication 
technology in the context of healthcare. The features that we will 
consider are interference, security, energy consumption, reliability, 
and issue of coexistence. In the following, we further elaborate 
these features. Table 3 presents a comparison between the two 
technologies. 
 ZigBee uses mesh topology which has several advantages over 
point to point networks in terms of reliability, scalability, and 
addressing interference issue by virtue of their structure. 
Reliability in case of Wi-Fi can be addressed with overlapping 
WAPs (Wireless access points). The mesh topology can scale to 
hundreds of client nodes easily, but in case of point to point 
network in order to add an extra client node above 255, an extra 
access points or router needs to be added [10]. The interference 
issue in case of mesh can be resolved by choosing an alternate (or 
best) path [11], whereas in case of point to point networks, it is 
either required to lower the data rate, lower the transmit power, or 
change the channel [12]. In order to address the issue of 
coexistence between ZigBee and Wi-Fi, dynamic frequency 
selection and transmission power control is used [13]. Wi-Fi being 
IP based network provides all the benefits of IP standard such as 
heterogeneity, compatibility, flexibility, speed, security, efficiency, 
and accuracy. Power consumption is a concern in case of Wi-Fi 
with battery life usually ranging from 0.5 to 5 days, whereas in 
case of ZigBee the battery life can be as long as 1000 days 
depending upon the application [14]. For security both the 
technologies use encryption and authentication mechanism; 
ZigBee uses AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) block cipher 
with counter mode (CTR), whereas Wi-Fi uses RC4 stream cipher 
for data encryption. In case of Wi-Fi in order to overcome the 
weakness of WEP (Wire equivalent privacy), Wi-Fi protected 
access 2 (WPA2) is used. 
IV. DEMONSTRATORS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The experimental setup to compare both the architectures is 
shown in Figure 4. The scenario consists of a hospital room with 
twenty patient nodes reading patient’s medical data from various 
sensors including 2-lead ECG, SpO2, Blood Pressure, Heart Rate, 
Temperature, Respiration, and Glucose level. There is one sink 
node (for ZigBee based architecture) or a Wi-Fi access point (for 
Wi-Fi based architecture) to collect data from all the patient nodes 
in their respective setup. The distance between the adjacent patient 
nodes in same column is two meters and the distance between the 
adjacent patient nodes in different column is six meters. Every 
patient node transmits about 8.7 kbits (payload) of data per second. 
Figure 5 summarizes the average power consumption (mW) by the 
Table 3: Comparison between ZigBee and Wi-Fi 
Standard ZigBee Wi-Fi 
IEEE spec. 802.15.4 802.1 1a/b/g 
Frequency band 868/915 MHz; 
2.4 GHz 
2.4 GHz; 5 GHz 
Max signal rate 250 Kb/s 54 Mb/s 
Nominal range 10 - 100 m 100 m 
Number of RF channels 1/10; 16 14 (2.4 GHz) 
Channel bandwidth 0.3/0.6 MHz; 2 
MHz 
22 MHz 
Coexistence mechanism Dynamic freq. 
selection 
Dynamic freq. 
selection, transmit 
power control 
Battery Life (days) 100 – 1,000 0.5 – 5.0 
Basic cell Star BSS (basic service 
set) 
Extension of the basic cell Cluster tree, 
Mesh 
ESS (extended 
service set) 
Max number of cell nodes > 65000 255 
Encryption AES block 
cipher (CTR, 
counter mode) 
RC4 stream cipher 
(WEP), AES block 
cipher 
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patient (client) nodes of Wi-Fi and ZigBee based architectures, 
with respect to the experimental setup discussed. 
2m
6m
Sink Node Wi-Fi Router
6m
2m
 
Figure 4: Experimental setup to compare both the architectures 
The power consumption in case of three different Wi-Fi 
protocols 802.11b/g/n are 14, 17.5, and 14 mW respectively, 
whereas in case of the ZigBee based network the power 
consumption is considerably less (2.4 mW).  
 
 
Figure 5: Average power consumption in ZigBee and Wi-Fi based sensor 
nodes 
Thus we can observe that the power consumption in ZigBee 
based network is almost 6 to 7 times less (7 times for 802.11g and 
6 times for 802.11b/n ) when compared with Wi-Fi based network 
for the same experimental setup. At this point it is worth noting 
that although Wi-Fi based network consumes more power than 
ZigBee for lower data-rate, with increase in data rate, power 
consumption in ZigBee increases rapidly when compared to Wi-
Fi. In practise the maximum data-rate achieved for transmitting 
sensor data with ZigBee using contiki OS is 160 Kbits/sec, when 
the nodes are placed at a distance of around 10 meters. In case of 
star topology the network can support up to 18 nodes, whereas in 
case of mesh topology using multi-hopping each nodes can route 
data of up to 17 other nodes apart from transmitting the data 
acquired, thus increasing the scalability to higher number. At the 
present data rate (8.7kbits/sec payload) required, scalability is not 
an issue in case of Wi-Fi and the system can be scaled to large 
number of nodes using single access-point. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented wireless systems for remote 
monitoring of bio-medical signals to alleviate issues in traditional 
health monitoring systems and to improve the quality of medical 
care. Two variants of the wireless health monitoring systems are 
implemented to remotely monitor patients. One system 
implements wireless sensor network based on low power ZigBee. 
The system consists of set of sensor nodes (clients) to read data 
from various medical sensors process it and send wirelessly over 
ZigBee to a server node. The other system implements IP-based 
wireless sensor network, using Wi-Fi. The system consists of Wi-
Fi based sensor module to access bio-medical signals from patients 
and send it to a remote server which updates the database in real-
time. In both implementations, the server node collects the medical 
data from several client nodes and updates a remote database. The 
webserver application accesses the database and updates the 
webpage in real-time, which can be accessed remotely. 
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Abstract
In this paper, a secure mutual authentication scheme for an RFID implant system is developed. An insecure communication
channel between a tag and a reader makes the RFID implant system vulnerable to attacks and endangers the user’s safety and
privacy. The proposed scheme relies on elliptic curve cryptography and the D-Quark lightweight hash design. Compared to the
available public-key cryptosystems, elliptic curve-based cryptosystems are the best choice due to their small key sizes as well as
their eﬃciency in computations. The D-Quark lightweight hash design is tailored for resource constrained pervasive devices, cost,
and performance. The security analysis of the proposed authentication scheme revealed that it is secure against the relevant threat
models and provides a higher security level than related work found in the literature. The computational performance comparison
shows that our work has 48% less communication overhead compared to existing similar schemes. It also requires 24% less total
memory than the other approaches. The required computational time of our scheme is generally similar to other existing schemes.
Hence, the presented scheme is a well-suited choice for providing security for the resource-constrained RFID implant systems.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Elhadi M. Shakshuki.
Keywords: RFID implant system; IoT; security; healthcare; authentication and identification; elliptic curve cryptography
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as an attractive future networking paradigm. The new generation of Internet is
an IPv6 network interconnecting traditional computers and a large number of smart objects or networks. IoT consists
of smart objects and low-power networks such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)1, Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) networks2, Body Area Networks (BANs)3, and actuators. IoT provides an integration approach for all physical
objects that contain embedded technology to be coherently connected and enables them to communicate, sense and
interact with the physical world. Thus, information of any object or service will be accessible in a systematic way.
This results in the generation of enormous amounts of data which have to be stored, communicated, processed and
presented in a seamless, secure, and easily interoperable manner. IoT has many potential applications in our everyday
life: a smart home where no energy is wasted, productive businesses where oﬃces turn into smart and interactive
environments and factories transmit production-related information in real-time, and a proactive healthcare system
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that reduces costs without compromising the quality of health services. In the near future, most of the population
will benefit from the BANs. The combination of ”things” such as sensors, wireless radio, RFIDs and 6LoWPAN1
will enhance monitoring methods and measurements of vital functions such as temperature, blood pressure, heart rate,
cholesterol levels and blood glucose. IoT services and applications will also have a great impact on independent living
of elderly population by detecting their chronic diseases and activities of daily living using wearable and ambient
sensors.
An RFID implant system is one of the components of IoT-based healthcare solutions. It can be introduced into the
human’s body in order to store health and medical records that can save a patient’s life in emergency situations. In
such a system, the identification process can be done completely automatically and there is no need to type, confirm or
remember passwords. People who suﬀer from cancer, diabetes, coronary heart disease, cognitive impairments, seizure
disorders and Alzheimer’s are the best choice to benefit from the RFID implant system. It was approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2004 for clinical use4. VeriMed, the commercial application of VeriChip
RFID implants, has been designed to be used for patient identification in healthcare. An RFID Implant system, consists
of three components: Implantable RFID Tags, RFID Reader(s), and Back-end Database Server. Implantable RFID
Tags are medical devices embedded into a human body through a surgical procedure. The commercial implantable
tags used for patients are passive tags, they do not need any built-in battery and their operation relies on energy that
is emitted by an external RFID reader. As these tags do not have any moving parts, once implanted they can remain
activated for more than 10 years4. An RFID Reader communicates with the implantable RFID tags and the back-end
database server. In an RFID implant system, the reader runs queries to the tags. The essential information associated
to the owner of the tag is kept in a back-end database server for the subsequent utilization.
The communication channel between the tag and the reader is insecure and our goal is to make this channel
secure. Security is a major concern wherever networks are deployed at large scale. Due to direct involvement of
humans in IoT healthcare, providing robust and secure data communication among healthcare sensors, caregivers and
patients carrying RFID tags are crucial. Whether the data gathered from patients or individuals are obtained with the
consent of the person or without it due to the need by the system, misuse or privacy concerns may restrict people
from taking advantage of the full benefits from the system. An RFID implant system in healthcare is a resource-
constrained system and it requires eﬃcient and optimized security solutions where the data concerning the patients
is secured with Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authentication (CIA). Without strong security foundations, attacks and
malfunctions in the RFID implant system will outweigh any of its benefits. Conventional security and protection
mechanisms including existing cryptographic solutions and privacy assurance methods that have been proposed to
the RFID systems in general, cannot be re-used. This is because of resource constraints, diﬀerent security level
requirements, and the system architecture of an RFID implant system. Thus, an RFID implant system requires a
robust, optimized, and lightweight security framework to fulfill the security level requirement and hardware footprint
constraints eﬃciently.
In this paper, we propose a secure elliptic curve-based mutual authentication scheme for RFID implant systems that
can be used in healthcare applications. Compared to related work proposed for RFID systems in general, our proposed
scheme is more eﬃcient in terms of communication overhead and memory requirement while oﬀering higher level
of security. In previous work4, we have discussed that the hardware footprint, power consumption limitations, and
security level requirements of RFID implant systems are diﬀerent from mainstream applications of RFID due to the
delicate use cases and safety-critical specifications. Thus, security solutions being proposed in this regard must be
optimized based on characteristic restrictions and requirements of RFID implant systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related work. Section 3
discusses the security requirements and threat models of RFID implant systems. Section 4 presents our proposed
ECC-based mutual authentication scheme to the RFID implant systems. Section 5 provides a comprehensive security
and computational performance analysis of our scheme. In this section, the comparison of this work with similar
existing approaches is also presented. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Related Work
Several communication security schemes, either ECC-based or non ECC-based, have been proposed in literature
to solve security and privacy issues in RFID systems. In this section, we examine some of the existing ECC-based
security schemes for RFID systems since our proposed authentication scheme also relies on ECC.
In 2006, Tuyls et al.5 proposed an ECC-based RFID identification scheme using the Schnorr identification protocol.
They claimed that their scheme can resist against tag counterfeiting. However, in 2008 Lee et al. 6 presented that this
scheme suﬀers from the location tracking attack as well as forward security. In such a scheme when an adversary can
compute the public key X(= −t.P) of a tag, it can benefit from X in order to get access to other information related to
the tag. Lack of scalability is another problem of the Tuyls et al.’s scheme. This is because at each time a tag needs
to be identified, the reader should fetch the tag’s public key from the database server to verify it. This means that the
reader requires to perform linear search to identify each tag. By doing so, considerable computational cost will be
imposed to the whole system.
In 2007, Batina et al.7 proposed an ECC-based RFID identification scheme based on Okamoto’s authentication
algorithm. Although they claimed that their scheme can resist against active attacks, in 2008, Lee et al.8 asserted
that this scheme suﬀers from tracking as well as a forward secrecy problem. Lee et al. in 20106, proposed an ECC-
based RFID authentication scheme in order to address the existing tracking problems in5 and7. Nevertheless, in the
mentioned schemes, the authors merely consider tag to reader identification, excluding reader to tag authentication9.
This causes tags to reply to any malicious query being sent by an adversary. The major reason is that tags are not
capable of confirming to whom they are talking to. In 2011, Zhang et al. 10 proposed an ECC-based randomized key
scheme in order to improve Tuyls et al.’s and Lee et al.’s schemes. Although their scheme is secure against relevant
attacks concerning the RFID systems, it still not capable of performing mutual authentication. In 2013, Liao et al. 9
proposed a secure ECC-based authentication scheme integrated with ID-verifier transfer protocol. Similar to Zhang et
al.’s work, Lial et al.’s scheme achieves the required security level of RFID systems. However, their tag identification
scheme lacks performance eﬃciency in terms of the tag’s computation time and its memory requirement.
Based on the above-mentioned weaknesses and vulnerabilities, we believe that there still is lack of secure and
eﬃcient authentication scheme for RFID implant systems. In addition, hardware footprint and power consumption
limitations and security level requirements of RFID implant systems diﬀer from mainstream applications of RFID due
to the safety-critical specifications and delicate use cases.
3. Security Requirements and Threat Models of RFID Implant Systems
Security requirements and threat models of RFID implant systems in healthcare will be discussed in this section.
First, we present the security requirements of RFID implant systems and then we introduce the most relevant threat
and attack models.
3.1. Security Requirements
When designing an authentication scheme, the security requirements of an RFID implant system need to be well
defined. The security requirements can be defined in terms of mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability, and forward security.
Mutual Authentication: mutual authentication is a scheme where both sides, a tag and a reader, authenticate each
other. Unlike the most common authentication schemes, where just a party authenticates another party, mutual au-
thentication is critical if each of the parties is involved in a communication. Without having mutual authentication in
an RFID system, either of the parties can falsify their identities.
Confidentiality: all of the secret information concerning the RFID implant system are securely transmitted during
all communications. To ensure the confidentiality, one of the two parties, either the tag or the reader, transmit the
encrypted information and just the other one can decrypt it.
Data Integrity: the data collected and stored by a device must be protected from tampering by unauthorized parties.
Availability: the device should be resilient to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and a malicious entity should not be
able to aﬀect the operational capabilities of the device in any way.
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Forward Security: The property of forward security ensures that the revelation of the tag’s secret information will
not threaten the security of previously transmitted information.
3.2. Threat Models
In the following, we sketch some of the most relevant attack models concerning the RFID implant systems.
Unauthorized Location Tracking: such an attack is directed against the privacy of tagged people in order to track
their activities. For example, the activity of a person who is implanted with an RFID tag can be tracked by any
unauthorized person. This will happen if an adversary pretends to be a trusted component of an RFID implant system.
By doing so, the adversary will be able to track an implanted person and access his/her confidential information, or
implement a counterfeiting attack to probing the information that he captured from the tag.
Eavesdropping Attack: in an RFID implant system, with an eavesdropping attack the adversary can capture the
communications conveyed between the tag and the reader. In this type of attack the adversary does not need to
communicate with the RFID tag. He/she only captures the transmitted signals using Radio Frequency (RF) equipment.
The information gained by the adversary can be utilized later against the privacy of the implanted users.
Impersonation Attack: to impersonate either a tag or a reader in an RFID implant system. In this system, when there
is no authentication scheme to prove that the tag/reader is authentic, it is possible that the adversary implements the
impersonation attack against the whole system and utilizes the gained information (e.g. medical history of a patient)
in malicious ways. As a result, such a system requires a robust and secure authentication scheme to verify that the
tag/reader is valid.
Replay Attack: all messages transmitted between a tag and a reader can be captured and saved by an adversary.
Then, he/she can transmit the intercepted information in an attempt to deceive an authorized device and pass the
authentication phase. For example, an illegal reader may listen and capture the information transmitted between a tag
and an unauthorized reader, and then replay the communication in order to gain the same result that a legal reader and
tag can benefit from.
4. The Proposed Authentication Scheme
This section presents an ECC-based mutual authentication scheme that satisfies the security requirements in an
RFID implant system. A mutual authentication scheme enables the communicating parties, a tag and a reader, to
respectively verify and ensure each other’s identity. Later, it will be shown that the proposed communication scheme
is secure against several relevant attacks and compared to related work has less communication overhead and requires
less memory to perform the authentication.
The proposed scheme consists of three phases: 1. the reader authentication and verification phase, 2. the tag
identification phase, and 3. the tag verification phase. In the proposed scheme, we suppose that the communication
between the reader and the back-end database server is done through a secure channel, while communication between
the RFID implant tag and the reader is not secure. Our proposed ECC-based mutual authentication scheme will
provide a secure channel between the tag and the reader in such a way that they can communicate with each other
securely and eﬃciently. Before describing the three mentioned phases, in Definition 1, we first introduce parameters
and notations used in our proposed scheme.
4.1. Reader Authentication and Verification (Phase 1)
The reader authentication and verification phase of our proposed scheme relies on Elliptic Curve Discrete Loga-
rithm Problem (ECDLP)11. In this phase, the reader chooses a random number r1 ∈ Zn and computes R1 = r1.P as
its public key. Next, it initializes its counter value i1 to one and sends both R1 and i1 to the tag. It then increments
the value i1 by r1. Upon receiving the message, the tag checks whether i2 (which is initialized to zero) is greater
than i1. If the condition holds, it replaces i2 by i1 and selects a random number r2 ∈ Zn. Then, the tag computes
r3 = X(r2.P) ∗ Y(R1) where * is a non-algebraic operation over the abscissa of (r2.P) and the ordinate of R1 (This
operation can be either modular addition if the field is binary or a bitwise xor if the field is prime) and it sends the
value r3 to the reader. After receiving r3, the reader computes R2 = r1.IDt + r3.s3 and sends the value R2 to the tag.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code of Reader Authentication and
Veriﬁcation
Inputs: (r1, R1): The private key and the public key of the
reader. i1: The reader’s counter value.
Output: Determine whether the reader authentic or not?
Body:
1: i1 ← 1;
2: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
3: r1 ← i;
4: R1 ← r1.P ;
5: i1 ← i1 + r1;
6: end for
7: send R1 to the tag;
8: for j = 1 to n− 1 do
9: if i1 ≥ i2 then
10: i2 ← i1;
11: r3 ← X(r2.P ) ∗ Y (R1);
12: end if
13: end for
14: Tag send r3 to the reader;
15: Reader computes R2 ← r1.IDt + r3.s3 and sends the value
R2 to the tag;
16: if (R2 − r1.IDt)r−13 .P = IDr then
17: return Success;
18: end if
Finally, the tag checks whether (R2 − r1.IDt)r−13 .P = IDr holds. Then, the tag verifies that the reader is authentic.
Algorithm 1 shows how the authentication and verification of the reader is done in this scheme.
4.2. Tag Identification (Phase 2)
Both the tag identification and the tag verification phases of our proposed scheme rely on Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)11 using Quark lightweight hash design. Quark is one of the most recent lightweight
hash designs and it was first proposed by Aumasson et al. in 201312. The design of Quark lightweight hash relies
on non-linear Boolean functions and bit shift registers. Therefore, not only its implementation becomes feasible, but
also, the circuit area requirements of this hash design are well suited for implantable medical devices. In addition,
a digital signature oﬀers identification along with integrity and non-repudiation. In our previous work, we stated
that due to the resource limitations and the delicate use cases of the RFID implant systems, the need for lightweight
cryptographic hash designs has to be carefully considered. That is the reason why in our proposed ECC-based tag
identification algorithm, we utilized the D-Quark (one of the flavors of Quark) lightweight hash design rather than the
general purpose hash designs (e.g. SHA-113 and SHA-314)15.
In the tag identification phase of our proposed scheme, the tag’s initial secret point is s1 ∈ E(Fg) from which the
next secret point s2 and IDt will be computed. To generate the second secret point, the tag computes s2 = f (X(s1)).P.
Obtaining the first secret point from the second is diﬃcult, as it requires the computation of an elliptic discrete
logarithm. Since the second key is generated from the second key, our scheme provides forward security.
For the sake of eﬃciency, the function f should be selected in a manner that avoids large Hamming weights for s2,
assuring that the computation of s2.P will be fast without compromising security16. Once the generation of the second
secret point s2 is done, the tag selects a random integer k ∈ Zg and computes a curve point (x, y) = k.G. In order to send
its digital signed message (d, c) to the reader, the tag computes d = x mod n. If d = 0, the tag starts to select another
random number k ∈ Zg and computes the next curve point. The tag computes its IDt = Mb(X(s1)) ∗ Mb(X(s2)).P
where Mb will output some middle bits of the input values. The operand * is a non-algebraic operation ∈ Fg done over
the abscissa of the first and the second secret points (This operation is modular addition as the field is binary). Then,
the tag computes c = k(hash(IDt) + X(s1).d). Here again, if the computed c = 0, the tag will start the algorithm by
selecting another random integer k. Finally, the tag sends the computed values (d, c) and (IDt) to the reader. Algorithm
2 shows the pseudo-code of the tag identification phase of the proposed scheme.
4.3. Tag Verification (Phase 3)
In this phase, in order to verify the tag is authentic the reader selects a random integer rs ∈ Zn and it computes its
public key pr = rs.P. for j ∈ [1, n − 1], the reader checks whether d, c ∈ Zn. If the result is valid, the reader calculates
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Algorithm 2 Pseudo-code of Tag Identiﬁcation
Inputs: rs ∈ Zn: a random integer (sent from the reader’s side)
and a hello request. s1: tag’s ﬁrst secret point.
Output: IDt: Tag’s ID and (d, c): the tag’s digital signature.
Body:
1: The tag checks:
2: if rs = 0 then
3: s2 = f(X(s1)).P ;
4: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
5: The tag selects a random integer k and computes the
curve point (x, y) = k.G;
6: The tag computes d = x mod n;
7: if d = 0 then
goto 3;
8: end if
9: The tag computes the value of its ID as: IDt =
(Mb(X(s1)) ∗Mb(X(s2))).P ;
10: Then, the tag computes: c = k.(Hash(IDt) +X(s1) ∗
d) mod n;
11: if c = 0 then
goto 3;
12: end if
13: send IDt, (d, c) to the reader;
14: end for
15: end if
$OJRULWKP  3VHXGRFRGH RI 7DJ 9HUL¿FDWLRQ
,QSXWV IDt 7KH WDJ¶V ,' DQG (d, c) WKH WDJ¶V GLJLWDO VLJQDWXUH
2XWSXW 'HWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKH WDJ LV DXWKHQWLF RU QRW"
%RG\
 IRU j = 1 WR n− 1 GR
 LI d, c ∈ [1, n− 1] WKHQ
 h = Hash(IDt)
 z OHIW PRVW ELW RI h
 w = c−1 mod n
 u1 = zw mod n
 u2 = dw mod n
 FXUYH SRLQW (x, y) = u1.P + pr
 HQG LI
 HQG IRU
 LI r = x mod n WKHQ
 UHWXUQ 6XFFHVV
 HQG LI
h = Hash(IDt), where Hash is the same Quark lightweight hash function that is used in the previous phase to generate
the tag’s signature. Once the hash value of (IDt) is computed, the reader selects the leftmost bit of h and denotes it as
z. Then, the reader calculates the values w, u1, u2 exactly as shown in Algorithm 3. Based on the calculated values,
the reader computes the curve point (x, y) = u1.P+ pr. Finally, the reader will accept the tag’s signature as a valid one
if the equation r = x mod n holds.
5. Security and Computational Performance Analysis of The Proposed Authentication Scheme
In this section, we will analyze the security and performance of the proposed scheme in order to verify whether the
essential requirements have been satisfied.
5.1. Security Analysis
In the following, we analyze our proposed scheme against some of the most relevant attacks. As it is mentioned in
section 4, we assume that the communication between the reader and the back-end database server is done through a
secure channel, while communication between the implantable tag and the reader is not secure.
Mutual Authentication: in the reader authentication phase of our proposed scheme, to verify that the reader is legal,
the tag computes whether (R2 − r1.IDt)r−13 .P = IDr. Conversely, to verify whether the tag is authentic (based on
its transmitted (IDt) and the digital signed message), the reader checks if r = x mod n holds. This is how mutual
authentication is achieved in our proposed scheme.
Availability: in our scheme, since the tag and the reader change their secret points s1, s2, and s3 once they are
successfully authenticated, it is not possible that an adversary performs a denial of service attack.
Forward Security: in our scheme, if an adversary tries to decrypt some of the information that he has eavesdropped,
for example the tag’s second secret key s2, he/she will not benefit from the gained information. Obtaining the first
secret key from the second one will require a solution to the ECDSA, which is not easily possible.
Unauthorized Tracking of The Tag: In our proposed scheme, the only public information concerning the tag is
its ID. In the tag identification phase, it was shown that the value of the tag’s ID results from the product of a non-
algebraic operation done over some middle bits of the abscissa of the first and second secret keys of the tag. As
a result, it is impossible to compute and obtain the tag’s secret keys from its current ID. The main reason is that
obtaining the secret points implies the computation of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Since solving the
discrete logarithm problem is as hard as the integer factorization problem, this problem cannot be solved eﬀortlessly.
Thus far, there has not been any polynomial time algorithm proposed to solve discrete logarithm problems.
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Table 1. Security properties comparison with the available ECC-based designs.
Batina et al. 7 Zhang et al. 10 Liao et al. 9 Lee et al. 6 This work
Tracking of the tag No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eavesdropping attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Impersonation attack No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Replay attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Forward security No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Anonymity No Yes Yes No Yes
Mutual authentication No No Yes No Yes
Availability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Eavesdropping Attack: In our scheme, from one hand, in the tag identification phase, if an adversary tries to guess
the tag’s secrets s1 and s2, the only public information concerning it is ID. As it was discussed earlier, the bits of
the tag’s ID result from a non-algebraic operation done over some middle bits of the abscissa of two diﬀerent secret
points s1 and s2. Thus, it is computationally unfeasible to obtain the secret from its ID. On the other hand, in the
digital signature generation section, if an adversary could guess the value d, it cannot obtain the value c eﬀortlessly.
This value is also generated from a non-algebraic operation done over the abscissa of the secret point s1 and the
value d. The gained result will be added to the hash value of IDt and multiplied by a random number k. Such an
operation cannot be easily computed by an adversary as it requires to compute the discrete logarithm problem that
is not computationally feasible. For the same reason, in the reader authentication phase, even if an adversary could
guess one of the values R1 or R2 or r3, he/she still cannot easily obtain other secure information related to the reader.
Based on the discussion above, the adversary also cannot implement any Replay Attack.
Impersonation Attack: concerning this type of attack, we consider two diﬀerent scenarios:
• Impersonation of the reader: here, if an adversary tries to impersonate the reader, he/she will fail. This is
because if the attacker tries to impersonate as a fake reader to the tag, he/she must compute R1 and at the same
time try to guess the value r2 (which is not easily feasible). Nevertheless, without the reader’s computed value
R2 = r1.IDt + r3.s1, the adversary (fake reader) cannot compute (R2 − r1.IDt)r−13 .P = IDr to verify whether the
reader is authentic.
• Impersonation of the tag: in order to impersonate the tag of our proposed scheme, an adversary needs to have
an access to the tag’s secrets s1 and s2 and as it was presented earlier in this section, the values of the secret
keys cannot be acquired from the public information of the system IDt.
Based on the discussion above, our proposed scheme is secure and robust against relevant attacks related to RFID
systems. The security properties comparison of our proposed scheme and other ECC-based related works is presented
in Table 1. In the table, the term ”Yes” states that the available ECC-based designs are secure against the above-
mentioned attacks. ”No” indicates that those ECC-based designs are not robust and secure against the specified
attacks and the threats models. From the security point of view, as the table shows, Lee et al.’s and Zhang et al.’s
schemes have almost the same properties against diﬀerent types of attacks. Nevertheless, their major disadvantage is
that they do not have any security solution for mutual authentication. Although the security properties of our scheme
are similar to Liao et al.’s scheme, in the next section we will show that our scheme provides better eﬃciency in terms
of computational cost, total memory required, and communication overhead.
5.2. Computational Performance Analysis
As it was presented earlier, implantable tags are resource-constrained pervasive devices. They are tiny in terms of
size and computational capacity. Hence, it is important to analyze the performance of the authentication scheme to
ensure that the overhead is minimal. Such an analysis can be done based on various criteria including computational
cost, memory requirements, and communication overhead. In this work, we mainly focus on the performance analysis
of implantable tags since RFID readers are known to be robust devices9.
205 Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  32 ( 2014 )  198 – 206 
As a common cryptographic primitive, we utilize standardized 163-bit elliptic curve domain parameters recom-
mended by National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST). The parameters are defined over the binary finite
field F(2163). We utilize ECDSA algorithm having the coordinate (x, y). As a reminder, the elliptic curve domain
parameters over F(2m) are specified by the tuple T = (m, f (x), a, b,G, n, h) where m = 163 and the representation of
F(2163) is defined by, f (x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 111. In their work, Godor et al. 17 measured the computational
time required for scalar multiplication of 163-bit point elliptic curve, the SHA-1 hash function13, and the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)18 algorithm. As an environment to measure the computational time for the mentioned
cryptography algorithms, they used an Intel Core2 CPU T5500 1.66 GHz having 1GB RAM. Based on the results
deduced from their work, at the frequency of 5 MHz, the computational time required to compute the scalar multipli-
cation of 163-bit point elliptic curve is 64 ms19.
Kumar et al.20 presented that in High Frequencies (HF) such as 13.56 MHz, which is normally the frequency used
in most RFID applications (e.g. smart cards, access control and libraries), the scalar multiplication of 163-bit point
elliptic curve is done in 31.8 ms. Nevertheless, such a frequency and other higher frequencies have not been approved
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) neither for Implantable Medical Device (IMD) applications nor
human identification purposes4. In Low Frequencies (LF) such as 323 KHz, 243 ms computational time is needed for
completing the scalar multiplication, which is too long compared to 64 ms. Hence, we evaluate the performance of
our proposed ECC-based scheme at 5 MHz frequency. In addition to reducing the computation time, this allow us to
make a fair comparison with related work and also to take into account the restriction of the FDA.
In our proposed scheme, we outline the storage requirement by considering the tag’s memory including its public
key and private key. The private key is denoted as the tag’s secret keys s1 and s2 and the public key is the tag’s public
key IDt. In the proposed scheme, the required memory consists of (IDt,s1,s2) where the IDt needs 163 bits memory
and s1 and s2 together require 326 bits memory. So the total required memory is: 62 bytes= 163 bits + 326 bits. Table
2 presents the performance comparison of our proposed tag identification scheme with related work.
The computational cost of our proposed tag identification algorithm includes three scalar points and it is computed
as: (64 ms * 3 = 192 ms). Thus, our tag identification algorithm requires 192 ms to compute the multiplication of the
three scalar points of the scheme. As Table 2 presents, when the number of ECC scalar point multiplication (ECm)
increases, it will have a direct impact to the time required to do this multiplication. Hence, in real-time systems, the
system will require considerable time until the authentication is performed successfully.
Table 2. Performance comparison with the available ECC-based designs.
Batina et al. 7 Zhang et al. 10 Liao et al. 9 Lee et al. 6 This work
Communication-overhead 82 82 82 82 42
(ECm,hash) (2,0) (3,0) (5,0) (3,0) (3,1)
Public-key memory 41 41 61 41 21
Private-key memory 41 41 41 41 41
Total memory (byte) 82 82 102 82 62
Computational time (ms) 128 192 320 192 192
To evaluate the communication overhead of our algorithm, the information that is transmitted between the tag
and the reader during the tag identification phase needs to be considered. Hence, in our scheme we evaluated the
value of communication overhead based on the messages IDt, (d, c) exchanged between the tag and the reader in the
mentioned phase. Here, the overhead is 42 bytes and it is evaluated as: (163 * 2 = 326/8 bytes).
The communication overhead of the proposed elliptic curve-based mutual authentication scheme is compared with
the other schemes. The proposed scheme achieves 48% reduction in communication overhead compared to the Batina
et al.’s, the Zhang et al.’s, the Liao et al.’s and the Lee et al.’s schemes, respectively. In case of total memory, it
requires 24% less memory than the Batina et al.’s, the Zhang et al.’s and the Lee et al.’s schemes. Compared to Liao
et al.’s scheme, the proposed scheme requires 39% less storage. Our proposed scheme needs the same amount of
computation time as Zhang et al.’s and the Lee et al.’s to perform the authentication between the tag and the reader.
Compared to Liao et al.’s scheme, the computational time of the proposed scheme reduces by 60%. However, the
computation time increases by 50% compared to Batina et al.’s scheme.
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel secure elliptic curve-based mutual authentication scheme for RFID implant
systems. To the best of our knowledge, previously proposed elliptic curve-based authentication schemes, concerning
RFID systems in general, cannot fully fulfill the essential security and performance requirements of RFID implant
systems. Most of the earlier proposed solutions were not secure against the most relevant attacks of the RFID systems
or they were not capable of performing mutual authentication between a tag and a reader. The proposed mutual
authentication scheme relies on elliptic curve cryptography. An elliptic curve cryptosystem is more eﬃcient in terms
of key sizes and required computations than conventional public key cryptosystems. In the proposed scheme, reader
authentication and verification is performed based on ECDLP. While tag identification and tag verification phases
rely on ECDSA using Quark lightweight hash. We proved that our proposed scheme is secure against the relevant
attacks and also ensures a higher security level than related work found in the literature. In addition, we carried out
computational performance analysis of our proposed scheme and the analysis results show that our elliptic curve-
based mutual authentication scheme has 48% less communication overhead than similar available schemes. It also
requires 24-39% less total memory than the compared existing schemes. Based on the results presented in this paper,
we conclude that the proposed scheme has the appropriate features for use in RFID implant systems. We believe that
our scheme is not just limited to RFID implant systems, it can also be applied to any application of IoT that requires
secure and eﬃcient authentication.
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ABSTRACT We propose a low-latency approach for generating secure electrocardiogram (ECG) feature-
based cryptographic keys. This is done by taking advantage of the uniqueness and randomness properties
of ECG’s main features. This approach achieves a low-latency since the key generation relies on four
reference-free ECG’s main features that can be acquired in short time. We call the approach several ECG
features (SEF)-based cryptographic key generation. SEF consists of: 1) detecting the arrival time of ECG’s
fiducial points using Daubechies wavelet transform to compute ECG’s main features accordingly; 2) using a
dynamic technique to specify the optimum number of bits that can be extracted from each main ECG feature,
comprising of PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST intervals; 3) generating cryptographic keys by exploiting the above-
mentioned ECG features; and 4) consolidating and strengthening the SEF approach with cryptographically
secure pseudo-random number generators. Fibonacci linear feedback shift register and advanced encryption
standard algorithms are implemented as the pseudo-random number generator to enhance the security level
of the generated cryptographic keys. Our approach is applied to 239 subjects’ ECG signals comprising of
normal sinus rhythm, arrhythmia, atrial fibrillation, and myocardial infraction. The security analyses of the
proposed approach are carried out in terms of distinctiveness, test of randomness, temporal variance, and
using National Institute of Standards and Technology benchmark. The analyses reveal that the normal ECG
rhythms have slightly better randomness compared with the abnormal ones. The analyses also show that
the strengthened SEF key generation approach provides a higher security level in comparison to existing
approaches that rely only on singleton ECG features. For the normal ECG rhythms, the SEF approach has in
average the entropy of about 0.98 while cryptographic keys which are generated utilizing the strengthened
SEF approach offer the entropy of ∼1. The execution time required to generate the cryptographic keys on
different processors is also examined. The results reveal that our SEF approach is in average 1.8 times faster
than existing key generation approaches which only utilize the inter pulse interval feature of ECG.
INDEX TERMS Cryptographic key generation, electrocardiogram, bio-electrical signal, body area network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Body Area Network (BAN) is one of the main enabling
technologies for ubiquitous healthcare systems [1]. It has
emerged as a new design to carry out remote patient mon-
itoring efficiently. BAN comprises of medical sensors that
obtain, process, manage, transmit, and store patients’ health
information at all times. Sincemedical sensor nodes deal with
patients’ vital health data, securing their communication is an
absolute necessity [2]. Without robust security features not
only patients’ privacy can be breached but also adversaries
can potentially manipulate actual health data resulting in
inaccurate diagnosis and treatment [3].
Medical sensors rely on cryptography to secure their com-
munications [4]. Proper application of cryptography requires
the use of secure keys and key generation methods. Key
generation approaches that are proposed for generic wireless
sensors are not directly applicable to tiny sensors used in
BANs as they are highly resource-constrained and demand
a higher security level [5]. Key generation in sensor networks
generally requires some form of pre-deployment. Neverthe-
less, given the constrained nature of medical sensors used in
BSNs, conventional key generation approaches may poten-
tially involve reasonable computations as well as latency dur-
ing network or any subsequent adjustments, due to their need
for pre-deployment. Biometrics are generally regarded as
the only solution that is lightweight, requires low resources,
and indeed can identify authorized subjects in BANs [4],
[6]–[8]. By developing robust key generation approaches
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using biometric systems, the security of medical sensors can
be offered in a plug-n-play manner where neither a net-
work establishment nor a key pre-distribution mechanism is
required. Cryptographic keys can be generated within the
network on the fly through the usage of information collected
by medical sensors. Furthermore, key revocation and renewal
will be done automatically when and as needed. The choice
of a biometric to be used for generating cryptographic keys
relies on the capability of medical sensors on extracting
an individual’s relevant biometric information. The selected
feature(s) should also meet the following design goals [4]: (i)
Distinctive, meaning that it should be different for different
subjects at any given time. (ii) Time-variant, meaning that it
should be different for the same person at different time inter-
vals. (iii) Random, meaning that it should be cryptographi-
cally random to provide security. A low degree of randomness
enables an attacker to acquire a patient’s cryptographic key
and manipulate their medical data. (iv) Universal, meaning
that the feature should be measurable from each subject.
Iris, fingerprints, and voice are some physiological features
of the body which have the potential to identify individuals
with a high degree of assurance. However, these biometric
traits are not secure enough to be used for key generation
techniques. The reason is that people often leave their finger-
prints everywhere, audio recorders can be utilized to deceive
speech recognition systems, and iris images can be captured
by hidden cameras [1]. Over the last decades, several efforts
have been made for the development of the next genera-
tion of biometrics known as internal biometrics (also called
physiological biometrics or bio-signals) [9]. The main physi-
ological biometrics include electrocardiogram (ECG), elec-
troencephalogram (EEG) [10], and photoplethysmogram
(PPG) [11]. From mentioned bio-signals, ECG is the only
fiducial-based physiological signal of humans. Fiducials are
points of interest (P, Q, R, S, and T waves) that can be
extracted from each ECG signal. It has been found that
the ECG meets the aforementioned design goals of a bio-
metric trait to be used for cryptographic key generation
techniques [4], [7].
Current ECG-based cryptographic keys are mostly gener-
ated using Inter Pulse Interval (IPI) feature of an ECG signal
[5], [7], [12]–[16]. IPI is measured from two consecutive
R peak points where the R peaks are the tallest and most
conspicuous peaks in an ECG signal. In [17], we demon-
strated that existing IPI-based key generation approaches
suffer from a low level of security in terms of distinctive-
ness, test of randomness, and temporal variance. In this
regard, in [17], we presented two different ECG-based cryp-
tographic key generation approaches that offer higher secu-
rity levels compared to conventional approaches. More pre-
cisely, we proposed to integrate Cryptographically Secure
Pseudo-Random Number Generators (CSPRNG) along with
IPI sequences to generate robust ECG-based cryptographic
keys. First, we proposed a strengthened IPI-based key gener-
ation approach using a sequence of IPIs and the Fibonacci
Linear Feedback Shift Register Pseudo Random Number
Generator (LFSR-PRNG), called IPI-PRNG [18]. Second, we
proposed an alternative key generation approach that utilized
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm [19] and
IPI sequences as the seed generator for the AES, called IPI-
AES. In IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches, our main focus
was to enhance the security of the generated cryptographic
keys while realizing a clear trade-off between the security
level and key generation execution time.
In this article, we propose a new approach, called Several
ECG Feature (SEF) based cryptographic key generation. The
SEF approach alleviates the key generation execution over-
head of the existing as well as our previous approaches, while
preserving the achieved high security levels. The proposed
approach is applied to both normal and abnormal ECG sig-
nals. The main contributions of this article, which is a major
extension of our recent work published in [17], are threefold:
• The SEF approach uses 4 main reference-free1 features
of the ECG signal (being extracted from every ECG
heartbeat cycle) along with consecutive IPI sequences
to generate ECG-based cryptographic keys.
• To reinforce and enhance the security level of our
approach, we consolidate the SEF key generation
approach with two different cryptographically secured
pseudo random number generators: (i) SEF-PRNG: we
strengthened the security level of the SEF approach by
exploiting the Fibonacci-LFSR pseudo random num-
ber generator (ii) SEF-AES: our SEF approach is also
strengthened by utilizing the AES algorithm in counter
mode. This technique exploits our SEF key generation
approach as the seed generator for the AES algorithm.
• We evaluate the efficiency of our SEF, SEF-PRNG,
and SEF-AES approaches by simulations in terms of
distinctiveness, test of randomness, temporal variance,
and execution time on real ECG data from 239 subjects
with different heart health conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
in Section II, the related work and motivation are dis-
cussed. In Section III, bio-electrical signals and ECG char-
acteristics are discussed. Section IV presents the proposed
cryptographic key generation approaches utilizing the ECG
bio-electrical signal. Simulation results including distinctive-
ness, test of randomness, temporal variance, and key genera-
tion execution time are provided and discussed in Section V.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
In [20]–[24], fuzzy vault-based bio-cryptographic key
generation protocols are proposed for BANs. In each of
these protocols, frequency domain characteristics of PPG
and ECG signals are used as the physiological parameters.
Bao et al. [25] presented an entity authentication protocol
and a fuzzy commitment-based key distribution protocol, in
which the IPI values generated from the PPG signals are
1In this context, the reference-free property indicates a dynamic technique
in which no ECG fiducial point is fixed as reference.
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employed as the physiological parameters. In their work,
adaptive segmentation is used to divide the value range of
the IPI into segments. The main drawback of the above-
mentioned approaches is that they are not applicable enough
to be used for generating cryptographic keys for medical
sensors. This is due to the required heavy-weight computa-
tions. Poon et al. [4] and Zhang et al. [7] further evaluated
the performance of Bao et al.’s [25] approach using both PPG
and ECG signals with respect to their error rates. In another
study by Bao et al. [12], another solution is proposed for
which physiological parameter generation is utilized in a bio-
cryptographic security protocol. The authors claimed that the
physiological parameters which are generated utilizing the
individual and multi-level IPI sequences have comparable
distinctiveness and randomness. Nevertheless, the latency of
these approaches is very high as 256 IPIs are required in order
to generate a 64 bit cryptographic key.
Altop et al. [5] and Xu et al. [14] proposed key gen-
eration approaches in which the IPI values generated from
ECG signals are utilized. In both of these works, the authors
employ Gray encoding to map each IPI value to a 4-bit binary
number using a uniform quantization method. According
to the authors, the generated physiological parameters pass
the randomness measurement tests presented by the NIST
test benchmark [26]. They also stated that the generated
physiological parameters pass both temporal variance and
distinctiveness tests. However, in [5] and [14] no related
numerical information for experimental performance evalu-
ation in terms of key generation execution time is provided.
In addition, compared to our approach, these works have
failed to provide as high a security level as our approach in
terms of distinctiveness, test of randomness, and temporal
variance. Zhang et al. [7], Poon et al. [4], and Bao et al. [12]
evaluated the performance of the physiological parameter
generation, utilizing both PPG and ECG signals. The authors
developed physiological parameter generation techniques
which can be utilized in bio-cryptographic key generation
approaches. In their work, these authors claimed that phys-
iological parameters generated utilizing IPI sequences offer
promising features to be exploited for cryptographic key
generation approaches.
Zheng et al. [27] proposed a time-domain physiological
parameter generation method. They used the time distances
between the R peaks as the reference points and other
peak values of an ECG signal from one heartbeat cycle.
The authors claimed that their solution is faster than the
conventional IPI-based methods and it ensures the property
of randomness. However, their proposed approach lacks reli-
ability as it is only applicable to ECG records collected form
subjects with normal ECG rhythm or subjects with no sever
cardiovascular diseases. In healthcare systems, subjects often
suffer from Cardiovascular Diseases (CVDs) such as Cardiac
Arrhythmia, Poor R-wave Progression,Myocardial infraction
and Anterior Wall MI in which the R peaks are not easily
detectable, or might be even missing within one heartbeat
cycle. Choosing the R peak as the reference for calculation
all the other features is not always reliable to be used for the
binary sequence generations. In addition, as the main focus
of the approach present in [27] is on rapid key generation,
distinctiveness and temporal variance properties were not
analyzed and reported in their approach. In this context, we
claim that a robust ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approach needs to cover both healthy and unhealthy human
subjects. This necessities ECG features selection which is
independent of any reference point. In a scenario where one
or more fiducial points cannot be detected (due to some
abnormalities), the system tries to compute and use as many
features as it can collect from the current heartbeat cycle.
This will be continued until the next heartbeat cycle(s) that
ECG signal becomes normal. When ECG features selection
is independent of any reference point, the efficiency and
reliability of the ECG-based cryptographic key generation
will not be affected.
In [17], our main focus was on the development and
analysis of secure and efficient ECG-based cryptographic
key generation techniques. We proposed two different ECG-
based cryptographic key generation approaches for which the
IPI feature of ECG underlays both of the approaches. The
aim was to enhance the security of BANs through a robust
key generation approach where keys are generated on the
fly without requiring key pre-distribution solutions. It was
realized that there is a clear trade-off between the security
level and the key generation execution time of the proposed
ECG-based cryptographic key generation approaches. This
article essentially extends our previous work by reducing the
key generation execution times yet providing high security
levels. Our proposal is motivated by the fact that to alleviate
the key generation execution times, while preserving high
security levels, other main features of an ECG signal in addi-
tion to RR (also known as IPI) can be exploited. In this regard,
our proposed approach exploits the main fiducial points of an
ECG signal to detect and compute the the main ECG features.
The utilized main features include PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST
intervals. This is based on the fact these features are highly
reliable and ensure the randomness property. For this purpose,
we have comprehensively studied the aforementioned main
features of most known ECG signals ranging from normal
to abnormal ones belonging to patients with various cardio-
vascular diseases. We have also investigated the property of
randomness of the aforementioned features to ensure that they
can be used along with IPI for generating cryptographic keys.
We hypothesize that, by exploiting additional features, cryp-
tographic keys can be generated faster and in more efficient
and reliable manner than those approaches which rely only on
singleton IPI sequences and require R peaks as the reference
points. Our approach considers both normal and abnormal
electrocardiogram signal waveforms.
III. BIO-ELECTRICAL SIGNALS AND
ELECTROCARDIOGRAM (ECG) CHARACTERISTICS
A Bio-electrical signal is any signal that can be continu-
ously monitored and measured from any living being’s body.
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Bio-electrical signals refer to the change in electric current
generated by the sum of an electrical potential difference
across an organ, a specialized tissue or a cell system. Such
signals are low frequency and low amplitude electrical signals
that can be measured from biological beings, for instance,
humans.
ECG is a rhythmically repeating and quasi-periodical sig-
nal which is synchronized by the function of the heart, and the
heart performs the generation of bio-electrical events. It is the
electrical manifestation of the contractile activity of the heart
that is recorded at the chest level by measuring signal levels
from several electrical leads attached to the patient’s skin.
ECG has been mainly employed in various medical applica-
tions. For instance, it has been utilized to diagnose cardiac
diseases, which are one of the leading causes of death in the
world [28]. Over the last few decades, there have been many
efforts to develop automatic and computer-based diagnostics
of heart failures [6], [21], [29]–[31]. Recently, ECG has been
broadly utilized for biometric identification [32]–[35].
ECG signals consist of a series of positive and negative
waves. Signals captured from each lead provide different
information. In a single heartbeat cycle, there are particular
waves called P, QRS and T that can be recognized using
different leads for measurement. The first peak, the P wave,
is a small upward wave, which specifies atrial depolarization.
Approximately 160 ms after the onset of the P wave, the QRS
wave is produced by ventricle depolarization. The ventricular
Twave in the ECG indicates the stage of re-polarization of the
ventricles. A significant modification concerning the ECG
anatomy occurs from birth to adolescence, that is, during the
first 16 years of life [36]. According to the study presented
in [36], the amplitude of the P wave does not change consid-
erably while the amplitudes of the S and Rwaves reduce from
childhood to adolescence. A progressive modification of the
Twave from childhood to adolescence has also been stated by
Dickinson [37]. 48 In addition, the QT interval will shorten
much more than the rest of the intervals when the heart rate
increases. This change can be corrected by normalizing the
QT interval according to the heart rate. The dependence of
the QT interval to heart rate can be adjusted utilizing Bazett’s
QT interval correction for which the corrected QT interval is
found to be somewhat constant over the years [38]. It should
be mentioned that for simplicity, we have not considered QT
interval correction/normalization in this article. Aging does
not affect any gender-based variances in cardiac electrophys-
iological properties in adolescents. However, stress, anxiety,
and physical exercise can change the Heart Rate Variability
(HRV) and morphology [36].
IV. GENERATING CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS UTILIZING
ECG BIO-ELECTRICAL SIGNAL
Medical sensors rely on cryptographic keys to secure end-
to-end communications or encrypt/decrypt messages that
need to be conveyed between the sensors and health
caregivers [17], [39]. Solutions based on cryptographic keys
generated from individuals’ ECG signals are best suited for
tiny medical sensors as these solutions are lightweight and
require low resources [8]. By developing robust and effi-
cient cryptographic key generation approaches, the security
of medical sensors can be offered in a plug-and-play man-
ner where neither a network establishment nor a key pre-
distribution mechanism is required. Cryptographic keys can
be generated within the network on the fly via the usage
of ECG data collected by medical sensors when and as
needed. The generated keys can be employed, for example,
in end-to-end communications to securely encrypt/decrypt
patients’ medical data being transferred between sensors
and health caregivers [17], [39]. The keys can also be used
for authentication and authorization of peers, confidentiality,
and integrity of the conveyed messages in BSNs [40]–[42].
A robust cryptographic key generated within a BAN can also
prevent probable attack scenarios including passive informa-
tion gathering and message corruption, replay attacks and
Denial of Service attacks (DoS), just to name a few.
As Fig. 1 presents, the first step to generate ECG-based
cryptographic keys is raw ECG data acquisition from sub-
jects. The collected ECG data include information about the
heart rate, morphology, and rhythm being recorded by placing
a set of electrodes on body surfaces such as neck, chest,
legs, and arms. Once collected, raw ECG data needs to be
prepared for further analysis. Analysis of the ECG signal can
be split into two principal steps by functionality: ECG signal
pre-processing and feature extraction.
A. ECG SIGNAL PRE-PROCESSING
The collected data fromECG signals normally contains noise.
The noise has to be removed since the presence of noise
makes the analysis and the classification of the data less
accurate. Pre-processing suppresses or removes noise from
an ECG signal by employing an appropriate filtering scheme.
Hence, pre-processing is an essential task prior to extracting
the features of an ECG signal.
B. ECG SIGNAL FEATURE EXTRACTION
ECG feature extraction is a procedurewhere themain features
of a sample are extracted. The main objective of the ECG
feature extraction process is to select and maintain relevant
data of an original signal. Current ECG feature extraction
methods are classified into two major classes, fiducial meth-
ods and non-fiducial methods. In fiducial methods, points of
interest including P, Q, R, S, and T within a single heart-
beat waveform (i.e., local minima or maxima or amplitude
difference between consecutive fiducial points) are used.
Algorithms based on non-fiducial points do not utilize pecu-
liar points to generate the feature set. Non-fiducial methods
extract discriminative data from an ECG signal without hav-
ing to concentrate on fiducial points. They are prone to a
high dimension feature space, which in turn propagates the
computational overhead and requires more information for
trainings that are practically unbounded [43]. High dimen-
sional information may include irrelevant and superfluous
data that can degrade the performance of the classifier. In this
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FIGURE 1. Block diagram of ECG signal analysis and n-bit binary sequence generation using consecutive IPI sequences.
article, a fiducial-based algorithm is employed to perform the
ECG feature extraction task. In particular, Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT) is utilized to extract the required features
of individuals’ ECG signal.
The DWT is a prevalent technique for frequency and time
analysis. Wavelet transformation is a linear function which
decomposes a signal into components at different resolutions
(or scales). Let ψ(t) be a real (or complex valued function)
∈ L2(R). The ψ(t) function can be considered as a wavelet,
if and only if, its Fourier transform ψˆ(ω) satisfies the follow-
ing equation [43]:∫ ∞
−∞
(
|ψˆ(ω)|2
|ω| ) = Fψ <∞ (1)
This tolerability clause implies that:∫ ∞
−∞
ψ(t)dt = 0 (2)
This means that ψ(t) is oscillatory which its area is equal to
zero. Let ψx(t):
ψx(t) = 1√xψ
( t
x
)
(3)
be the dilation of ψ(t) by a scale factor of x > 0. In the
above expression, 1√x is utilized for energy normalization.
Wavelet transform utilizes a series of small wavelets with
confined duration in order to decompose a signal. Therefore,
the wavelet transform of a function f (t) ∈ L2(R) at scale x
and position l can be written as:
Wf (x, l) = 1√x
∫ ∞
−∞
f (t)ψ∗( t − l
x
)dt (4)
where x is the scale factor, l is the translation of ψ(t) and *
denotes the complex conjugate of ψ(t).
The non-stationary nature of ECG signals allows one to
extend principal functions produced by shifting and scaling
of a single prototype function denoted as the mother wavelet.
Various wavelet families including Haar and Daubechies
exist in the literature and have been broadly utilized for the
ECG feature extraction. Haar wavelet is the simplest form of
wavelets. Haar wavelet is simple to understand and easy to
compute, while some detailed information cannot be captured
using it. Daubechies wavelet is theoretically more complex
than Haar and has higher computational overhead. But it is
more reliable as it can capture details that are missed by the
Haar wavelet [28].
In this article, the Daubechies wavelet transform is used
for the ECG feature extraction due to the higher reliability it
offers. More specifically, Daubechies DB4 wavelet is chosen
due to the resemblance of its scaling function to the shape
of ECG signals [44]. R peak detection is the core of the
Daubechies DB4 wavelet feature extraction where the other
fiducial points are extracted with respect to the location of
the R peak points. DB4 has four wavelet and scaling function
coefficients. Each step of the wavelet transform uses the
wavelet function to the input data. If the main dataset has N
values, the wavelet function needs to be applied in order to
calculate N/2 differences which reflect change in the data. In
the ordered wavelet transform, the wavelet values are saved in
the upper half of the N element input vector. The scaling and
wavelet functions are computed by taking the inner output
of the coefficients and four data values. The scaling function
coefficients (h) and thewavelet function coefficient (g) values
can be written as:
h0 = 1+
√
3
4
√
2
= −g3 h1 = 3+
√
3
4
√
2
= g2
h2 = 3−
√
3
4
√
2
= −g1 h3 = 1−
√
3
4
√
2
= g0 (5)
Daubechies DB4 scaling (a) and wavelet (c) functions can be
denoted as:
ai = h0S2i + h1S2i+1 + h2S2i+2 + h3S2i+3
ci = g0S2i + g1S2i+1 + g2S2i+2 + g3S2i+3 (6)
Each iteration in DB4 step computes a scaling function value
and a wavelet function value. The index i is incremented by
two with each iteration, and new scaling and wavelet function
values are computed. It should be mentioned that a normal
ECG signal consists of observable P waves, QRS complex
and T waves (See Fig. 2). In a normal sinus rhythm, the heart
rate for an adult ranges between 60-100 beats per minute.
All the main intervals on such an ECG recording are also
within normal ranges. Nevertheless, cardiac abnormalities
may also be observed in various datasets. These abnormal-
ities usually occurs when patients are suffering from specific
cardiovascular diseases, such as myocardial infraction, super
vascular arrhythmia, malignant ventricular arrhythmia, and
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other dangerous types of arrhythmia. Even normal subjects’
ECG signals may have some variations due to anxiety, stress,
and physical exercises. In these scenarios, the peak values
of some waves may not be detectable within one heartbeat
using the most common order of the Daubechies wavelet,
that is DB4. Hence, the intended main ECG features cannot
be extracted and computed. In such scenarios, it is found
that DB6 and DB9 are the best candidates among different
Daubechies scales to extract features from abnormal types
of ECG signals [28], [45]. This is because these Daubechies
scales keep certain details and squaring of the remaining
signal approximation which result in reliable detection of the
R peak points. Once the R peak points of an abnormal ECG
signal are detected (using the aforementioned DB scales),
other main peak values can be detected with respect to the
position of R. Based on the above discussion, the optimum
choice of the DB scales relies on the application and the type
of ECG signals need to be used. This means that if some of
the main features of an ECG signal cannot be extracted by
one order of the Daubechies wavelet transform, another scale
may provide more detail and accurate results. Thus, there will
be low chance that the efficiency of the ECG-based crypto-
graphic key generation approaches is affected. It should be
also mentioned accuracy and reliability is more efficient with
the higher Daubechies scales. While, the higher Daubechies
scales require more coefficients as well as processing time.
1) QRS COMPLEX AND R PEAK DETECTION
The detection of the R peak is the first step of feature extrac-
tion. In an ECG signal, the R peak has the highest ampli-
tude among all waves. The QRS complex detection involves
specifying the R peak of the heartbeat. Most of the energy of
the QRS complex lies between 3-40 Hz and the detection of
the QRS complex relies on modulus maxima of the Wavelet
Transform. This is due to the fact that modulus maxima and
zero crossings of the Wavelet Transform correspond to the
sharp edges of an ECG signal. The QRS complex generates
two modulus maxima with opposite signs having a zero
crossing between them. In a normal ECG signal, the Q and S
points occur about 0.1 second before and after the occurrence
of the R peaks, respectively. The left point denotes as the Q
point and the right point denotes the S point. The QRS width
can also be computed from the onset and the offset of the
QRS complex. The onset can be defined as the beginning of
the Q wave and the offset can be defined as the ending of the
S wave.
2) P AND T PEAKS DETECTION
The P wave generally comprises of modulus maxima pair
with opposite signs. The T wave also has similar character-
istics to the P wave. For the P and the T peak detections, the
lower and higher frequency ripples of the signal need to be
removed. To detect the P wave, this pair needs to be searched
within a window prior to the onset of the QRS complex.
The search window starts at about 200 ms before the onset
of the QRS complex and ends after the onset of the QRS
FIGURE 2. An ideal raw ECG signal and the filtered ECG signal with the
main fiducial points indicated.
complex. The zero crossing among the modulus maxima pair
corresponds to the peak points of the P wave. The extremum
of the signal after the zero crossings of each R peak is denoted
as T.
3) PR, RR, PP, QT, AND ST INTERVALS
The PR interval is specified as the interval between the onset
of the P wave and the onset of the R wave. The RR inter-
val is defined as the time elapsed between the adjacent R
peaks. Heartrate can be calculated as the reciprocal of the
RR interval, that is, the time difference between two R peak
points. The PP interval is specified as the interval between
the adjacent P waves due to atrial depolarization. The PP
interval is utilized to calculate the atrial rate. The ST interval
is denoted as the interval between the offset of the S-wave and
offset of the T-wave. The QT interval is computed by finding
the difference between the onset of the Q wave and the offset
of the T wave. These intervals are utilized as the main ECG
features in this article.
In [17], we presented two different ECG-based crypto-
graphic key generation approaches which use singular ECG
feature, that is IPI. Our first approach, IPI-PRNG, relied
on a pseudo-random number generator and consecutive IPI
sequences. The second approach, IPI-AES, relied upon the
AES block cipher in counter mode, using IPI as the seed
generator for the AES algorithm. It should be noted that, more
explanations and details regarding our IPI-PRNG and IPI-
AES approaches can be found in [17]. The following section
presents our proposed cryptographic key generation utilizing
several ECG features. The proposed approach extends our
previouswork by reducing the key generation execution times
yet providing high security levels. Our proposal is motivated
by the fact that to alleviate the key generation execution times,
while preserving high security levels, other main features of
an ECG signal in addition to IPI can be exploited.
C. GENERATING CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS UTILIZING
SEVERAL ECG FEATURES (SEF)
In this section, we present a new cryptographic key gen-
eration approach, called SEF, which employs other main
features of an ECG signal rather than using just singleton IPI.
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FIGURE 3. The normal distribution of PR, PP, QT, and ST intervals.
We describe and justify in more detail the selected features
to be used along with the IPI feature of the ECG signal for
generating cryptographic keys.
The SEF cryptographic key generation approach uses all of
the main ECG features from one heartbeat cycle. The utilized
features are PR, RR (also known as IPI), PP, QT and ST. The
major reason to use such features is that P, Q, R, S and T
waves are noticeable within an ECG signal rhythm for which
PR, RR, PP, QT and ST intervals are known as the main
and normal components of an ECG waveform [6]. In cardi-
ology, the PR interval is the period which extends from the
beginning of the onset of atrial depolarization (P wave) until
the beginning of the onset of ventricular depolarization (the
QRS complex). The PR interval is normally between 120 to
200 ms in duration. The PP interval is the distance between
consecutive P waves due to atrial depolarization. The PP
interval is utilized to calculate the atrial rate. In a normal ECG
signal, the PP interval and the RR interval are equivalent.
Thus, atrial rates and ventricular rates are not independently
separated.
In an abnormal ECG signal, for example, when there is
an atrioventricular dissociation due to complete heart block,
the atrial rate is different from the ventricular rate. This
causes for the PP interval to be shorter than the RR interval,
meaning that atrial rate is greater than the ventricular rate. The
normal PP interval is more than 180-190 ms in duration [6].
The QT interval is measured as the time between the initiation
of the Q wave and the termination of the T wave in the
heart’s electrical cycle. The QT interval demonstrates electri-
cal re-polarization and depolarization of the ventricles. The
QT interval is an important feature of the ECG in a sense that
it is a marker for the potential of ventricular tachyarrhythmias
as well as a risk factor for sudden death. Similar to the
RR interval, the QT interval relies on the heart rate. This
means that the faster the heart rate, the shorter the RR and
QT intervals. This variation can be corrected by normalizing
the QT interval according to the heart rate. It should be
mentioned that, specifying whether or not the QT interval is
normal is not totally a straightforward task as the duration
differs according to the patient’s heart rate. To allow for this,
the corrected QT interval (QTc) must be calculated using
Bazett’s equation [38]:
QTc = QT√
RR
(7)
where QT is the measured QT interval, QTc is the corrected
QT interval, and RR is the computed RR interval. The normal
corrected QT interval is below 0.46 for women and below
0.45 formen. In this article, for the sake of simplicity, we have
not considered the QT interval correction presented above.
Finally, the ST segment specifies the time that ventricles
pump the blood to the lungs and the body. The ST segment
connects the QRS complex and the T wave which also serve
as the base-line from which to measure the amplitudes of
the other waveforms. The normal ST segment has a duration
of 80-120 ms. In [17], we presented that the fluctuation
of the RR interval fits into the normal distribution which
indicates the randomness of RR intervals. This finding was
also supported by our measurement of entropy, the NIST
benchmark, and the Chi-square test presented in [4] and [7].
Likewise, in this section, we show that the distributions of
PR, PP, QT and ST intervals also fit into the normal dis-
tribution. Thus, these features can be utilized along with
RR interval for ECG-based cryptographic key generations.
The feasibility of using the PR, PP, QT, and ST intervals is
based on the fact that all these features should also fulfill
the property of randomness. We examined this property by
collecting 30 seconds ECG data of different subjects obtained
from the Physiobank database [46]. From the collected ECG
data, we have computed all of the consecutive ECG features
and plotted their histograms. As can be seen from Figure 3,
similar to the RR interval, the distribution of PR, PP, QT
and ST intervals also fit into the normal distribution. Hence,
these additional main ECG features also fulfill the property
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of randomness. This is an essential property to ensure that
the cryptographic keys which are generated from these ECG
intervals are random. Moreover, in [17], we extracted a fixed
number of 8 bits from each IPI. This was done using a
Pulse CodeModulation (PCM) [47] binary encoder. PCM is a
digital interpretation of an analog signal which takes samples
of the amplitude of the analog signal at certain intervals. The
sampled analog data then is quantized and represented as a
digital n-bit binary number. Bit 1, most significant bits, is
the first bit that specifies the polarity of the sample. Bit ‘‘0’’
represents negative polarity and bit ‘‘1’’ represents positive
polarity. Bits 2, 3, and 4 reveal the segment where the sample
data is placed. Bits 5, 6, 7, and 8, least significant bits, define
the quantized value of the sample inside one of the segments.
In this article, we enhance our approach by using a dynamic
technique which can specify the optimized number of bits
that can be extracted from each ECG feature. In this regard,
our comprehensive analyses have revealed that the alteration
range of each ECG feature differs whitin each dataset. This
is due to the fact that each ECG feature offers different
Standard Deviations (SDs) andmean values. These variations
are visible for the PR, PP, QT, and ST features as shown
in Figure 3. As a result, extracting a fixed number of bits
(e.g., 8 bits) per ECG feature is not an efficient and optimum
solution. Therefore, an efficient technique is required where
the number of binary values per ECG feature can be extracted
as optimum as possible while considering the variation range
of SDs and mean values per ECG feature. Based on the
discussion above, we utilize a dynamic technique in order
to specify the optimized number of bits which need to be
extracted from each ECG feature. The used technique enables
to extract optimal binary values and ensures the randomness
property as the binary sequences are produced based on the
real-time variation of the measured ECG signal [27]. The
utilized technique to determine the number of optimum bits
(M) can be defined as:
µ(FXi) = 1N
N∑
i=1
xi (8)
SD(FXi) = σ (FXi) =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(xi − µ)2 (9)
Cv = σ (FXi)
µ(FXi)
(10)
M = d ln (σ (FXi))
ln(2)
e + dCve (11)
where FXi represents a set of any one of the PR, PP, QT,
and ST features from one sampled ECG dataset in the ith
heartbeat, xi represents each value in the dataset, µ is the
mean value of the dataset,6 is the summation,N is defined as
the number of values in the dataset, σ indicates the standard
deviation of a dataset, and Cv is the coefficient of variation
which is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to
the mean value. The main reason to use the ln function in
the equation (14) is that from the information theory point
of view, ln provides a solution for determining the number
of optimal bits needed in a code (even when the code is
not known). Since the SD and mean values of each main
feature within one ECG dataset are different, the number of
extracted optimum bits vary accordingly. In the jth heartbeat,
the efficient number of binary bits Bopt that can be extracted
efficiently from one ECG feature can be defined as:
Bopt = GET_BITS_FROM_FLSB(FXj, lsb,M ) (12)
FLSB is a function which extracts M bits from Least Signif-
icant Bits (LSB) of its input FXi. By exploiting the afore-
mentioned technique, optimumbinary values can be extracted
from the required main ECG features per heartbeat cycle. The
extracted binary values per heartbeat cycle then need to be
concatenated to form an m-bit binary sequence. Finally, to
generate an n-bit sequence using the SEF approach, binary
sequences which are produced from k consecutive heartbeats
are required to be concatenated.
Our study also reveals that the variation range of all of the
main ECG features differs in different ECG datasets. To give
an example, the number of optimum binary values which can
be extracted from the PR feature of Normal Sinus dataset is
not identical to the number of the binary values which can
be extracted from PR feature of the European ST-T dataset.
Table 1 presents the results of different subject groups which
we have investigated for this purpose. We have selected 10 of
the most-known ECG recording and cardiovascular disease
datasets from the open source Physiobank database [46].
In this regard, from each of the following 10 datasets, 5 sub-
jects are randomly chosen for this study. The last dataset,
that is, the motion artifact ECG, includes short duration ECG
signals recorded from one healthy 25-year-old male perform-
ing different physical activities. The selected datasets are:
(i) Motion Artifact Contaminated ECG Database, sampled
at 500 Hz per second with 16-bits resolution, (ii) Super
Vascular Arrhythmia (Arrhyth.) sampled at 125 Hz,
(iii) Malignant Ventricular Arrhyth. sampled at 250 Hz,
(iv) MIT-BIH Long-Term sampled at 360 Hz, (v) Atrial Fib-
rillation sampled at 250 Hz, (vi) MIT-BIH Arrhyth. sampled
at 360 Hz, (vii) Myocardial Infraction sampled at 125 Hz,
(viii) MIT-BIH Noise Stress sampled at 360 Hz, (viiii) Euro-
pean ST-T Database sampled at 250 Hz, and (x) Normal
Sinus sampled at 128 Hz. The main motivation to select
these datasets is the fact that they are among the most recog-
nized ECG recordings and prevalent cardiovascular diseases
according to Physiobank [46]. Moreover, no recognizable
ECG recording nor a specific patient having one of these
cardiovascular diseases is found among each dataset. Thus,
any bias that can help in the identification of a specific
subject cannot be found. It should be also mentioned that in a
motion artifact contaminated ECG database, there is no other
information than the subject’s age and gender available. Our
experiments to extract the ideal number of binary values from
all of the main ECG features of each ECG dataset are pre-
sented in Table 1. As can be deduced from our measurements,
the optimum number of binary values which can be extracted
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TABLE 1. Optimum binary sequences produced from main general
features of ECG signals of subjects with different heart health conditions.
from various features of one ECG dataset totally differs from
one dataset to another. This is due to the utilization of the
aforementioned technique (where the optimum number of
bits can be extracted from each main ECG feature) instead
of a fixed number of bits representation since each feature of
the ECG has different mean and SD values.
According to the above discussion, in the SEF key genera-
tion approach, depending on the length of the cryptographic
key n that needs to be generated, approximately d n16e con-
secutive ECG heartbeat cycles need to be detected. From the
detected heatbeats, all of the main ECG features (PR, RR,
PP, QT and ST) from a t-second segment of a patient’s ECG
data need to be computed. To achieve this goal, the following
tasks are required to be performed: (i) for a specified period
of time t, the main fiducial points or peaks of a sensed ECG
signal (P, Q, R, S, and T) should be extracted utilizing a
generic feature extraction function, (ii) from the detected
fiducial points, the required x consecutive ECG features (PR1,
RR1, PP1, QT1, ST1), (PR2, RR2, PP2, QT2, ST2), . . . , (PRx ,
RRx , PPx , QTx , STx) should be computed, (iii) from the
computed main ECG features, the amount of optimum binary
values per ECG feature needs to be calculated. This should
be done using an equation where the ideal binary values
per ECG feature, that is m1, m2, . . . ,mx , will be selected
based on their mean values and SDs, and (iv) the generated
mi-bit binary sequences from each ECG feature then need to
be concatenated in order to form an n-bit binary sequence.
The generated n-bit binary sequence is considered as themain
cryptographic key generated using this approach. It should
be mentioned that the produced n-bit binary sequence using
the SEF approach underlays the SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES
approaches presented in the following sections.
1) STRENGTHENING SEVERAL ECG FEATURE-BASED KEY
GENERATION THROUGH PRNG (SEF-PRNG)
Similar to the IPI-PRNG, the SEF-PRNG approach also
consists of two main phases: (i) generating an n-bit binary
sequence from each subject’s ECG data. To do this, as dis-
cussed previously, about d n16e heartbeat cycles of a patient’s
ECG data needs to be collected. From the collected data,
consecutive PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST features each of which
encoded into its optimum x-bit binary value (using the pre-
viously mentioned technique) need to be computed. After
that, the aforementioned steps in SEF approach need to be
performed in such a way that for each subject, an n-bit
binary sequence is generated. (ii) a Pseudo Random Num-
ber Generator (PRNG) is used to generate a random n-bit
binary sequence. To generate a random n-bit binary sequence,
the Fibonacci Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is
employed. We have utilized the Fibonacci LFSR function
of MATLAB similarly as we did in the IPI-PRNG approach
to produce a random n-bit binary sequence. Once the n-bit
random binary sequence is generated (using the Fibonacci
LFSR function), the main cryptographic key can be gener-
ated. If SEFn is the n-bit binary sequence generated from
ECG and and FLFSRn is the n-bit random binary sequence
generated using the Fibonacci LFSR, the main n-bit crypto-
graphic key is produced by XORing the outputs of phases (i)
and (ii).
2) STRENGTHENING SEVERAL ECG FEATURE-BASED KEY
GENERATION THROUGH AES (SEF-AES)
Similarly as IPI-AES, the SEF-AES approach also uses the
AES [19] block cipher in counter mode as the cryptographic
pseudo-random number generator to generate n-bit crypto-
graphic keys. In SEF-AES, to generate an n-bit cryptographic
key, two n-bit binary sequences need to be generated as the
main seeds of the AES algorithm. The first seed is considered
as input data (plaintext) of the AES and the second one
is considered as the encryption/decryption key. To generate
these two seeds, we exploit the SEF key generation approach
as the seed generator. To do this, d n8e consecutive heartbeat
cycles of a patient’s ECG signal need to be collected. From
the collected data, consecutive PR, RR, PP, QT and ST
features are encoded into their optimum x-bit binary values
The produced x-bit binary sequences from each heartbeat
cycle further need to be concatenated to form a 2n-bit binary
sequence. After that, the 2n-bit binary sequence needs be
divided into two n-bit binary sequences. The first sequence is
used as the input data (plaintext) and the second one is used
as the AES encryption key. At the final stage, the output of
the AES-n algorithm (ciphertext) is considered as the main
n-bit cryptographic key generated utilizing the subjects’ ECG
signals.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we assess the security level and performance
of our proposed ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approaches in terms of distinctiveness, test of random-
ness, temporal variance, and key generation execution time.
We conduct our experiments on both normal and abnor-
mal ECG signals obtained from the publicly available and
widely used database, that is, Physiobank [46]. PhysioBank
comprises of databases of multi-parameter neural, cardiopul-
monary, and other biomedical signals from patients and
healthy subjects with a variety of conditions including sudden
cardiac death, irregular heartbeat (arrhythmia), congestive
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FIGURE 4. The distribution of hamming distance of any two 128-bit cryptographic keys generated using IPI-AES and SEF-AES approaches for subjects
with different heart health conditions. (a) The distribution of hamming distance between any two 128-bit cryptographic keys generated using IPI-AES
approach for subjects with different heart health conditions. (b) The distribution of hamming distance between any two 128-bit cryptographic keys
generated using SEF-AES approach for subjects with different heart health conditions.
heart failure, sleep apnea, and epilepsy. Our experiments are
carried out on both normal and abnormal ECG signals which
are obtained from 239 subjects studied by the Beth Israel
Hospital Laboratory in Boston and Physikalisch-Technische
Bundesanstalt (PTB), the National Metrology Institute of
Germany. The employed ECG signals include: (i) ECG sig-
nals of of 18 subjects (5 men, aged 26 to 45, and 13 women,
aged 20 to 50) with Normal Sinus Rhythm. The recordings
are digitized at 128 samples per second with resolution over
a 10 mV range. (ii) ECG signals of 48 subjects with Arrhyth-
mia (22 women of age 23 to 89 and 26 men of age 32 to
89) which they were recorded by a two-channel ambulatory
ECG system. The recordings are digitized at 360 samples per
second with 11-bit resolution over a 10 mV range per patient.
(iii) ECG signals of 25 subjects with Atrial Fibrillation. The
individual recordings are each 10 hours in duration, and
contain two ECG signals each digitized at 250 samples per
secondwith 12-bit resolution over a range of 10mV. (iv) ECG
signals of 148 subjects with Myocardial Infraction (89 men
aged 17 to 87 and 59 women aged 19 to 83). Each signal is
digitized at 1000 samples per second, with 16 bit resolution
over a range of 16 mV. We have captured 100 different sam-
ples of 5minute long ECG data for each subject and evaluated
the efficiency of our approach in terms of distinctiveness, test
of randomness and temporal variance. The collected ECG
signals are filtered using a low-pass filter with a 30 Hz
threshold frequency. Such a filter reduces the environmental
noise and provides a smoother signal for further analysis.
For our experiment, we have generated 128-bit cryptographic
keys using the aforementioned approaches. We have imple-
mented and analyzed our key generation approaches utilizing
MATLAB [48].
A. DISTINCTIVENESS
The first experiment is to determine whether the crypto-
graphic keys generated utilizing the presented approaches are
distinctive for different individuals. Distinctiveness indicates
that the generated keys should be significantly different for
different subjects, at any given time. Hamming Distance
(HD) is utilized as the main metric in order to evaluate the
difference between any two cryptographic keys of equal
length. For two sufficiently long binary sequences, the dis-
tribution of HD should be centered at half of the length of
the binary sequences. This indicates that these sequences are
randomly generated [5]. The reason is that any bit of a random
binary number should have equivalent probability to be zero
or one. Hence, the average of HD of a sufficiently large and
random set of n-bit binary sequences is anticipated to be
about n/2, provided that the binary sequence is distinctive.
For two different bits, i and j, which are extracted from
the same position of two independently generated crypto-
graphic keys (K), the probability P(Ki,Kj) can be represented
as [5]:
P(Ki,Kj) = 0.25 Ki = 1, 0 & Kj = 1, 0 (13)
HDd =
∑
P1 6=P2
(| ECGi,P1 − ECGi,P2 |)
| sig |2 (14)
To evaluate the distinctiveness of different keys generated
using the presented approaches, we use the average Hamming
Distance metric, as defined in Equation (17).
HDd is the computed Hamming Distance between the
cryptographic keys generated using ECG signals of different
subjects, | sig | is the length of the used physiological
signal set, i defines the ECG index, and P1 and P2 defines
the patient’s indexes. We have investigated the distinctive-
ness of the cryptographic keys generated utilizing our SEF,
IPI-PRNG, IPI-AES, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches
and compared the results with the conventional IPI approach.
We have sampled the ECG signals of each subject over
100 random start-times. The average HD between the cryp-
tographic keys of the two different subjects generated at the
same start-time is then calculated.
The HDs between different subjects’ cryptographic keys
are calculated (See Figures 4a and 4b). The results of our dis-
tinctiveness calculations show that the average HD between
the cryptographic keys generated from the ECG signals
of two different subjects using IPI, SEF, IPI-PRNG, SEF-
PRNG, IPI-AES, and SEF-AES are 47.76% (≈ 62 bits),
48.13% (≈ 62 bits), 49.09% (≈ 63 bits), 49.41% (≈ 63 bits),
49.84% (≈ 64 bits), and 49.93% (≈ 64 bits), respectively.
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FIGURE 5. NIST pass rate comparison of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation approaches for subjects with different heart health
conditions. (a) NIST Tests, MIT-BIH Arrhythmia. (b) NIST Tests, MIT-BIH Arrhythmia. (c) NIST Tests, MIT-BIH Normal Sinus Rhythm. (d) NIST Tests,
MIT-BIH Normal Sinus Rhythm. (e) NIST Tests, MIT-BIH Atrial Fibrillation. (f) NIST Tests, MIT-BIH Atrial Fibrillation. (g) NIST Tests, PTB-Myocardial
Infarction. (h) NIST Tests, PTB-Myocardial Infarction.
B. TEST OF RANDOMNESS
Generating distinctive and long keys is not sufficient as it is
also necessary to ensure that the keys are sufficiently random
and cannot be predicted easily. Randomness is related to
Shannon entropy. Entropy is a measure of uncertainty for
many cryptographic purposes. The Shannon entropy equation
can be written as [49]:
H (r) = −
n∑
i=1
P(ECGi) log2 P(ECGi) (15)
r is an information source with n mutually exclusive events,
P(ECGi) is the probability of the ith event. According to this
evaluation metric, the randomness level of a binary sequence
increases when H (r) closes to 1.
We have evaluated the randomness of the 128-bit
cryptographic keys generated using the SEF, IPI-PRNG,
SEF-PRNG, IPI-AES, and SEF-AES approaches. Then,
we have compared our results with the conventional IPI
approach. The randomness of the generated keys is evalu-
ated from two perspectives: (i) Shannon entropy and (ii) the
pass rates of the NIST statistical benchmark. To evaluate
randomness from the Shannon entropy point of view, we have
computed the entropy of the keys generated from each sub-
ject’s ECG signal over 100 random start-times using IPI, SEF
IPI-PRNG, SEF-PRNG, IPI-AES, and SEF-AES approaches.
The randomness of the generated cryptographic keys are also
evaluated using the NIST benchmark. The NIST benchmark
is developed for cryptographic random and pseudo-random
number generator applications. The results of the NIST statis-
tical tests are pass rates (also called P-values) which indicate
the probability of randomness of the generated cryptographic
keys. If a P-value is less than the threshold, that is, 1% the
randomness hypothesis fails.
Five main tests proposed by NIST for evaluating random-
ness are utilized in this article. They are the frequency test
(F-Test), the runs test (R-Test), the frequency test within a
block (B-Test) and the test for the longest run of ones in
a block (L-Test). Description of the above-mentioned tests
can be found in more detail in [26] and they are briefly
summarized as follows: (i) The F-Test specifies whether the
number of 0s and 1s in the input sequence are approximately
the same as would be anticipated for a real random sequence.
(ii) The R-Test specifies if the number of runs of 0s and 1s
of different lengths is as anticipated for a random sequence.
Run, refers to an uninterrupted sequence of identical bits.
(iii) The B-Test specifies whether the frequency of 1s in an
N-bit block is approximatelyN/2, as would be expected under
an assumption of randomness. (iv) The L-Test specifies if the
length of the longest run of 1s in the tested sequence is con-
sistent with the length of the longest run of 1s that would be
anticipated in a random sequence. (v) The A-Test compares
the frequency of overlapping blocks of two adjacent lengths,
that is, l and l + 1 versus the expected result for a random
sequence.
As shown in Figures 5, in all approaches the entropy values
as well as the NIST pass rates are close to 1 signifying that
the distribution of 0s and 1s in the generated keys among
the 6 approaches are quite uniform. In addition, we find out
that the randomness of abnormal ECG signals is slightly
worse than the normal ones. This is due to the fact that for
some abnormal ECG signals their ECG feature patterns were
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TABLE 2. Execution time comparison of different ECG-based key generation approaches to produce 128-bit cryptographic keys.
irregular and sometimes hard to be detected. Compared to the
normal ECG signals, abnormal signals are more chaotic and
have larger variation resulting in less reliable ECG features.
For normal ECG signals, the IPI and SEF approaches have
in average the entropy of about 0.98, the IPI-PRNG and
SEF-PRNG approaches, have in average the entropy of about
0.99, and the IPI-AES and SEF-AES approaches offer the
entropy of∼ 1. The results of the test of randomness revealed
that there is no significant difference between the results of
entropy nor the NIST pass rates of any two different cryp-
tographic keys generated using the strengthened IPI-based
and the SEF approaches. The cryptographic keys generated
using the IPI-PRNG, SEF-PRNG, IPI-AES and SEF-AES
approaches provide better randomness in terms of entropy
as well as NIST pass rates compared to the IPI approach
and the SEF approaches. We have found out that the crypto-
graphic keys which are generated utilizing the strengthened
ECG features (IPI or SEF) offer better results in terms of
randomness, that is ∼ 1 entropy, as well as in terms of NIST
pass rates than just utilizing singleton ECG features. A high
level of randomness prevents the cryptographic keys from
being easily predicted by any malicious activity. As a result,
cryptographic keys generated using our proposed approaches
meet the design goal of randomness.
C. TEMPORAL VARIANCE
Being different for the same subject at different time inter-
vals is another main requirement of a binary sequence to be
used as a cryptographic key. Temporal variance measures the
resemblance between two cryptographic keys that are gener-
ated using a bio-signal (i.e., the ECG signal in this context)
of the same subject at different time intervals. The analysis of
the temporal variance also indicates that medical data of one
subject which is encrypted using a robust cryptographic key
cannot be decrypted effortlessly using a non-real time ECG
signal from the same subject.
We evaluated the temporal variance of different 128-bit
cryptographic keys which are generated using the IPI, SEF,
IPI-PRNG, SEF-PRNG, IPI-AES and SEF-AES approaches.
This is to ensure that a new measurement of a subject’s ECG
will not lead to the same key. We have sampled ECG signals
of each subject over 100 random start-times. The average
HDs between the keys of the same subject generated at dif-
ferent start-times are then calculated. To compute temporal
variance, the average HD between cryptographic keys that
are generated utilizing the ECG signal of the same subject
at different start-times is computed.
The HD equation being utilized for computing the tempo-
ral variance of the generated keys can be written as [5]:
HDs =
∑
P1=P2
(| ECGt1i,P1 − ECG
t2
i,P2
|)(| sig |
2
) (16)
HDs is the hamming distance computed between the cryp-
tographic keys generated from the ECG signal of the same
subject at different time intervals. t1 and t2 define different
start-times.
The results of our experiment show that the average HD
between the cryptographic keys which are generated via
the ECG signal of the same subject at different time inter-
vals using IPI, SEF, IPI-PRNG, SEF-PRNG, IPI-AES and
SEF-AES are 47.71% (≈ 62 bits), 48.02% (≈ 62 bits),
48.96% (≈ 63 bits), 49.33% (≈ 63 bits), 49.79% (≈ 64 bits),
and 49.9% (≈ 64 bits), respectively. Similar to the com-
puted results presented in the distinctiveness section, when
employing strengthened ECG features (either IPI-based or
SEF approach), the distribution of HDs of any two binary
sequences generated from the ECG signal of the same subject
does not change significantly. The normalized distribution
of HDs of two cryptographic keys that are generated using
strengthened IPI-AES and SEF-AES approaches are centered
at 64. Similarly, the normalized distribution of HDs of two
cryptographic keys that are generated using strengthened IPI-
PRNG and SEF-SEF approaches are centered at 63. For IPI
and SEF approaches, the normalized distribution of HDs of
two cryptographic keys are centered at 62. The main reason
for such similarities between the HD results (with just negli-
gible percentage differences) is due to the fact that our main
goal is to alleviate the key generation execution time while
preserving the achieved high security level in terms of tem-
poral variance. The average HD between the cryptographic
keys of the same subject generated using the IPI-PRNG,
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SEF-PRNG, IPI-AES, and SEF-AES approaches present bet-
ter results compared to the IPI and SEF approaches. This
is because ECG feature based cryptographic key generation
approaches which are strengthened using the PRNG and AES
algorithms appear to better distinguish the same subject’s
cryptographic key. Particularly, ECG feature based crypto-
graphic key generation approaches which are strengthened
using the PRNG and AES algorithms can increase the secu-
rity level of the generated keys as the correct keys cannot
be easily obtained via a brute-force attack. Therefore, the
cryptographic keys which are generated using our proposed
approaches meet the design goal of temporal variance.
D. KEY GENERATION EXECUTION TIME
To investigate the feasibility and key generation execution
overhead of our approaches compared to the conventional
IPI approach, we have examined the execution time required
to generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptography keys. For this
purpose, we utilized different processors ranging from tiny
micro-controllers (e.g., STM32L0 with 32 MHz operat-
ing frequency) to reasonably powerful embedded micro-
processors (ARM Cortex-A7). The considered processors
are widely used in different medical domains depending on
the power-performance requirements. Our experiments are
carried out on ECG recordings obtained from the mentioned
MIT-BIH Arrhythmia dataset, sampled at 360 Hz.
Table 2 presents the computed key generation execution
times of our IPI-PRNG, IPI-AES, SEF, SEF-PRNG, and
SEF-AES approaches as well as the conventional IPI
approach. The execution times are presented in both single
iteration and total times. Single iteration execution time indi-
cates the time required to produce an x-bit binary sequence
from one heartbeat cycle. Total execution time means the
sum of single iteration execution times until successive iter-
ations of the operations yields the desired result, that is,
generates the desired 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys.
To give an example, considering a subject with the ECG
heartrate of 60 bpm, the specific STM32L0 microcontroller
requires about 187.4 ms, 225.2 ms and 278.9 ms execu-
tion times per iteration for the IPI, IPI-PRNG, and IPI-AES
approaches, respectively. These are the times these three
approaches require to produce an 8-bit binary sequence from
one ECG heartbeat cycle. As discussed earlier, to generate
128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys, it is required for IPI,
IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches to compute 16 heart-
beat cycles from a subject’s ECG signal. Thus, the total key
generation execution times of IPI, IPI-PRNG, and IPI-AES
approaches are computed as: 187.4 * 16 = 3 (s), 225.2 *
16 = 3.3 (s), and 278.9 * 16 = 4.5 (s), respectively. The
same microcontroller requires about 114.6 ms, 133.4 ms,
and 178.2 ms execution times for the SEF, SEF-PRNG, and
SEF-AES approaches to produce 16-bits binary sequences
from one ECG heartbeat cycle. However, as presented ear-
lier, to generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys, the
SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES approaches need to compute
8 heartbeat cycles from a subject’s ECG signal. As a result,
the total key generation execution times of SEF, SEF-PRNG,
and SEF-AES approaches are calculated as 114.6 * 8= 1 (s),
133.4 * 8 = 1.1 (s), and 178.2 * 8 = 1.5 (s), respectively,
which are considerably lower than their counterparts. The
key generation execution times of SEF, SEF-PRNG and
SEF-AES are in average 1.8 times times faster than IPI, IPI-
PRNG and IPI-AES approaches. This is due to the fact that
in IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES in total 8 bits can be extracted
from one ECG heartbeat cycle, while in SEF, SEF-PRNG
and SEF-AES approaches in total 16 bits can be extracted
from the same heartbeat cycle. Thus, by utilizing additional
ECG features, the latency of ECG-based key generation
approaches can be significantly reduced. As can be seen from
the results of distinctiveness, test of randomness, temporal
variance and execution time, there is a clear trade-off between
execution time and security level for different approaches.
the IPI-AES and SEF-AES approaches show higher security
levels in comparison to the SEF, IPI-PRNG, SEF-PRNG and
the conventional IPI approach. However, such a high security
level increases the execution time on average by 41.2% and
38.8% compared to the IPI-based and the SEF approaches,
respectively. In this context, the IPI-PRNG and SEF-PRNG
better balance the trade-off as they offer a higher security
level while imposing a much lower execution time overhead,
that is, on average 12.3% and 9.6% compared to the IPI-based
and the SEF approaches, respectively. It should be mentioned
that the efficiency of the proposed approaches highly depends
on the application domain in which the approaches are uti-
lized. As generating keys is performed in an on-demand way
and not in every message transaction, the delay imposed by
it might be more tolerable for some applications compared
to others. Therefore, the IPI-AES and SEF-AES approaches
can be a better alternative for applications where high security
level is demanded and the latency can be tolerated. Another
observation which can be made from Table 2 is the significant
difference in execution time for different processors. This is
mainly due to the difference in the processing power and
memory available for each processor. This can guide design-
ers and developers to adjust their demanded security level
with the available processing power or vice versa.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a low-latency approach for generating secure
ECG feature based cryptographic keys. Most existing key
generation approaches are not directly applicable to BANs.
The reason is that sensors used in BANs are extremely
resource-constrained and demand a low-latency key gen-
eration time as well as a high security level. To allevi-
ate these limitations, we proposed a robust key generation
approach employing several ECG features, called SEF. Our
SEF approach utilizes 4 main reference-free ECG features
comprising of PR, RR, PP, QT, and ST. A dynamic technique
is used to specify the optimum number of bits that can be
extracted from each main ECG feature. We consolidated and
strengthened the SEF approach with cryptographically secure
pseudo-random number generator techniques. The Fibonacci
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linear feedback shift register and the AES algorithm are
implemented as pseudo-random generators to enhance the
security level of our approach. The security evaluation of the
generated keys was made in terms of distinctiveness, test of
randomness, temporal variance, as well as using the NIST
benchmark. Our approach is applied to normal and abnormal
ECG signals. The analyses showed that the strengthened key
generation approach offers a higher security level in com-
parison to existing approaches which rely only on single-
ton ECG features. Our analyses also reveal that the normal
ECG signals have slightly better randomness compared to
the abnormal ones. Cryptographic keys which are generated
from normal ECG signals using the SEF approach have in
average the entropy of about 0.98. Cryptographic keys that
are produced using the strengthened SEF approach offer the
entropy of ∼ 1. In addition, the reinforced key generation
approach has also better P-value NIST pass rates compared
to state-of-the-art approaches which rely only on singleton
ECG features.We also found out that our approach is approxi-
mately 1.8 times faster than existing IPI-based key generation
approaches. Future work includes investigating and analysis
of other physiological signals within a BAN. This is to real-
ize how the generated cryptographic keys can also be used
by other bio-sensors to provide intra-BAN communication
security.
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We propose an end-to-end security scheme for mobility enabled healthcare Internet of Things (IoT).
The proposed scheme consists of (i) a secure and efficient end-user authentication and authorization
architecture based on the certificate based DTLS handshake, (ii) secure end-to-end communication based
on session resumption, and (iii) robust mobility based on interconnected smart gateways. The smart
gateways act as an intermediate processing layer (called fog layer) between IoT devices and sensors
(device layer) and cloud services (cloud layer). In our scheme, the fog layer facilitates ubiquitous mobility
without requiring any reconfiguration at the device layer. The scheme is demonstrated by simulation
and a full hardware/software prototype. Based on our analysis, our scheme has the most extensive set of
security features in comparison to related approaches found in literature. Energy-performance evaluation
results show that compared to existing approaches, our scheme reduces the communication overhead
by 26% and the communication latency between smart gateways and end users by 16%. In addition, our
scheme is approximately 97% faster than certificate based and 10% faster than symmetric key based DTLS.
Compared to our scheme, certificate based DTLS consumes about 2.2 timesmore RAM and 2.9 timesmore
ROM resources. On the other hand, the RAM and ROM requirements of our scheme are almost as low as
in symmetric key-based DTLS. Analysis of our implementation revealed that the handover latency caused
by mobility is low and the handover process does not incur any processing or communication overhead
on the sensors.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in information and communication technolo-
gies have given rise to a new technology: Internet of Things
(IoT) [1–3]. IoT enables people and objects in the physical world
as well as data and virtual environments to interact with each
other, hence realizing smart environments such as smart trans-
port systems, smart cities, smart healthcare, and smart energy. The
rising cost of healthcare, and the prevalence of chronic diseases
around the world urgently demand the transformation of health-
care from a hospital-centered system to a person-centered envi-
ronment, with a focus on citizens’ disease management as well
as their wellbeing [4]. It has been predicted that in the following
decades, the way healthcare is currently provided will be trans-
formed from hospital-centered, first to hospital-home-balanced in
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: saramo@utu.fi (S.R. Moosavi).
the 2020’s, and then ultimately to home-centered in 2030’s [5].
This essential transformation necessitates the fact that the con-
vergence and overlap of the IoT architectures and technologies for
smart spaces and healthcare domains should bemore actively con-
sidered [4,6–8].
Security is a major concern wherever networks are deployed
at large scales. IoT-based healthcare systems deal with human-
related data. Although collected from innocuous wearable sensors,
such data is vulnerable to top privacy concerns [9–12]. In IoT-based
healthcare applications, security and privacy are among major
areas of concern as most devices and their communications are
wireless in nature [13]. An IP-enabled sensor in a Medical Sensor
Network (MSN), for instance, can transmit medical data of patients
to a remote healthcare service. However, in such scenarios, the
conveyed medical data may be routed through an untrusted
network infrastructure, e.g. the Internet. Hence, in healthcare IoT,
security and privacy of patients are among major areas of concern.
In this regard, the authentication and authorization of remote
healthcare centers/caregivers and end-to-end data protection are
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2016.02.020
0167-739X/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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critical requirements as eavesdropping on sensitive medical data
or malicious triggering of specific tasks can be prevented [14].
Due to direct involvement of humans in IoT-based healthcare
applications, providing robust and secure data communication
among healthcare sensors, actuators, patients, and caregivers are
crucial. Misuse or privacy concerns may restrict people to utilize
IoT-based healthcare applications.
Conventional security and protection mechanisms including
existing cryptographic solutions, secure protocols, and privacy as-
surance cannot be re-used due to resource constrains, security
level requirements, and system architecture of IoT-based health-
care systems [15]. To mitigate the aforementioned risks, strong
network security infrastructures for a short and long-range com-
munication are needed. There are significant security solutions to
current wireless networks which are not directly applicable to IoT-
based healthcare applications due to the following challenges [16]:
(i) security solutions must be resource-efficient as medical sen-
sors have limited processing power, memory, and communication
bandwidth. (ii) Medical sensors can be easily lost or abducted as
they are tiny in terms of size.
To deal with the mentioned challenges, Constrained Appli-
cation Protocol (CoAP) [17] proposes Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) [18] to be used for resource-constrained ser-
vices/applications. DTLS is a complete security protocol as it of-
fers authentication, key exchange, and protection of application
data. An IoT-enabled application may be in one of the following
four security modes: (i) NoSec, meaning that the DTLS is disabled
and there is no protocol level security. However, the use of IPsec as
network layer security is recommended. (ii) Symmetric Key-based
DTLS, meaning that DTLS is enabled and symmetric key-based au-
thentication is utilized. (iii) Public Key-based DTLS, meaning that
DTLS is enabled and the resource constrained device has an asym-
metric key pair. The public key is not embedded in an X.509 cer-
tificate. (iv) Certificate-based DTLS, meaning that DTLS is enabled
and the constrained device has an asymmetric key pair. The X.509
certificate is signed by a Certificate Authority (CA). Medical sensors
used in healthcare IoT have limited ROM, RAM, CPU and energy re-
sources. Thus, new challenges arisewhen using certificates on such
resource-constrained devices.
In [19], as shown in Fig. 1, we presented a secure and effi-
cient authentication and authorization architecture for IoT-based
healthcare systems using smart e-health gateways in a distributed
fashion. More precisely, we proposed to exploit the smart gate-
ways’ advantageous property of being non-resource constrained
for outsourcing the processing burden of end-user authentication
and authorization from tiny medical sensors. The system architec-
ture of our proposed IoT-enabled healthcare system includes the
followingmain components: (i)Device Layer: enabledwith ubiqui-
tous identification, sensing, and communication capacity, in which
bio-medical and context signals are captured from home/hospital
room(s) or patients’ body to be used for treatment and diagno-
sis of medical states. (ii) Fog Layer: consists of a network of dis-
tributed smart e-health gateways where those gateways support
various communication protocols and acts as a touching point be-
tween the device layer and cloud layer. (iii)Cloud Layer: this layer is
composed of the remote healthcare server and patients’ classified
health data. (iv) Web Interface: as a graphical user interface to be
used by remote caregivers for final visualization and apprehension.
Recently, there have been efforts in designing Smart e-Health
Gateways for Healthcare Internet of Things (Health-IoT) sys-
tems [4]. In a smart home/hospital,where themobility and location
of patients are confined to hospital facilities or buildings, gateways
can play a key role. The stationary nature of such gateways enables
them with the exclusivity of being non-resource constrained in
terms of power consumption, memory, and communication band-
width. By providing the necessary security context to the medi-
cal sensors, smart gateways remove the need to authenticate and
authorize remote healthcare centers/caregivers from the sensors.
Therefore, anymalicious activity can be blocked before entering to
a medical constrained domain. For this purpose, we employed the
certificate-based DTLS handshake as it is the main transport layer
security solution for IoT.
In healthcare IoT systems, improving patients’ quality of life is
important to mitigate the negative effects of being hospitalized.
Providing patients with the possibility to walk around the
medical environments knowing that themonitoring of their health
condition is not interrupted is an important feature. Enabling
mobility support for patient monitoring systems offers a high
quality of medical service as it allows patients to move around
freely within the premises. Patients do not need to be worried
about moving around as the system can enable mobility while
monitoring their vital signs continuously.
In our previous work [19], the main focus was on the analy-
sis and development of authentication and authorization between
peers rather than end-to-end security. In [20], we proposed a
session resumption-based end-to-end security scheme for health-
care IoT systems to securely and efficiently manage the commu-
nication between medical sensors and remote healthcare centers/
caregivers. The proposed scheme relied on the certificate-based
DTLS handshake between non-resource-constrained distributed
smart gateways and end-users at the start of the communication
(initialization phase). To provide end-to-end security, the session
resumption technique without server-side state is utilized. The
session resumption technique has an abbreviated form of the DTLS
handshake and it neither requires heavy-weight certificate-related
nor public-key operations as it relies on the previously established
DTLS connection.
In this article, an end-to-end security scheme for mobility en-
abled healthcare IoT is proposed. The main contributions of this
article, which is a major extension of our recent works published
in [19,20], are twofold. First, we propose an end-to-end security
scheme for healthcare IoT with the explicit consideration of mo-
bility for medical sensors. We exploit the concept of fog layer in
IoT for realizing efficient and seamless mobility since fog extends
the cloud paradigm to the edge of the network. Second, we ana-
lyze the characteristics of the proposed scheme in terms of security
and energy-performance on a prototype of a healthcare IoT system
through simulation and hardware/software prototype.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: in Section 2,
the related work and motivation are discussed. Section 3 presents
our proposed system architecture for healthcare IoT. In Section 4,
the requirements of secure and efficient communication for
healthcare IoT system are presented and discussed. Section 5
presents the proposed end-to-end security scheme for healthcare
IoT systems. Fog layer-based mobility for our proposed end-
to-end security scheme is presented in Section 6. Experimental
results including energy-performance and security evaluations are
provided and discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes
the article.
2. Related work and motivation
For the discussion of related work, we recognize three main
research directions: (i) IoT-based Healthcare Security, (ii) Smart
Gateways, and (iii) Mobility solutions for IoT systems.
2.1. IoT-based healthcare security
CodeBlue is one of the most popular healthcare research
projects that has been developed at the Harvard sensor network
Lab [21]. In this approach, several medical sensors are placed
on a patients’ body. CodeBlue has been expected to be deployed
in in-hospital emergency care, stroke patient rehabilitation and
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Fig. 1. The architecture of a healthcare IoT system with secure end-to-end communication.
disaster response. The authors of CodeBlue admit the necessity
of security for IoT-based medical applications. However, the
security aspects of CodeBlue are still left as future work. Lorincz
et al. [22] suggest that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [23]
and TinySec [24] are efficient solutions to be used for key
generation and symmetric encryption in the CodeBlue project,
respectively. Kambourakis et al. discuss some attack models
and security threats concerning the CodeBlue project: denial-
of-service attack, snooping attack, grey-hole attack, sybil attack,
and masquerading attacks [25]. An in-hospital patient monitoring
system called MEDiSN has been developed at Johns Hopkins
University [26]. It consists of multiple physiological motes which
are battery powered and equipped with medical sensors in order
to collect patients’ medical and physiological health information.
The MEDiSN architecture focuses on reliable communication,
routing, data rate, and QoS [26]. In their proposed architecture,
the authors of MEDiSN acknowledged the necessity of having
encryption for the physiological monitors. However, they did
not mention which cryptosystems have been used for the data
confidentiality and integrity. Although the authors claim that
security is providedby theMEDiSNarchitecture, their studydidnot
reveal much information regarding the security implementation.
An architecture called Sensor Network for Assessment of Patients
(SNAP) [13] has been proposed to address the security challenges
concerning the wireless health monitoring systems. However, the
mainproblemof the aforementioned architecture is that it does not
authenticate users when providingmedical data. Furthermore, the
data collected from medical sensors are conveyed to a controller
in plaintext format. Hence, the medical data of the patients
can be modified or intercepted by a malicious user. In [27], a
lightweight identity-based cryptography solution called IBE-Lite
has been proposed. The basic idea of IBE-Lite is to balance security
and privacy with availability. Nevertheless, several security and
privacy issues as well as efficiency problems are recognized in
IBE-Lite. First, in their work, Tan et al. do not consider sensor
to base station/end-user data authentication. Therefore, falsified
medical information can be introduced or treated as authentic
due to the lack of authentication schemes. Second, IBE-Lite cannot
resist against replication attacks. Consequently, an adversary can
insert malicious medical sensors into the network.
To establish interoperable network security between end-peers
from independent network domains, variants of conventional end-
to-end security protocols have been recently proposed among
which Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is one of themost
relevant protocols [18]. In this regard, Hummen et al. [14] present
an implementation of a delegation architecture based on an
off-path delegation server. Their proposed delegation-based ar-
chitecture relies on a centralized delegation server. Due to this,
their proposed architecture lacks scalability and reliability. More
precisely, their architecture cannot be extended to be employed
for multi-domain infrastructures, e.g. large in-home/hospital
domains. Also, their proposed architecture suffers from a consider-
able network transmission overhead resulting to a long transmis-
sion latency.Moreover, if an adversary performs a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack or compromises the delegation server, a large quantity
of stored security context of a constrained domain can be retrieved.
2.2. Smart e-health gateway
There have been many efforts in designing gateways for one
or several specific applications and architectural layers. Muller
et al. [6] present a gateway called SwissGate which handles and
optimizes the operation of sensor networks. They transparently
employ their proposed gateway on home automation applications.
Shen et al. [7] propose a prototype of a smart 6LoWPAN (IPv6
over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks) border router
that makes local decisions of users’ health states based on a
Hidden Markov Model. Finally, Rahmani et al. [4] present a smart
e-health gateway called UT-GATE in order to bring intelligence
into IoT-based ubiquitous healthcare systems. These gateways
are intelligent in the sense that they have been empowered to
autonomously perform local data storage and processing, to learn,
and to make decisions at the edge of the network (i.e., in a
distributed fashion), thanks to the provided embedded processing
power and storage capabilities of the gateways. A smart gateway
can rapidly provide preliminary results and reduce the redundant
remote communication to cloud servers by using data aggregation,
embedded machine learning, and inferences, thus offering the
basic services at the edge of the network. In this way, remote
cloud computers will just provide premium services which are
often computationally intensive and require access to the central
database.
In a smart home/hospital, gateway is in a unique position
between Body/Patient/Local Area Network (BAN/PAN/LAN) and
Wide Area Network (WAN). This promising opportunity can
be exploited by different means such as collecting health
and context information from those networks and providing
different services accordingly. As mentioned above, compared
to the conventional gateways which often just perform basic
functions such as translating between the protocols used in
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the Internet and sensor networks, smart e-health gateways are
empowered with the property of being non-resource constrained
in terms of processing power, memory, power consumption,
and communication bandwidth. In [19,20], we demonstrated
the use of a smart gateway to handle medical sensors’ main
computation and communication overhead that results from
end-user authentication and authorization.
2.3. Mobility solutions for IoT systems
In [28], Valenzuela et al. propose a solution to support mobility
for in-home health monitoring systems using wearable sensors.
This approach utilizes a coordinator sensor attached to patients’
body that is responsible for all the communications between
wearable sensors and network Access Points (APs). Jara et al.
in [29–31], propose a solution to support the mobility of sensors
employed to monitor patients in hospital environments. This
approach supports intra-mobility exploiting elements such as
sink nodes and gateways in their proposed architecture. This
proposal supposes that each mobile node has a base network
and can move into other networks. Fotouhi et al. [32] present
a handover approach for mobility support in Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs) which can be easily employed for Body Sensor
Networks (BSNs) [33,34]. In their work, different parameters are
utilized to specify the time for handover, but the most important
ones are the Received Signal Strength (RSS) and the sensor velocity.
To verify the quality of the link as well as to decide handover
mechanism, this solution requires a continuous exchange of
probe or acknowledge messages between the sensor and the
corresponding access point. However, this continuous messages
exchange weaken the network in terms of transmission overhead,
memory, and energy consumption.
In [19], ourmain focuswas on the development and analysis of a
secure and efficient authentication and authorization architecture,
while in [20] we proposed a secure end-to-end communication
scheme via session resumption for healthcare IoT system. In these
works patients’ mobility support was not considered. This article
essentially extends our previous works by incorporating enhanced
mobility while providing secure end-to-end communication. Our
proposal is motivated by the fact that to enable mobility for
healthcare IoT systems, an intermediate computing layer, that
is the fog layer [35], can be exploited between the device layer
and the cloud layer. More precisely, the mobility support can be
provided to the medical sensors ubiquitously from the fog layer so
that nomore reconfiguration is needed in the resource-constrained
device layer.
3. Healthcare IoT system architecture
Healthcare IoT systems are distinct in that they are built to
serve human beings, which inherently raises the requirements of
safety, security, and reliability. Moreover, they have to provide
real-time notifications and responses regarding the status of
patients. In a typical healthcare IoT system, to monitor patients’
activities and vital signs, the system has to ensure the safety of
patients. In addition, physicians, patients, and other caregivers
demand a dependable system in which the results are accurate
and timely, and the service is reliable and secure. To guarantee
these requirements, the smart components in the system require
a predictable latency and reliable communication with the
upper computing layer. The conventional cloud-based approaches
cannot assure the requirements of healthcare IoT systems, as the
connection to the cloud is less reliable and may incur additional
latency. In this article, we utilize a novel system architecture as a
suitable paradigm to address the aforementioned requirements.
Fig. 2. The three-tier system architecture of the healthcare IoT system (SN and DB
stand for Sensor Node and Database, respectively).
Fog computing is a paradigmextending cloud computing and its
services to the edge of the network. Fog distinguishes from cloud
in its proximity to end-users/devices, dense geographical distri-
bution, real-time interaction, support for mobility, heterogeneity,
interoperability and pre-processing along with interplay with the
cloud. Fog devices are heterogeneous in nature, ranging from end-
user devices and access points to edge routers and switches allow-
ing their use in wide variety of environments. Fog services can be
implemented in a variety of devices ranging from smart phones to
edge routers and access points with a reasonable support of local
storage and processing.
The three-tier system architecture of the healthcare IoT sys-
tem on which we apply our end-to-end security scheme is shown
in Fig. 2. In such a system, patients’ health-related information is
recorded by implanted or wearable medical sensors with which
the patient is equipped for personal monitoring of multiple pa-
rameters. This health-related data may also be supplemented with
context information, i.e. time, date, location, and relevant environ-
ment information which enables the recognition of abnormal pat-
terns and the making of more precise inferences. The functionality
of each layer in this architecture is as follows:
(i) Device layer: the lowest layer consisting of several physical
devices including implantable or wearable medical sensors
that are integrated into a tiny wireless module to collect
contextual and medical data. Enabled by the ubiquitous
identification, sensing, and communication capacity, bio-
medical and context signals are captured from the body and/or
the room. The signals are used formanaging the treatment and
diagnosis ofmedical conditions. The signal is then transmitted
to the upper layer (i.e., smart gateways in the Fog layer)
via wireless or wired communication protocols such as IEEE
802.15.4, Bluetooth LE, Wi-Fi, etc.
(ii) Fog layer: the middle layer consists of a network of
interconnected smart gateways. Cloud computing paradigm
is an efficient alternative to establishing and maintaining
private servers and data centers. Particularly, due to its
‘‘pay-as-you-go’’ business model, it gives more efficiency
and freedom to web applications. However, these features
demand high computation and storage as well as batch
processing. This model enables developers and end-users
to exploit cloud services with a minimum knowledge of
the underlying hardware and infrastructure. However, this
becomes an issue in applications which require low latency
(emergency care). Such challenges are addressed in the Fog
computing paradigm by extending the cloud services to the
edge of the network. As mentioned before, we exploit Smart
e-Health gateways which support different communication
protocols, act as a touching point between a sensor network
and the local switch/Internet. A smart gateway receives data
from different sub-networks, performs protocol conversion,
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and provides other higher level services. It acts as repository
(local database) to temporarily store sensors’ and users’
information, and provides intelligence at the edge of the
network. In addition, by taking responsibility for handling
some computational and processing burdens of the sensors
and the cloud, a smart gateway at the fog layer can cope with
many challenges such as energy efficiency, scalability, and
reliability issues [35].
(iii) Cloud layer: The cloud layer includes broadcasting, data
warehousing and big data analysis servers, and a hospital local
database that periodically performs data synchronization
with the remote healthcare database server in the cloud. In
the cloud layer, accessibility to patients-related health data is
classified as public data (e.g., patients’ ID or blood type) and
private data (e.g., DNA).
4. Requirements of secure and efficient communication for
healthcare IoT system
In this section, various criteria that represent desirable
characteristics of secure communication for a healthcare IoT
system are presented.
Data confidentiality: All relevant data being transmitted be-
tween communicating peers remains unknown for others. To pre-
vent patients’ health data from the leakage attack, such data needs
to be kept confidential. This can be achieved using strong encryp-
tion schemes meaning that even if an adversary eavesdrops on
transmitted packets, he/she cannot easily get access to them. Data
confidentiality should also be resistant to any device compromise
attack, for example, medical sensor or smart gateway compromise
attack.
Data integrity: Ensures that patients’ health data is received in
the exact way as it was sent and it has not been manipulated in
transit. Since in healthcare IoT systems most devices and their
communications are wireless in nature, maintaining data integrity
is a necessary task. To provide data integrity, a Cyclic Redundancy
Checksum (CRC), that is used to detect random errors during
packet transmission, or a Message Authentication Code (MAC) are
usually employed.
Mutual authentication and authorization: Allows the communi-
cation peers to ensure and validate the identity of each other. Mu-
tual authentication needs to be done in the whole system so that
private medical information cannot be accessed by any unautho-
rized user. This way, an adversary cannot claim to be a valid user to
obtain patients’ health data or inject invalid information. Authen-
tication can be achieved by sending aMAC alongwith themessage.
On the other hand, authorization indicates that only authorized
users/sensors can access resources and services in an IoT-enabled
healthcare system.
Data freshness and forward security: Data freshness indicates
that patients’ health data is fresh and an adversary has not replayed
the previously transmitted data. The property of forward security
ensures that the revelation of current encrypted medical sensors’
data does not threaten the security of the previously transmitted
health data.
Availability: Ensures that medical sensors and all services
utilized in an IoT-enabled healthcare system can constantly
provide services to authorized users whenever required (despite
of possible Denial of Service (DoS) attacks). Fulfilling availability,
however, is a difficult task as DoS attacks can exhaust the power
supplies of the medical sensors or heavily reduce the network
performance by jamming the radio channel.
Scalability and lightweight solutions: Scalability refers to the
capability of an IoT-enabled healthcare system to continue
functioning well even if such a system may be modified in terms
of size (e.g. sensors, hardware or services may be added/removed).
In emergency situations, an IoT-enabled healthcare system should
have the capability of fast reaction without compromising the
patients’ security and privacy. It is necessary to minimize
communication, computation, and memory overhead of medical
sensors due to the low capabilities of these sensors. Hence,
cryptographic solutions being proposed should be lightweight to
fulfill the aforementioned requirements.
Data access control: In healthcare IoT systems, caregivers
(i.e. doctors, pharmacists, nurses, etc.) are directly involved with
patients’ physiological and medical data. Thus, a real-time role-
based access control needs to be available to restrict caregivers’
access based on their privileges.
Patient consent: Patients’ consents are always essential when
caregivers decide to circulate their medical records to another
healthcare sector/hospital in order to provide higher quality
of healthcare. Informed consent refers to the process of get-
ting patients’ permission before conducting medical procedures/
interventions (e.g. medical treatment’s nature, consequences,
harms, risks, and benefits). Informed consent is a fundamental
principle of healthcare and it is collected according to the guide-
lines of medical and research ethics.
Mobility support: Mobility is one of the most important chal-
lenges in healthcare IoT systems which increases the applicability
of these technologies. The mobility support enables patients to go
for a walk around the medical domain(s) while he/she is continu-
ouslymonitored. Furthermore,mobility allows the patient tomove
from his/her base MSN to other rooms for medical tests without
losing the continuous monitoring.
End-to-end security: End-to-end security is one of the major
requirements in healthcare IoT systems. This feature enables the
end-points of a healthcare IoT system, that is caregivers and
medical sensors, to securely communicate with each other beyond
the independent network.
5. End-to-end security scheme for healthcare IoT system
In [19], we presented a secure and efficient authentication
and authorization architecture for healthcare IoT system using
smart e-health gateways called SEA (lower black arrow shown in
Fig. 1). In [20], we presented a comprehensive end-to-end security
scheme for healthcare IoT systems using the session resumption
technique (upper black arrow shown in Fig. 1). Before presenting
the fog layer-based mobility for our proposed end-to-end security
scheme, we briefly explain our previous work in this section.
5.1. Secure and efficient authentication and authorization architec-
ture
In the paradigms of healthcare IoT, not only data can be
collected by smart devices (medical sensors) and transmitted to
end-users (caregivers), but end-users can also access, control,
and manage medical sensors through the Internet. Since patients’
health data is the basis for enabling applications and services in
healthcare IoT, it becomes imperative to provide secure end-to-end
communication between end-users andmedical sensors to protect
the exchange of health data. In addition, privacy of patients and
key negotiation materials should be protected to prevent anyone
other than the negotiation peers from learning the contents of
the negotiations. It is also important that malicious activities be
blocked at the entrance to MSNs. Hence, mutual authentication
and authorization of end-users and devices used in healthcare IoT
systems is a crucial task.
Our proposed architecture called SEA exploits the role of smart
e-health gateways in the fog layer to perform the authentication
and authorization of remote end-users securely and efficiently on
behalf of the medical sensors [19]. By providing the established
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Fig. 3. Message flights for the full certificate-based DTLS handshake while issuing
a session ticket [19].
connection context to the medical sensor nodes, these devices no
longer need to authenticate and authorize a remote healthcare
center or a caregiver. Thus, any malicious activity can be
blocked before entering to a constrained medical domain. The
architecture of our proposed healthcare IoT monitoring system in
home/hospital domain(s) is shown in Fig. 1. In such an architecture,
patient health-related information is recorded by body-worn or
implanted sensors, withwhich the patient is equipped for personal
monitoring of multiple parameters. This health data can be also
supplemented with context information (e.g., date, time, location,
and temperature) which enables to identify unusual patterns and
make more precise inferences about the situation. Our proposed
SEA focuses on a fact that the smart e-health gateway and the
remote end-user have sufficient resources to perform various
heavy-weight security protocols as well as certificate validation.
To provide end-to-end communication between a remote end-
user and a constrained medical device, distributed smart e-health
gateways are introduced to build a transport layer security
protocol that is Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [18].
DTLS handshake protocol is the main transport layer security
solution for IoT. As Fig. 3 presents, a full handshake begins with a
ClientHello message, that includes the security parameters for the
connection which is used later during the handshake to compute
the pre-master secret key. Flight 3 contains additional cookie from
ClientHelloVerify. Flight 4 includes several messages and starts
with ServerHello message which contains the negotiated cipher
suite for the current handshake and the smart gateway’s random
value which is utilized later during the handshake to compute
the master secret key. The agreed cipher suite relies on supported
cipher suites by the end-user. If the smart gateway and the
end-user cannot agree on a common cipher suite, the handshake
is canceled with a HandshakeFailure alert message. The next
message of flight 4 is smart gateway’s Certificate message which
holds gateway’s certificate-chain. The first certificate in the chain
includes the smart gateway’s public key which is created using
OpenSSL in version of 1.0.1.j. OpenSSL is an open source project for
implementing SSL, TLS and various cryptography libraries such as
symmetric key, public key, and hash algorithms. It is commonly
utilized for creating and managing keys and certificates. Once
the certificate is validated, the end-user can extract the smart
gateway’s public key. The CertificateRequest is only sent in a
mutual handshake and includes the lists of the smart gateway’s
valid certificates. The ServerKeyExchange message is only sent
with specific cipher suites that need more parameters in order
to compute a master secret key. The cipher suite employed in
this work is TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA_256.
The name indicates the use of elliptic cryptography, particularly-
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Furthermore, for encryption AES-
based CCM with an IV of 8 bytes is used. With this cipher
suite, ServerKeyExchange message contains the ECDH public key
of the smart gateway and the detail of the associated elliptic
curve. The ServerHelloDonemessage announces the end of flight 4
messages. The first message of flight 5 is the end-user’s certificate
in case mutual authentication is run. ClientKeyExchange includes
additional parameters utilized to compute the master secret
key. In this case, the ECDH public key of the smart gateway
is conveyed. CertificateVerify is a message which enables the
end-user to prove to the smart gateway that it carries the
private key which corresponds to the public key contained
in the certificate. Thus, it is only transmitted in the mutual
authentication. With the ChangeCipherSpec message, the end-user
informs the smart gateway that next messages will be encrypted
using the agreed cipher suites and secret keys. The Finished
message includes the encrypted hash over all flight messages
which ensure that both peers have been performing handshake
based on unmodified flight messages and the handshake is
performed successfully. In flight 6, the smart gateway responds
with its own ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages. With the
Finished messages both peers agree to send and receive securely
protected application information over this connection. Upon this
connection setup, as shown in Fig. 4, the remote end-point and the
smart e-health gateway mutually authenticate each other.
It is supposed that within the certificate-based DTLS hand-
shake, from one hand, the smart gateway authenticates (Auth-
req.1) the remote end-user through certificates. In this regard,
similar to current web browsers, smart gateways hold a pool of
trusted certificates. On the other hand, the smart gateway either
authenticates (Auth-req.2) to the remote end-user through certifi-
cates within the DTLS handshake or based on an application-level
password once the handshake is terminated. Once the mutual au-
thentication between the end-user and the smart gateway is done
successfully, the end-user authorizes (Authz.) as a trusted entity
so that a data query from the end-users’ side is transmitted to the
medical sensor through the smart gateway. To facilitate the secu-
rity and authorization of communication, it is required that both
entities, the constrained medical sensor and the smart gateway,
also mutually authenticate (Mut-auth.) one another once during
the initialization phase. In SEA, this is done by performing a public
key-based DTLS handshake between both entities. Although sym-
metric key-based DTLS handshake provides an efficient alterna-
tive to public key-basedDTLS handshake, the symmetric key-based
handshake needs secret keys to be pre-shared and readily avail-
able at both communication end-points. Moreover, compared to
the symmetric key-based DTLS handshake, obtaining secret points
in a public key-based handshake implies the computation of el-
liptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Since solving the discrete
logarithm problem is as hard as integer factorization, this problem
cannot be solved effortlessly [23].
Oncemutual authentication and key exchange protocol is done,
it is required that both peers agree upon a commonkey. This shared
common key can be generated using an already agreed elliptic
curve between the both peers. Using the shared common key,
one peer (i.e., constrained medical sensor) encrypts the gathered
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Fig. 4. The proposed SEA architecture overview using distributed smart e-health
gateways.
patients’ medical data applying the efficient Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES-CCM) [36] algorithm and transmits the encrypted
medical information (Enc./Dec.) to the smart e-health gateway
and vice versa. AES-CCM offers confidentiality, integrity, and
authentication of payload compared to other commonly known
symmetric encryption/decryption algorithms (e.g., RC5, andTriple-
DES), it is known as one of the most efficient ones. Moreover, AES
is supported by many constrained devices used for IoT platforms.
This make AES-CCM a desirable encryption/decryption algorithm
choice for constrained devices.
Our SEA architecture achieved the following benefits: (i) net-
work transmission overhead and latency were reduced compared
to themost recently proposed architectures. This is because a great
part of the work, that is authentication and authorization of a re-
mote end-user/healthcare center, is shifted to be performed by
distributed smart e-health gateways. (ii) the privacy of patients,
vital certificates, and key negotiation materials were effectively
protected, and (iii) the scalability and reliability of the systemwere
enhanced as the architecture was changed from centralized to dis-
tributed.
5.2. The proposed end-to-end security scheme
In SEA [19], our main focus was on the development and
analysis of an authentication and authorization architecture for
IoT-enabled healthcare systems rather than end-to-end secure
communication. In [20], we enabled end-to-end secure com-
munication between end-points of a healthcare IoT system
(i.e., medical sensors and end-users) by developing a session
resumption-based scheme which offloads the encrypted session
states of DTLS towards a non-resource-constrained end-user. The
main motivation to employ the DTLS session resumption is to
mitigate the overhead on resource-constrained sensors. Because,
transmitting and processing of messages in the certificate-based
DTLS handshake are resource intensive tasks. The session resump-
tion technique is an extended form of the DTLS handshake which
enables a client/server to continue the communication with a
previously established session state without compromising the
security properties. The session resumption approach improves
the performance of the DTLS handshake in terms of required band-
width, computational overhead, and number of transmitted mes-
sages. The main idea to employ session resumption is to perform
heavy-weight operations only once, during an initial DTLS hand-
shake connection (initialization) phase. Thus, the peers need to
keep minimal session state, even after the session is terminated.
The session resumption enables the peers to resume the secure
connectionwithout the need for running expensive operations and
transmitting long certificates.
Two types of DTLS session resumption techniques have been
proposed by IETF for constrained network environments [17].
(i) Abbreviated DTLS handshake where both peers have similar
resources and both peers maintain session state through con-
nections. (ii) DTLS session resumption without server-side state
which is an extension of DTLS handshake that allows a server
to offload the encrypted session state towards a non-resource-
constrained client [37]. In [20], we employed the second type of
session resumption (i.e. without server-side state) that offloads
the encrypted session state of the tiny sensors towards the non-
resource-constrained end-users/caregivers [18,37]. This is due to
the asymmetry in resources between medical sensors and end-
users/caregivers considering the constrained nature of sensors.
Before enabling secure end-to-end communication, as we
presented earlier, a full certificate-based DTLS handshake needs to
be performedonce by the end-user and the smart e-health gateway
(initialization phase). The protocol flow of the full certificate-based
DTLS handshake while issuing a session ticket (to be used later
in DTLS session resumption) is shown in Fig. 3. Here, the client
(i.e. end-user) indicates its support for session resumption with an
empty session resumption extension in the ClientHello message.
On the other hand, the server (i.e. medical sensor) indicates its
support for session resumption with an empty session resumption
extension in the ServerHello message. In addition, during the
handshake procedure, the smart gateway needs to build a new
session ticket which holds: (i) the key name that recognizes
the key utilized to encrypt the state, (ii) the validation of the
ticket, and (iii) the encrypted state. Once the full certificate-based
DTLS handshake between the aforementioned end-points is done
successfully, the smart gateway updates the medical sensor about
the validity of the end-user as well as the status of the DTLS
handshake. This is done by encrypting the respective information
using AES-CCM encryption algorithm. The AES-CCM algorithm
ensures the confidentiality, integrity and authentication of the
transmitted payloads. Here, the encryption key is used as secret
key, which is shared between the smart gateway and the medical
sensor and generated by utilizing the mutually agreed elliptic
curve cryptographic algorithm. More details regarding the shared
secret key generation can be found in [19]. This enables medical
sensors to perform the session resumption with authorized and
validated end-users.
To provide secure end-to-end communication between an end-
user and a medical sensor, the end-user needs to initiate the
session resumption mechanism with the sensor by sending a
ClientHello message (Fig. 5). This time, the ClientHello message
comprises a session resumption extensionmaintaining the session
ticket and a random value R∗. During this step, the medical
sensor uses the received encrypted and authorized session update
from the smart gateway in order to resume the DTLS connection
which has previously been established between the end-user
and the smart gateway. The protocol flow for the DTLS session
resumption without server-side state used in this work is shown
in Fig. 5. Upon receiving the SessionTicket extension, the medical
sensor which acts as a server needs to decrypt and verify the
correctness of the ticket using the corresponding key which is
the pre-master secret. When the session ticket is completely
verified, the sensor responds with a ServerHello message holding
an empty session resumption extension and a random value R′′.
In the same flight, the sensor also issues a new session ticket,
which contains the information of the current state, that is, the
current master secret. The current master secret is computed
using the Pseudo Random Function (PRF), that is, a HMAC-based
secret expansion function, over the previous master secret key
(pre-master secret) and the exchanged random values R∗ and R′′,
respectively. The random values provide the property of forward
secrecy meaning that revelation of the current single key just
allows access to the information of that session and does not
threaten the security of the previous DTLS sessions. The new
session ticket is conveyed through the NewSessionTicket message
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Fig. 5. The proposed session resumption based end-to-end security for healthcare
Internet of Things [20].
and kept by the end-user for a possible subsequent session
resumption. This way the resource-constrained sensor offloads
the computational and processing burden of its state towards
the non-resource-constrained end-user. Later, by exchanging the
ChangeCipherSpec messages, the new keying material is utilized in
order to secure the communication channel. Finally, by exchanging
the Finished messages the correctness of the agreed keys and the
integrity of all exchangedmessages are verified. This concludes the
handshake and provides the exchange of secured application data.
In this work, to generate the SessionTicket, the revised version of
recommended ticket construction proposed in [37] is used. This is
because the recommended ticket construction leads to an exces-
sive ticket size for resource-constrained network environments.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide a revised version of the rec-
ommended ticket construction that will take the constraints of the
device/network into account with respect to the transmission
overheads. TheNewSessionTicket message includes a lifetime value
and a session ticket. The lifetime value represents the number of
seconds until the session ticket expires. The structure of the session
ticket is opaque to the communicating peers and only the ticket is-
suer can access the session ticket information. The recommended
ticket structure presented in [37] suggests to use AES-CCM for en-
cryptionwith a 12 byte Initialization Vector (IV) and a 32 byteMAC
based on HMAC-SHA-256. However, in this work, an 8-byte MAC
based on HMAC-SHA-256 and a 12-byte IV are utilized, as they are
the recommended cipher suites for secure CoAP over DTLS [17].
The major advantages offered by our scheme compared to
the conventional end-to-end security solution [38] can be found
in [20]. We applied our proposed session resumption-based end-
to-end security scheme for healthcare IoT to the full system ar-
chitecture shown in Fig. 1. As can be seen from the architectural
viewpoint, the end-to-end security is fulfilled by (i) using the full
initial certificate-based DTLS between end-users and smart gate-
ways and (ii) utilizing session resumption techniquewhich enables
end-users and sensors to directly communicate and transmit the
encrypted health-related information. The full procedure consid-
erably alleviates the processing load on tiny sensors in terms of au-
thentication, authorization, certificate related functionalities, and
public key cryptography operations.
6. Fog layer-based mobility for the proposed end-to-end
security scheme
Mobility support is one of the most important issues in health-
care IoT systems. In such systems, improving patients’ quality of
life is essential. Providing patients with the possibility to walk
around the hospital wards knowing that the monitoring of their
health condition is not interrupted is an essential feature. Using a
portable patient monitoring system offers a high quality of medi-
cal service by providing freedom of movement to patients. Mobil-
ity enables patients to go for a walk around the medical domain(s)
while they are monitored. In addition, mobility allows the patient
to move from his/her base MSN to other rooms for medical tests
without losing the continuous monitoring. This scenario can also
be extended to other environments such as a nursing house or in-
home patient monitoring. The main goal of the continuous moni-
toring in the healthcare IoT systems is to achieve a knowledge base
from the patient which enables the remote server and the Knowl-
edge Base System (KBS) to detect symptoms, predict, and man-
age the illnesses. Mobility can be categorized into two main topics
denoted as macro-mobility and micro-mobility. The movement of
medical sensors between variousmedical network domains distin-
guishes the macro-mobility. Micro-mobility assumes that medical
sensors move between different MSNs within the same domain.
To achieve a continuous monitoring of patients considering the
mobility support, it is essential to develop self-configuration or
handover mechanisms which are capable of handling secure and
efficient data transfers among different MSNs. A data handover
mechanism is defined as the process of changing or updating the
registration of a mobile sensor from its associated base MSN to
the visited MSN, for example, when moving across the hospital’s
wards. Data handover solutions should enable the ubiquity when
they need towork autonomouslywithout human intervention. The
handovermechanism should also offermedical sensors continuous
connectivity, if there exist several gateways in the hospital or
nursing/home environments.
Medical sensors carried by patients are utilized to collect
various biological or physiological parameters. Healthcare IoT
services are supposed to serve patients in a seamless and contin-
uous way when they are moving in a hospital a nursing facility or
at home. More precisely, the mobility support should be provided
to the medical sensors ubiquitously from the upper layer (i.e. Fog
layer) so that zero reconfiguration is needed in the sensor layer.
Fog layer-based handover solutions try to endow healthcare IoT
systems with ubiquitous features and provide continuous patient
monitoring as well as mobility support.
6.1. Requirements of mobility support for a healthcare IoT system
In this subsection, we present different requirements that need
to be fulfilled while offering mobility support for a healthcare IoT
system.
(1) In healthcare IoT, mobility must be supported in both star
andmesh topologies including single- andmulti-hop routing.
Mesh networks are mostly formed by nodes with a high
degree of mobility.
(2) Signaling must be minimized by removing the use of broad-
cast/multicast flooding as well as the frequency of link scope
broadcast/multicast messages. Reduction of the mentioned
mobility signalingmessagesmitigates the transmission over-
head.
(3) Mobility solutions should be compatible and interoperable
with the current IPv6 protocols such as Internet Control
Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) and Mobile Internet
Protocol version 6 (MIPv6).
116 S.R. Moosavi et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 64 (2016) 108–124
(4) In the fog layer, a local gateway must notify other available
gateways about the presence of mobile sensors in its domain.
The reason is that binding necessary updates about the
network must be performed by gateways rather than the
mobile sensors to unburden tiny sensors from performing
heavy tasks.
(5) Global addressing must be supported in mobility solutions.
Medical sensors must be addressable anytime needed
independent of their current locations. In healthcare IoT, it is
one of the main challenges to accomplish global connectivity
with the devices using the current Internet infrastructure.
(6) Header information and payloads regarding data messages
should be optimized carefully. This reduces fragmentation,
the transmission overhead of data messages, and latency
while roaming.
(7) Mobility solutions must be based on distributed storage
of patients’ medical information rather than conventional
centralized approaches to support fault tolerance.
(8) The authentication and authorization of medical sensors,
smart gateways and caregivers must be performed to ensure
the protection of resources, confidentiality, and integrity of
the medical information.
(9) Robust security solutions must be provided as healthcare
IoT requires ensuring the protection of patients’ medical
information. Security support can be provided by the AES
algorithm which is provided in the data link layer. However,
stronger mechanisms to guarantee patients’ privacy as well
as the security of their medical data can be offered by IPSec in
the network layer and DTLS in the transport layer.
(10) In real-time healthcare IoT, mobility detection must be agile
so that it avoids delays, jitter, and interruptions of the com-
munication during the data handover process. Data handover
procedures (on the evaluation of specific metrics) can be cat-
egorized into two main groups: movement parameters and
communication parameters. The movement parameters are
based on the node position, and movement direction, and
velocity. Such parameters are difficult to capture in resource-
constrained sensors made to collect just physiological pa-
rameters. The second group utilizes the communication
parameters in order to handle the requirements for the han-
dover task. The wireless link between two devices can be
evaluated using two different metrics: the Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI) and the Link Quality Indicator (LQI).
According to [39], the most frequently monitored parameter
utilized to evaluate the handover decisions is the Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI). The RSSI represents the signal power
of a message received by a node which is mostly measured in
decibels (dB). The alteration of this value should be directly related
to the distance between a sender and a receiver. However, the
value of thismetric suffers from interference from the surrounding
environment and, thereby, this relation is not linear in most
situations. The evaluation of RSSI can be performed in twodifferent
ways:
(i) Choosing the best value: In this approach, if a patient carrying
medical sensors moves to an overlapped coverage area of
two or more smart gateways, the one with the higher RSSI
value is the one with which the medical sensor chooses to
communicate. Due to the oscillation of the RSSI, this model
can lead to unnecessary data handovers when a sensor is
under several smart gateways’ coverage zones. Despite this
unpleasant behavior, this model is easy to be deployed and if
optimized, it can minimize the data handover costs.
Fig. 6. Mobility scenario.
(ii) Making a decision based on comparison against a threshold
value: To mitigate the number of unnecessary data handovers
performed by the previous approach, this model recommends
the use of a threshold value to decide the proper moment
to switch to a new gateway. If a sensor moves out from
the registered smart gateway’s coverage area, the RSSI
value will be decreased. If this value undershoots to a
predefined threshold value, the sensor needs to be registered
to another nearby smart gateway which can receive signals
with satisfactory signal strength.
It should be noted that proposing an efficient policy formobility
support in fog-based architectures is beyond the scope of this
article. Instead, the key contribution of this work is to present
how our proposed session resumption-based end-to-end security
scheme can be extended to be efficiently maintained andmanaged
whenmobility takes place. In otherwords, it can be considered as a
sub-process of a fullmobility procedure to address security aspects
after it is decided by a policy making module that roaming should
be performed from a smart gateway to another.
6.2. Mobility scenario
Fig. 6 presents the scenario where a patient wearing medical
sensors decides to move from its room (base network) to other
rooms (visited networks). We assume a mobility scenario which
consists of several MSNs for remote patient monitoring in a
hospital or nursing/home environment. In the considered scenario,
patients may roam through the hospital wards or move to other
rooms due to some medical tests (e.g., Laboratory or X-ray).
In the case that a moving sensor loses its connection with
one of the smart gateways, he/she will stop being monitored by
the caregivers. This condition is not favorable in situations where
real-time and continuous monitoring is necessary. To enable
seamless transitions of medical sensors, providing an efficient
and robust data handover mechanism among smart gateways,
considering the limitations of sensors, is of essential importance.
The mobility scenario is discussed in three phases in the following
subsections.
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6.2.1. Message exchange in patients’ base MSN
This phase presents the initial state of the medical sensors
where each sensor is connected to its base MSN via smart e-health
gateway and exchange the required messages. These messages
may consist of data frames requests, responses, and acknowledg-
ments of data transmission between the medical sensors and the
smart gateways.
The data frames include: (1) information regarding the DTLS
session states for the subsequent DTLS session resumption and
(2) information about the validity of remote caregivers. Informa-
tion is exchanged between both peers using the aforementioned
AES-CCM algorithm. Request messages are queries to the medi-
cal sensor to either get or change some values. Response messages
include replies to the requestmessageswhere the results of the op-
eration can be obtained. In addition, the request and responsemes-
sages include information that needs to be transmitted between
the sensor and the gateway during the DTLS handshake to perform
mutual authentication.
6.2.2. Entering to a new medical subnetwork
Healthcare IoT services are supposed to be offered to patients
in a seamless and continuous way when they are moving. When
a patient moves out of his/her base MSN, the sensor detects that
the quality of its connection with the associated smart gateway
is reduced below a pre-defined threshold. We propose to provide
mobility support to the sensors from the fog layer to alleviate
processing and computation burden of the sensors. To do so, the
smart gateway located in the base network needs to check, through
the fog layer, whether the medical sensor is accessible from other
gateways. This type ofmobility (micro-mobility) is just provided to
those sensors that are in the same domain/sub-network and their
IP addresses do not change. This type of scenario is desirable for
MSNs of a hospital as the entire network relies on the samedomain.
To provide continuous monitoring of patients, efficient and
seamless data handover mechanisms between smart e-health
gateways are needed. Thesemechanisms should take the following
features into consideration: (1) Data handover between smart
gateways should be quick and seamless considering that the
connection to the sensor needs to be preserved during the whole
process. (2) After a successful data handover, the changes of
routes to the moving medical senor should be spread quickly by
the entire healthcare IoT system. (3) The number of messages
which need to be exchanged among gateways should be kept
minimal (transmission overhead). As a result, to enable mobility
for healthcare IoT systems, the following functions need to be
performed in the fog layer between smart gateways:
(i) Neighbor Solicitation, Advertisement, and Authentication:
Neighbor solicitation and advertisement functions need to
be done between the smart gateways in the fog layer
to enable seamless mobility. The successful integration of
multiple smart gateways on a shared backbone (i.e. fog layer)
offers an efficient mobility support. To facilitate the security
and the authorization of communication between available
smart gateways, it is also required that gateways mutually
authenticate one another. As presented earlier, smart gateways
are non-resource-constrained devices and they are intelligent
in the sense that they have been empowered to autonomously
perform local data storage and processing, to learn, and to
make decisions at the edge of the network. Hence, the mutual
authentication between gateways can be done securely and
efficiently using the ECDSA algorithm which was previously
presented and analyzed in SEA [19].
(ii) DataHandover:Data handover is defined and considered as the
process of changing/updating the registration of a sensor from
one smart gateway to another one. For example, whenmoving
across hospitals’ different rooms. This mechanism enables the
mobility support ofmedical sensors in healthcare IoT domains.
In a case that a moving medical sensor loses its connection
with one of the smart gateways or if it takes too long to be
registered/updated by a new one, the desirable continuous
communication and monitoring cannot be ensured. Thus, the
smart gateway located in patients’ base network needs to
periodically send update messages to other gateways in the
same domain (e.g., hospital). These messages may include
information about the authorized sensors aswell as caregivers.
Thereby, when a patient enters to another MSN, due to some
medical tests, no authentication needs to be done between the
sensor and the new gateway. The reason is that the gateway
located in the visited network has already been updated, with
all necessary information regarding the communication, by the
gateway in the base MSN. However, in the case that a new
mobile sensor is detected in an MSN, the authentication needs
to be performed. As a result, any malicious activity can be
discovered and blocked before entering to an MSN.
6.2.3. Returning back to the base MSN
When the patient returns back to his/her base network, the
medical sensor sends a re-association request to inform the home
smart gateway regarding its new location.
As can be noticed from Fig. 7, mobility is enabled in our
proposed end-to-end security scheme using the fog concept. It
is shown that by exploiting the fog layer, the mobility support
can be provided to the medical sensors ubiquitously without
compromising the end-to-end security.
7. Implementation and evaluation
The system architecture illustrated in Fig. 1 is implemented for
experimental evaluation, with the main goal of secure and effi-
cient authentication and authorization as well as providing mo-
bility for the proposed end-to-end security scheme. To Imple-
ment our proposed architecture, we setup a platform that consists
of medical sensors, UT-GATE smart e-health gateways, a remote
server, and end-users. UT-GATE is constructed from the combina-
tion of a Pandaboard [40] and a Texas Instruments (TI) SmartRF06
board that is integrated with a CC2538 module [41]. The Pand-
aboard is a low-power and low-cost single-board computer de-
velopment platform based on the TI OMAP4430 system-on-chip
(SoC) following the OMAP architecture and fabricated using 45 nm
technology. The OMAP4430 processor is composed of a Cortex-A9
microprocessor unit (MPU) subsystem including dual-core ARM
cores with symmetric multiprocessing at up to 1.2 GHz each. In
our configuration, UT-GATE uses 8 GB of external memory and is
powered by Ubuntu OS which allows to control devices and ser-
vices such as local storage and notification. To investigate the fea-
sibility of our proposed architecture, the Wismote [42] platform,
which is a common resource-limited sensor, is utilized in Con-
tiki’s network simulation tool Cooja [14]. Wismote is equipped
with a 16 MHz MSP430 micro-controller, an IEEE 802.15.4 ra-
dio transceiver, 128 kB of ROM, 16 kB of RAM, and supports
20-bit addressing. For the evaluation, we use the open source
tool OpenSSL version 1.0.1.j to create elliptic curve public and
private keys from the NIST P-256 (prime256v1) and X.509 cer-
tificates. X.509 certificates are the prevailing form of certificates
and are employed in the certificate-based mode of DTLS [43]. The
server association to the end-user is created using OpenSSL API
118 S.R. Moosavi et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 64 (2016) 108–124
Fig. 7. The handshaking procedures of the proposed end-to-end security scheme for mobility enabled healthcare IoT.
which provides all necessary functions related to end-users in-
cluding configuration, certificate, handshake, session state, and ci-
pher suites to support session resumption. TinyDTLS [44] is used as
the code-base of the proposed scheme, in this work. TinyDTLS is
an open-source implementation of DTLS in symmetric key-based
mode. We extend it with support for the certificate-based DTLS
as well as session resumption. For the public-key functions, we
utilize the Relic-toolkit [45] that is an open source cryptography
library tailored for specific security levels with emphasis on effi-
ciency and flexibility. The MySQL database is set up for static and
non-static records. Static records which are managed by system
administrators, include white tables, essential data required by
the DTLS handshake, and an end-user authentication mechanism.
Non-static records store up-to-date bio-signals that are syn-
chronized between the Pandaboard database and a cloud server
database. The cloud server database is processed using xSQL Lite
which is the third party tool for data synchronization. With re-
spect to the cryptographic primitives and to make a fair compari-
son, we followed similar cipher suites (which are current security
recommendations for constrained network environments [17]) as
employed in themost recently proposed authentication and autho-
rization architecture for IP-based IoT [45]. In this regard, we utilize
elliptic curve NIST-256 for public-key operations, AES_128_CCM_8
(with an IV of 8 bytes) for symmetric-key, and SHA256 for hashing
operations.
7.1. Energy-performance evaluation
In this subsection,we analyze our proposed end-to-end security
scheme from the energy-performance point of view.
Transmission overhead: To perform the certificate-based DTLS
handshake, as shown in Fig. 3, all message flights need to be
transmitted to establish a DTLS connection. When transmitted
over size-constrained IEEE 802.15.4 radio links, these messages
must additionally be split into several packet fragments due
to their extensive message size [14]. As Table 1 presents, the
transmission overhead of the proposed SEA approach to the most
recently proposed architecture for a successful certificate-based
DTLS connection is compared. As the baseline for this evaluation,
a simulation environment is implemented using Cooja. Then, the
transmission overheads of the certificate-based DTLS protocol
between two wirelessly connected WiSMotes is measured. To
quantify the transmission overhead, the pcap tool in combination
with the Cooja simulator is employed. The presented results
signify averages over 100 measurement runs. In a delegation-
based architecture, the measured transmission overhead of the
certificate-based DTLS handshake is 1609 bytes which causes in
total 24 fragments for the transmission of all handshake messages
from the delegation server to the end-user [14]. In contrast, the
proposed SEA architecture requires transmission of 1190 bytes
and it causes 18 fragments totally. As a result, the transmission
overhead in our proposed architecture is reduced by 26% compared
to the delegation-based architecture.
Latency: Latency is defined as the time needed for a data packet
to travel from one designated point to another. It is an essential
metric for real-time applications. In this work, we calculate the
latency from two perspectives: (i) The communication latency
from a smart gateway to an end-user for the authentication and
authorization process, and (ii) Data handover latency between
two smart gateways for the proposed mobility enabled end-to-
end security scheme. The communication latency and the data
handover latency are estimated on a 20 Mb/s broadband Internet
connection (see Table 2).
(i) Communication latency: To estimate the communication la-
tency, the processing time which is spent from sensor node
to the end-user (NE) is calculated. This processing time de-
duced from the summation of communication latency from
sensor node to smart gateway (NG) and smart gateway to end-
user can be written as: LatencyNE = LatencyNG + LatencyGE .
In this work, to compute the communication latency from the
UT-Gate to the end-user, a proxy server is adjoined to the net-
work. Through the proxy server, the transmission latency be-
tween the end-user and the UT-Gate can be easilymeasured as
the proxy server listens to requests transmitted from the end-
user to the UT-Gate and vice versa without tampering or mod-
ifying them. To compute the communication latency of GE, the
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Table 1
Performance comparison with the most recently proposed authentication and authorization approach for
IoT.
Transmission-overhead (byte) Latency-GE (s) Latency-NG (s)
SEA approach (this work) 1190 5.001 ∼15
Hummen et al. [14] 1609 6.08 ∼15
SEA approach improvements (%) 26 16 0
Table 2
Data handover latency between two smart gateways
with different packet size.
Packet size (byte) Data handover latency (ms)
10 2.288
30 2.410
50 2.517
100 2.884
200 3.113
500 3.342
1k 3.685
5k 4.588
Fiddle [4] proxy server, which is a desktop application, is em-
ployed to track requests and responses. Fiddle offers a large
number of services including security testing and HTTP/HTTPS
traffic recoding. According to our analysis, the proposed SEA
architecture achieves an almost equivalentNG processing time
to the delegation-based architecture [14]. However, the pro-
posed SEA approach considerably reduces the processing time
required for GE compared to the delegation-based architec-
ture. As shown in Table 1, in SEA, the processing time required
for GE is about 5.001 s whereas this time increases to about
6.08 s in the delegation-based architecture. Thus, regarding the
latency from the gateway to the end-user, the proposed ar-
chitecture obtains about 16% improvement compared to the
delegation-based architecture.
(ii) Data handover latency: To demonstrate how our proposed end-
to-end security scheme enables mobility, we implemented
a real system in which two UT-GATE gateways with the
configuration described above are employed. We assume that
these gateways are connected through the fog layer where
one of the gateways acts as a client and the other one
acts as a server. In the experiments, we created a 100-byte
lookup table for each gateway that consists of: (i) control
data which consists of the DTLS session resumption state,
information about the authorized caregivers, medical sensors’
IDs, and patients’ IDs. (ii) Patients’ health data that includes
heart rate, body temperature, and oxygen saturation. In our
analysis, we calculated the latency of the data handover
process between the gateways. To show the scalability of our
method, we considered messages with different sizes which
may need to be exchanged between the gateways for the data
handover process. The results are shown in Table 6. As can be
deduced from the Table, the data handover latency between
two gateways is negligible and mobility is supported in an
agile way without any computational and processing burden
to the sensors. In addition, by increasing the packet size,
latency marginally increases showing the scalability of our
scheme. As mentioned before, seamless mobility is a necessity
in healthcare IoT systems. The experiments show that our
proposed end-to-end security scheme also provides support
for this feature. It should be noted that proposing a novel
mobility approach is orthogonal to the proposed idea. It means
that any fog-basedmobility solution can be combinedwith our
security scheme.
Sensor-side processing time: For the evaluation, in Cooja, we
configured two Wismotes as a client and a server. Once the
booting process is performed, the client initiates the handshake
by sending the ClientHello message. After a successful handshake,
we measured the total processing time at the sensor-side (server).
The results of our measurements using three different approaches
are shown in Table 4. As can be seen from the Table, the
symmetric key-based mode and our session resumption-based
scheme require almost similar processing time. The proposed
scheme requires 20 ms less processing time than the symmetric
key-based mode. This is due to the fewer message flights needed
to be exchanged in the session resumption (compared to the full
symmetric key-based DTLS), resulting in less computations at the
sensor-side. The processing time for the certificate-based DTLS
handshake is considerably higher than both the symmetric key-
based and the session resumption-based modes. The certificate-
based DTLS requires about 5690 ms at the sensor-side which
is mainly due to the expensive public key-based operations
(i.e. ECDSA and ECDH).
Client-side processing time: The total processing time at the
client (end-user) side using three different approaches is shown in
Table 4. For the client-side, we used amachinewith IntelCoreTMi5−
4570 CPU operating at 2.2 GHz and having 6 GB of RAM. The
processing time of the proposed scheme using DTLS session
resumption is 45 ms, where as the conventional symmetric key-
based requires 49 ms. This is due to the lesser number of control
messages needed for session resumption, compared to the full
symmetric key-based DTLS. The processing time for certificate-
based DTLS handshake, is considerably higher than both the
symmetric key-based and the session resumption-based modes.
The certificate-based DTLS requires approximately 3744 ms at the
client-side which is mainly due to the expensive public key-based
operations. Compared to symmetric key-based and certificate-
based DTLS, our session resumption-based scheme has 8.1% and
98.7% improvements in terms of client-side processing time,
respectively.
Run-time performance: In this work, run-time refers to the time
it takes for the handshake between themedical sensor and the end-
user to be done successfully. To provide end-to-end security, we
calculate the total run-time performance of three different DTLS
modes. The results are presented in Table 3. As can be seenfrom
the Table, our scheme which utilizes the DTLS session resumption
technique is about 97% and 10% faster than certificate-based and
symmetric key-base DTLS handshake, respectively.
Energy consumption: To measure the consumed energy of each
sensor, we utilize the equation: E (mJ) = U(V ) × I (mA) ×
t (ms) where U represents the supply voltage, I is the current
draw of the hardware, and t is the time. We calculate the
energy consumption of the Wismote sensor when performing
the DTLS session resumption, the symmetric key-based DTLS
handshake, and the certificate-based DTLS handshake. According
to the datasheet available in [42], the Wismote has a current
consumption of 18.5 mA and a supply voltage of 3 V. The results
are presented in Table 4. As can be seen from the Table, our
techniques are considerably more energy efficient in comparison
to the certificate-based DTLS handshake technique. It saves 11% of
energy compared to the symmetric key-based DTLS.
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Table 3
Client-side processing time and total run-time performance of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end security.
Client-side processing time (ms) Run-time performance (ms)
DTLS session resumption without server-side state 45 205(DTLS_Session_Resumption_WITH_AES_128) (this work)
Certificate-based DTLS
3744 9434
(DTLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA_256)
Symmetric key-based DTLS
49 229
(DTLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
Table 4
Sensor-side processing time and energy consumption of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end security.
Sensor-side processing time (ms) Energy consumption (mJ)
DTLS session resumption without server-side state 160 8.87(DTLS_Session_Resumption_WITH_AES_128) (this
work)
Certificate-based DTLS
5690 315.79
(DTLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA_256)
Symmetric key-based DTLS
180 9.99
(DTLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
Table 5
Memory footprint of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end security.
RAM overhead (kB) ROM overhead (kB)
DTLS session resumption without server-side state 3.51 14.29(DTLS_Session_Resumption_WITH_AES_128) (this work)
Certificate-based DTLS
7.8 41.1
(DTLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA_256)
Symmetric Key-Based DTLS
2.96 13.49
(DTLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8)
Memory requirement: To calculate total RAM and ROM require-
ments of the utilized session resumption technique, we used the
msp430-size tool which is provided by the MSP430-gcc compiler.
We evaluated RAM and ROM requirements using three different
modes of DTLS handshake: (i) DTLS session resumption used in
our proposed scheme, (ii) symmetric key-based DTLS handshake,
and (iii) certificate-basedDTLS handshake. As shown in Table 5, the
certificate-based DTLS consumes about 2.6 times more RAM and 3
timesmore ROM resources thanwhat is required by the symmetric
key-based DTLS handshake. These overheads are considerable for
devices having limited resources particularly in terms of memory.
In [19], we presented that our proposed IoT-enabled healthcare
architecture enables the constrained medical sensor to unburden
all certificate-related and public-key operations to the distributed
smart e-health gateway. Thus, the memory burden of the medi-
cal sensors is considerably alleviated. Compared to the symmetric
key-based mode, our proposed session resumption-based scheme
adds a negligible memory overhead (RAM and ROM overheads are
only increased by 0.5 kB and 0.8 kB, respectively). This minor in-
crease is due to the session resumption extension and the storage
of the session tickets.
7.2. Security evaluation
In this section, we analyze our proposed end-to-end security
scheme from the security perspective. We conclude this section
by comparing our work with the most recently proposed schemes
found in the literature.
Data confidentiality: In this work, to provide confidentiality,
128-bit AES-CCM with a 16 byte initialization vector is employed
to protect patients’ information that needs to be transmitted
between communicating peers. In the proposed scheme, even if an
adversary eavesdrops on some or all of the transmitted patients’
health data, he/she cannot access those data easily as they are
encrypted using the secure and robust 128-bit AES encryption
algorithm. A brute force attack on 128-bit AES would require 3.4 ∗
1038 years [36].
Data integrity: In this work, to ensure that the transmitted data
is received in the exact same way as it is sent, a 8 byte Message
Authentication Code (MAC) based onHMAC-SHA-256 is employed.
This is done by creating the MAC of a messagem (that needs to be
transmitted) using the SHA-256 hash function and a shared secret
key K (SessionKey) over m which can be written as: HMAC(m) =
SHA256(K ,m) = HMAC(K ,m) = D. The MAC is a cryptographic
checksum on message m that uses the SessionKey to detect both
accidental and intentional modifications of the message. Based on
the above equation, the secure HMAC generates a fixed length hash
digest D from the message m. It has the characteristics of being
simple to compute, while infeasible to retrieve the m from the
given hash digest D. The small changes in m result in a different
hash value. Such features are specified as preimage and collision
resistant, respectively. Thus, our proposed scheme ensures the
property of data integrity.
Mutual authentication and authorization: In SEA [19], we pre-
sented that sensors used in medical applications are highly
resource-constrained for which reason they cannot cope with
cryptography techniques demanding heavy computations. To
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overcome this limitation, we proposed to employ non-resource-
constrained smart e-health gateways in distributed fashion to per-
form the authentication and authorization of end-users mutually
on behalf of the sensors. The proposed architecture relied on the
certificate-based DTLS handshake and the employed cipher suite
was TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA_256. The
name indicates the use of elliptic cryptography, particularly-Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Al-
gorithm (ECDSA).We proved that,within the certificate-basedDTLS
handshake, from one hand, the smart e-health gateway authenti-
cates the remote end-user through certificates. On the other hand,
the smart gateway either authenticates to the remote end-point
through certificates within the DTLS handshake mechanism or
based on an application-level password once the handshake is ter-
minated. Therefore, mutual authentication and authorization of
peers is fulfilled in our work.
Forward security: As mentioned earlier, the property of forward
security ensures that the revelation of current encrypted patients’
health data should not threaten the security of previously
transmitted data. In this work, using the certificate-based DTLS
handshake, the shared SessionKey between peers is derived using
ECDH. For this, as Fig. 3 presents, each of the peers, the smart
gateway and the end-user, produce their own pair of private and
public keys on an already agreed elliptic curve. (a, b) for the smart
gateway and (c, d) for the end-user. Then, the peers exchange their
public keys and the DTLS session key over the elliptic curve is
calculated as: a × b = SessionKey = c × d where × is the
scalar multiplication on elliptic curve. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) relies on the general hypothesis that the elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem is infeasible or at least it cannot be
solved in a reasonable time. Once the SessionKey is derived using
ECDH, the x-coordinate value of SessionKey serves as a shared
secret between the end-user and the smart gateway. The derived
shared secret is utilized further to protect the communication/data
transmitted between the peers. As shown in Fig. 3, since b
and d are public values of the peers, their exchange through
an unencrypted channel does not compromise or provide any
information concerning the SessionKey. This is because obtaining
the SessionKey implies the computation of elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP). Solving this problem is not easily
possible. The reason is that ECDLP is believed to be much harder
to solve than its counterpart over finite fields (DLP) or the integer
factorization problem (FP), the twomain alternatives for public key
cryptography.
Scalability and reliability: In SEA [19], we proposed a new ar-
chitecture for IoT-enabledhealthcare system (i.e. in-home/hospital
environments) which relies on distributed smart e-health gate-
ways. In our proposed architecture, we also discussed that in a
multi-domain smart home/hospital environment, if an attacker
runs a DoS attack or compromises one of the smart gateways, only
the associated medical sub-domain is disrupted. However, in most
of the recently proposed delegation-based architectures, if an at-
tacker performs a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or compromises
the delegation server, a large quantity of stored patients’ health
data can be retrieved. Specifically, in multi-domain networks, a
DoS attack can disrupt all the available constrained medical do-
mains as the functionality of those IoT-based domains depends
on the centralized delegation server. Hence, compared to most
recently proposed delegation-based architectures [14,38,46], our
proposed IoT-enabled healthcare architecture is more scalable and
reliable as the architecture is changed from being centralized to
distributed.
Lightweight solutions: In the previous section, we noted that
conventional security and protection mechanisms including ex-
isting cryptographic solutions, secure protocols, and privacy as-
surance cannot be re-used due to resource constraints, security
level requirements, and system architecture of IoT-based health-
care systems. To alleviate the constrained medical sensors from
all heavy processing burdens: (i) we exploit the non-resource-
constrained distributed smart gateways to perform the authen-
tication and authorization of remote end-users securely and
efficiently on behalf of medical sensors. (ii) to provide secure end-
to-end communication between the end-user and the tiny med-
ical sensor, we used the lightweight DTLS session resumption
technique. This is because session resumption has an abbreviated
form of a full DTLS handshake that relies on the previously es-
tablished security context, which neither requires heavy-weight
certificate-related nor public-key cryptography operations.
Access control: In our scheme, as we discussed earlier in the
mutual authentication and authorization section, the validation
and authorization of data and end-user access control are handled
by smart e-health gateways instead of the resource-constrained
medical sensors. Thus, any malicious activity is blocked at the
smart gateway before an unauthorized users get access to the
medical network domain(s).
Smart gateway and sensor spoofing: In the proposed architec-
ture, if an adversary pretends to be a trusted smart e-health gate-
way/medical sensor, from one hand, he/she can get access to all
information related to the DTLS sessions. On the other hand, pa-
tients’ encrypted health data can also be revealed to the attacker.
In this work, as Figs. 3 and 5 present, the smart e-health gate-
way and the end-user as well as the medical sensor and the smart
e-health gateway share a symmetric SessionKey between each
other. As it was presented earlier in the forward security section,
this shared SessionKey is generated using ECDH and solving this
algorithm is not easily possible [23]. Thus, by spoofing the smart
gateway/sensor, an attacker cannot deceive the end-user for access
to data concerning the DTLS session.
Denial of service attack (DoS): In SEA [19], we discussed in
more detail about the drawbacks of the state-of-the-art architec-
tures proposed for IoT-based systems. To give an example, in the
most recently proposed delegation-based architecture developed
by Hummen et al. [47], if an adversary performs a DoS attack or
compromises the centralized delegation server, a large number of
stored security context related to constrained domains can be re-
trieved. Specifically, in multi-domain networks, a DoS attack can
disrupt all the availablemedical domains as the functionality of the
IoT-based healthcare systems still relies on the centralized dele-
gation server. However, in our proposed IoT-enabled healthcare
system, in a multi-domain smart home/hospital network, if an
attacker runs a DoS attack or compromises one of the smart e-
health gateways, just the associated medical sub-domain can be
disrupted. The reason is that in our proposed architecture, the au-
thentication and authorization tasks of a centralized delegation
server is broken down to be performed by distributed smart e-
health gateways.
Stolen DTLS session tickets: In a DTLS handshake, an eavesdrop-
per may attempt to obtain the ticket and to utilize it to establish
a session with the server. However, a stolen ticket does not help
the adversary to resume the session as the session ticket is en-
crypted and the adversary does not have any knowledge about the
secret key. To minimize the feasibility of success of this attack, in
this work (as proposed by IETF [17]), the lightweight 128-bit AES
in CCM mode and the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithms are used by the
DTLS server to provide confidentiality and integrity, respectively.
This prevents an adversary from successfully executing a brute
force attack to obtain the tickets’ contents.
Forged DTLS session tickets: A malicious adversary can alter or
forge the session ticket in order to resume a DTLS session, to
impersonate as a valid user, to extend the lifetime of a session, or
to obtain additional privileges. To avoid the forged ticket attack,
we used the strong integrity protection algorithm HMAC-SHA-
256 to protect the session ticket. In the data integrity section, we
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Table 6
Security comparison of different schemes providing end-to-end security (‘‘✓’’ indicates that the scheme supports thementioned
security feature, and ‘‘✗’’ indicates that the scheme does not support the feature).
Security features Hummen et al. [14] Granjal et al. [38] Kang et al. [46] This work
Data confidentiality ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Data integrity ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Mutual authentication and authorization ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Forward security ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓
Architecture scalability ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Lightweight solutions ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Access control ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Smart gateway and sensor spoofing ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
Denial of Service (DoS) attack ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
End-to-end security ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
described in detail more how the integrity requirements can be
fulfilled using HMAC-SHA-256.
End-to-end security: In our proposed scheme, during the
initialization phase, the smart e-health gateways’ main tasks are
transmitting the information related to the DTLS sessions as well
as the necessary security contexts to themedical sensors. However,
the only performers of both the encryption and decryption of
patients’ health data (in DTLS session resumption) are the end-
user and the medical sensor. Thus, both end points directly
communicate with each other without the necessity of a smart
gateway as an intermediary node. Thus, end-to-end security is
ensured in our scheme.
The security comparisons of our proposed end-to-end se-
curity scheme and the most recently proposed approaches
are presented in Table 6. The state-of-the-art end-to-end se-
curity approaches proposed for IoT are presented by Hum-
men et al. [14], Granjal et al. [38], and Kang et al. [46].
However, we distinguish the following major advantages of-
fered by our scheme compared to their approaches. We be-
lieve that the approaches presented by Granjal et al. [38] and
Kang et al. [46] do not provide comprehensive end-to-end
security. Rather, they can be considered semi end-to-end secu-
rity. The main reason is that in these works, the 6LoWPAN Border
Router (6LBR) acts as an intermediary node located between the
sensor and the end-user. Every time these two end-points try to
communicate with each other, all the secret information related
to the communication needs to pass through the 6LBR. Whilst, the
smart gateway utilized in our work is only used during the initial-
ization phase (Fig. 5), and then afterwards, both end-points directly
communicate with each other through a channel secured by the
DTLS session resumption. Therefore, end-to-end security is guar-
anteed in our work.
The approaches presented by Granjal et al. [38] and Kang
et al. [46] also lack scalability and reliability as their proposed
system architectures rely on the centralized 6LBR. Themain reason
is that their proposed architectures cannot be extended to be
utilized in multi-domain infrastructures, such as large hospital
environments. For example, if a malicious adversary performs a
DoS attack or compromises the 6LBR, a large quantity of stored
information concerning the constrained domain can be retrieved.
More precisely, inmulti-domainnetworks, aDoS attack candisrupt
all the available medical networks as the functionality of the IoT-
based healthcare system still depends on the centralized 6LBR.
However, these issues are solved in our proposed scheme as the
architecture is distributed. To be more specific, in our scheme, in
a multi-domain smart home/hospital environment, if an attacker
runs a DoS attack or compromises one of the smart gateways,
only the associated medical sub-domain is disrupted. Although
Hummen et al.’s [14] proposed delegation-based architecture
offers end-to-end security, it is still not secure against the
DoS attack due to the use of a centralized delegation server.
Their presented architecture also suffers from shortcomings in
scalability and reliability which is mainly due to the reasons
mentioned above.
Based on the discussion above, our proposed scheme fulfills the
aforementioned requirements of secure and efficient communica-
tion for healthcare IoT systems and can efficiently provide end-to-
end security.
8. Conclusions
We presented an end-to-end security scheme for mobility en-
abled healthcare IoT systems. Based on literature, we determined
that our scheme has the most extensive set of security features in
comparison to related approaches. Our three-tier system architec-
ture consists of the device layer, the fog layer, and the cloud layer.
We leveraged the strategic position and the distributed nature
of smart gateways in the fog layer to provide seamless mobility
for medical sensors and to alleviate the sensors’ processing loads.
In our scheme, ubiquitous mobility is possible without requiring
any reconfiguration at the device layer. The end-to-end security
scheme was specified and designed by employing the certificate-
based DTLS handshake between end-users and smart gateways as
well as utilizing the session resumption technique. Our testbed
platform demonstration showed that, compared to existing end-
to-end security approaches, our scheme reduces the communica-
tion overhead by 26% and the communication latency between
smart gateways and end users by 16%. Our scheme performed ap-
proximately 97% faster than certificate-based and 10% faster than
symmetric key-based DTLS. In terms of memory requirements,
certificate-based DTLS consumes about 2.2 times more RAM and
2.9 times more ROM resources than our approach. In fact, the RAM
and ROM requirements of our scheme are almost as low as in sym-
metric key-based DTLS. Taking into account that the handover la-
tency caused bymobility is low and the handover process does not
incur any processing or communication overhead on the sensors,
we summarize that our scheme is a very promising solution for
ensuring end-to-end security and secure ubiquitous sensor-level
mobility for healthcare IoT.
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1. Introduction
IoT enables physical objects in the physical world as well as virtual environments to interact and exchange informa-
tion with each other in an autonomous way so as to create smart environments. Healthcare IoT systems are distinct in
that they are built to deal directly with the data of human health conditions, which inherently raises the requirements of
security, safety and reliability. In addition, they have to offer real-time notifications and responses about the status of
patients. In healthcare IoT systems, security and privacy of individuals are among major areas of concern as most de-
vices and their communications are wireless in nature. This is to prevent manipulating and eavesdropping on sensitive
medical data or malicious triggering of specific tasks. Key security requirements for healthcare IoT systems consist
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of three main phases: (1) secure cryptographic key generation, (2) authentication and authorization of each healthcare
IoT component, (3) and robust and secure end-to-end communication between sensor nodes and health caregivers are
critical requirements1. Existing security and protection techniques including cryptographic key generation solutions,
secure authentication and authorization, robust end-to-end communication protocols, and privacy assurance cannot
be re-used due to the following main reasons: (i) proposed security solutions must be resource-efficient as medical
sensor nodes used in healthcare IoT systems have limited memory, processing power, and communication bandwidth,
and (ii) medical sensor nodes can be easily abducted or lost since they are tiny in terms of size. To mitigate the
above-mentioned risks, robust and lightweight security solutions are needed.
In this paper, we analyze the performance of the state-of-the-art end-to-end security solutions in healthcare IoT
systems. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we identify and present the essential requirements of
robust security solutions for healthcare IoT systems which include (i) secure ECG-based cryptographic key generation,
(ii) authentication and authorization of each healthcare IoT component based on certificate-based Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS), and (iii) secure mobility-enabled end-to-end communication based on session resumption
technique as well as the concept of fog layer in IoT for realizing efficient and seamless mobility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related work. Section 3
discusses the architecture and requirements of healthcare IoT systems. Section 4 presents our healthcare IoT security
solutions. Section 5 provides a comprehensive performance analysis of different security solutions. In this section,
the comparison of our work with similar existing approaches is also presented. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
To establish an efficient inter-operable network security between end-points, variants of end-to-end security pro-
tocols have been proposed, among which DTLS is one of the most relevant protocols2. DTLS comprises of four
main protocols: Handshake, Alert, Change Cipher Spec, and Record. The most recently DTLS-based solutions are
proposed by Hummen et al.3, Zack et al.4, Granjal et al., 5 and Kang et al.6. In4, authors proposed symmetric key-
based DTLS solution as the basic cipher suite of DTLS to reduce packet fragmentation, loss and delay in a low-power
and lossy network. However, there is a limitation in the fact that the sensor devices cannot utilize this cipher suite
without a pre-shared key (PSK). In7, authors present a certificate-based raw public key cipher suite. This cipher suite
comprises of six flight messages which are fragmented into 27 datagram packets. Nevertheless, packet fragmentation
causes issues such as high data loss rate and packet re-transmission delays. To reassemble a fragmented message
packet, sensor devices have to keep fragmented pieces of the message in the buffer until all the pieces arrive. This is
a considerable burden to the resource-constrained sensor devices. In other works presented in3,5,6, the authors present
an implementation of delegation-based architecture which relies on a delegation server/certificate authority. Their
solutions, however, lack scalability and architecture reliability as their proposed architectures are based on a central-
ized delegation server/certificate authority or on the centralized 6LoWPAN Borader Router (6LBR). The main reason
is that their proposed architectures cannot be extended to be utilized in multi-domain infrastructures, such as large
hospital environments. If a malicious adversary performs a DoS attack or compromises the 6LBR, a large quantity of
stored information concerning the constrained domain can be retrieved. These issues are solved in our scheme as the
architecture is distributed. To be more specific, in our scheme, in a multi-domain smart home/hospital environment, if
an attacker runs a DoS attack or compromises one of the smart gateways, only the associated medical sub-domain is
disrupted. We believe that the approaches presented by Granjal et al.5 and Kang et al.6 do not provide comprehensive
end-to-end security. Rather, they can be considered semi end-to-end security. This is beacuse in these works, the
6LBR acts as an intermediary node located between the sensor and the end-user. Every time these two end-points try
to communicate with each other, all the secret information related to the communication needs to pass through the
6LBR. Whilst, the smart gateway utilized in our work is only used during the initialization phase, and then afterwards,
both end-points directly communicate with each other through a channel secured by the DTLS session resumption.
Although Hummen et al.s’3 proposed delegation-based architecture offers end-to-end security, it is still not secure
against the DoS attack due to the use of a centralized delegation server. Their presented architecture also suffers from
shortcomings in architecture reliability and scalability which is mainly due to the reasons mentioned above.
3. Healthcare IoT: Architecture and Requirements
In a typical healthcare IoT system, to monitor patients’ vital signs and activities, the system has to ensure the
security and privacy of patients. Physicians and other caregivers demand a dependable system in which the results
are accurate, timely and the service is reliable and secure. To guarantee these requirements, the smart components
in the system require a predictable latency, reliable and robust communication with other components of healthcare
IoT systems8. The 3-layer system architecture of our proposed healthcare IoT system on which the security solutions
can be applied is shown in Figure 1. In such a system, patients’ health-related information is recorded by wearable or
implantable medical sensor nodes with which the patient is equipped for personal monitoring of multiple parameters.
The functionality of each layer is as follows: (1) Device Layer, the lowest layer consisting of several physical devices
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patients. In healthcare IoT systems, security and privacy of individuals are among major areas of concern as most de-
vices and their communications are wireless in nature. This is to prevent manipulating and eavesdropping on sensitive
medical data or malicious triggering of specific tasks. Key security requirements for healthcare IoT systems consist
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of three main phases: (1) secure cryptographic key generation, (2) authentication and authorization of each healthcare
IoT component, (3) and robust and secure end-to-end communication between sensor nodes and health caregivers are
critical requirements1. Existing security and protection techniques including cryptographic key generation solutions,
secure authentication and authorization, robust end-to-end communication protocols, and privacy assurance cannot
be re-used due to the following main reasons: (i) proposed security solutions must be resource-efficient as medical
sensor nodes used in healthcare IoT systems have limited memory, processing power, and communication bandwidth,
and (ii) medical sensor nodes can be easily abducted or lost since they are tiny in terms of size. To mitigate the
above-mentioned risks, robust and lightweight security solutions are needed.
In this paper, we analyze the performance of the state-of-the-art end-to-end security solutions in healthcare IoT
systems. The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we identify and present the essential requirements of
robust security solutions for healthcare IoT systems which include (i) secure ECG-based cryptographic key generation,
(ii) authentication and authorization of each healthcare IoT component based on certificate-based Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS), and (iii) secure mobility-enabled end-to-end communication based on session resumption
technique as well as the concept of fog layer in IoT for realizing efficient and seamless mobility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of related work. Section 3
discusses the architecture and requirements of healthcare IoT systems. Section 4 presents our healthcare IoT security
solutions. Section 5 provides a comprehensive performance analysis of different security solutions. In this section,
the comparison of our work with similar existing approaches is also presented. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
To establish an efficient inter-operable network security between end-points, variants of end-to-end security pro-
tocols have been proposed, among which DTLS is one of the most relevant protocols2. DTLS comprises of four
main protocols: Handshake, Alert, Change Cipher Spec, and Record. The most recently DTLS-based solutions are
proposed by Hummen et al.3, Zack et al.4, Granjal et al., 5 and Kang et al.6. In4, authors proposed symmetric key-
based DTLS solution as the basic cipher suite of DTLS to reduce packet fragmentation, loss and delay in a low-power
and lossy network. However, there is a limitation in the fact that the sensor devices cannot utilize this cipher suite
without a pre-shared key (PSK). In7, authors present a certificate-based raw public key cipher suite. This cipher suite
comprises of six flight messages which are fragmented into 27 datagram packets. Nevertheless, packet fragmentation
causes issues such as high data loss rate and packet re-transmission delays. To reassemble a fragmented message
packet, sensor devices have to keep fragmented pieces of the message in the buffer until all the pieces arrive. This is
a considerable burden to the resource-constrained sensor devices. In other works presented in3,5,6, the authors present
an implementation of delegation-based architecture which relies on a delegation server/certificate authority. Their
solutions, however, lack scalability and architecture reliability as their proposed architectures are based on a central-
ized delegation server/certificate authority or on the centralized 6LoWPAN Borader Router (6LBR). The main reason
is that their proposed architectures cannot be extended to be utilized in multi-domain infrastructures, such as large
hospital environments. If a malicious adversary performs a DoS attack or compromises the 6LBR, a large quantity of
stored information concerning the constrained domain can be retrieved. These issues are solved in our scheme as the
architecture is distributed. To be more specific, in our scheme, in a multi-domain smart home/hospital environment, if
an attacker runs a DoS attack or compromises one of the smart gateways, only the associated medical sub-domain is
disrupted. We believe that the approaches presented by Granjal et al.5 and Kang et al.6 do not provide comprehensive
end-to-end security. Rather, they can be considered semi end-to-end security. This is beacuse in these works, the
6LBR acts as an intermediary node located between the sensor and the end-user. Every time these two end-points try
to communicate with each other, all the secret information related to the communication needs to pass through the
6LBR. Whilst, the smart gateway utilized in our work is only used during the initialization phase, and then afterwards,
both end-points directly communicate with each other through a channel secured by the DTLS session resumption.
Although Hummen et al.s’3 proposed delegation-based architecture offers end-to-end security, it is still not secure
against the DoS attack due to the use of a centralized delegation server. Their presented architecture also suffers from
shortcomings in architecture reliability and scalability which is mainly due to the reasons mentioned above.
3. Healthcare IoT: Architecture and Requirements
In a typical healthcare IoT system, to monitor patients’ vital signs and activities, the system has to ensure the
security and privacy of patients. Physicians and other caregivers demand a dependable system in which the results
are accurate, timely and the service is reliable and secure. To guarantee these requirements, the smart components
in the system require a predictable latency, reliable and robust communication with other components of healthcare
IoT systems8. The 3-layer system architecture of our proposed healthcare IoT system on which the security solutions
can be applied is shown in Figure 1. In such a system, patients’ health-related information is recorded by wearable or
implantable medical sensor nodes with which the patient is equipped for personal monitoring of multiple parameters.
The functionality of each layer is as follows: (1) Device Layer, the lowest layer consisting of several physical devices
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Fig. 1: The system architecture of our healthcare IoT system with secure end-to-end communication
including implantable or wearable medical sensor nodes that are integrated into a tiny wireless module to collect
contextual and medical data. (2) Fog Layer, the middle layer consists of a network of interconnected smart gateways.
A smart gateway receives data from different sub-networks, performs protocol conversion, and provides other higher
level services. It acts as repository (local database) to temporarily store sensors’ and users’ information, and provides
intelligence at the edge of the network. (3) Cloud Layer, the cloud layer includes broadcasting, data warehousing
and big data analysis servers, and a hospital local database that periodically performs data synchronization with the
remote healthcare database server in the cloud.
4. Healthcare IoT Security Solutions
As we comprehensively discussed in1, key security requirements for healthcare IoT systems consist of three main
phases: (i) secure and efficient cryptographic key generation for healthcare IoT devices, (ii) authentication and au-
thorization of each healthcare IoT component, and (iii) and robust and secure end-to-end communication between
medical sensor nodes and health caregivers. In the following, we briefly present our healthcare IoT security solutions.
4.1. ECG Feature-Based Cryptographic Key Generation
Since medical sensor nodes deal with patients’ vital health data, securing their communication is an absolute ne-
cessity. Without robust security features not only patients’ privacy can be breached but also adversaries can potentially
manipulate actual health data resulting in inaccurate diagnosis and treatment. Medical sensor nodes rely on cryptog-
raphy to secure their communications9. Proper application of cryptography requires the use of secure keys and robust
key generation methods. Key generation approaches that are proposed for wireless networks in general are not directly
applicable to tiny medical sensors as they are highly resource-constrained and demand a higher security level. Given
the constrained nature of medical sensor nodes used in healthcare Iot systems, conventional key generation approaches
may potentially involve reasonable computations as well as latency during network or any subsequent adjustments,
due to their need for pre-deployment. In10, we presented two different ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approaches. The first approach is integrating interpulse interval (IPI) sequence of ECG signal with pseudorandom
number that is generated using Fibonacci linear feedback shift register. The generated key is called IPI-PRNG. An al-
ternative key generation approach that utilized the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm and IPI sequences
as the seed generator for the AES, called IPI-AES. IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES offer higher security levels compared to
conventional key generation approaches. In11, we further improved the ECG-based key generation approach by in-
troducing the use of several ECG Features (SEF) that reduce the key generation execution time overhead significantly
while preserving the achieved high security levels. The proposed approach is applied to both normal and abnormal
ECG signals. The SEF approach uses 4 main reference-free 1 features of the ECG signal (being extracted from every
ECG heartbeat cycle) along with consecutive IPI sequences to generate ECG-based cryptographic keys. To reinforce
and enhance the security level of our approach, we consolidate the SEF key generation approach with two different
cryptographically secured pseudo random number generators, called, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES. We evaluated the
efficiency of our IPI-PRNG, IPI-AES, SEF, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches by simulations on real ECG data
from different subjects having various heart health conditions.
4.2. Mutual Authentication and Authorization of Healthcare IoT Components
In the paradigms of healthcare IoT, not only data can be collected by medical sensor nodes and transmitted to
end-users, but end-users can also access, control, and manage medical sensors through the Internet. As a result,
mutual authentication and authorization of end-users and devices used in healthcare IoT systems is a crucial task.
Our proposed architecture, called SEA, exploits the role of smart e-health gateways in the fog layer to perform the
1 In this context, the reference-free property indicates a dynamic technique in which no ECG fiducial point is fixed as reference.
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authentication and authorization of remote end-users securely and efficiently on behalf of the medical sensors12. SEA
focuses on a fact that the smart e-health gateway and the remote end-user have sufficient resources to perform various
heavy-weight security protocols as well as certificate validation. By providing the established connection context to
the medical sensor nodes, these devices no longer need to authenticate and authorize a remote caregiver. It is supposed
that within the certificate-based DTLS handshake, from one hand, the smart gateway authenticates the remote end-
user through certificates. In this regard, similar to current web browsers, smart gateways hold a pool of trusted
certificates. On the other hand, the smart gateway either authenticates to the remote end-user through certificates
within the DTLS handshake or based on an application-level password once the handshake is terminated. Once the
mutual authentication between the end-user and the smart gateway is done successfully, the end-user authorizes as a
trusted entity so that a data query from the end-users’ side is transmitted to the medical sensor nodes through the smart
gateway. To facilitate the security and authorization of communication, it is required that both entities, the constrained
medical sensor node and the smart gateway, also mutually authenticate one another during the initialization phase.
4.3. Secure End-to-End Communication for Mobility Enabled Healthcare IoT
In1, we enabled secure end-to-end communication between end-points of a healthcare IoT system by developing
a session resumption-based scheme which oﬄoads the encrypted session states of DTLS towards a non-resource-
constrained end-user. The main motivation to employ the DTLS session resumption is to mitigate the overhead on
resource-constrained medical sensors. The session resumption technique is an extended form of the DTLS hand-
shake which enables a client/server to continue the communication with a previously established session state without
compromising the security properties. The major advantages offered by our scheme compared to the conventional
end-to-end security solution can be found in1. We applied our proposed session resumption-based end-to-end secu-
rity scheme for healthcare IoT to the full system architecture shown in Figure 1. Providing patients with the possibility
to walk around the hospital wards knowing that the monitoring of their health condition is not interrupted is an es-
sential feature. To achieve a continuous monitoring of patients considering the mobility support, in1 , we developed
self-configuration/handover mechanisms which are capable of handling secure and efficient data transfers among dif-
ferent medical sensor networks. A fog layer-based data handover mechanism is defined as the process of changing
or updating the registration of a mobile sensor from its associated base MSN to the visited MSN, for example, when
moving across the hospital’s wards. Data handover solutions should enable the ubiquity when they need to work au-
tonomously without human intervention. The handover mechanism should also offer medical sensor nodes continuous
connectivity, if there exist several gateways in the hospital or nursing/home environments.
Table 1: Execution time comparison of different ECG-based key generation approaches to produce 128-bit cryptographic keys
Approach Execution Time Execution Time Energy Consumption Energy Consumption
Single Iteration (ms) Total (s) Single Iteration (µJ) Total (mJ)
IPI 9,13 181.3 2.9 9507.1 527.6
IPI-PRNG 198.6 3.2 11022.3 611.7
IPI-AES 244 3.9 13542 751.5
SEF 104.3 0.9 5788.6 321.2
SEF-PRNG 136.9 1.1 7598 421.6
SEF-AES 168.1 1.3 9884.5 548.5
5. Implementation and Performance Analysis
The system architecture illustrated in Figure 1 is implemented for experimental evaluation for two different sce-
narios: in-home and hospital room(s). To Implement the proposed healthcare IoT system architecture, we setup a
platform that consists of medical sensor nodes, UT-GATE smart e-health gateways, a remote server, and end-users.
UT-GATE is constructed from the combination of a Pandaboard and a Texas Instruments (TI) SmartRF06 board that
is integrated with a CC2538 module14. In our configuration, UT-GATE uses 8GB of external memory and is powered
by Ubuntu OS which allows to control devices and services such as local storage and notification. To investigate the
feasibility of our proposed architecture, the Wismote15 platform, which is a common resource-limited sensor nodes,
is utilized in Contiki’s network simulation tool Cooja3. For the evaluation, we use the open source tool OpenSSL
version 1.0.1.j to create elliptic curve public and private keys from the NIST P-256 and X.509 certificates. The server
association to the end-user is created using OpenSSL API which provides all necessary functions related to end-users
including configuration, certificate, handshake, session state, and cipher suites to support session resumption. Tiny-
DTLS 16 is used as the code-base of the proposed scheme. For the public-key functions, we utilize the Relic-toolkit 17
that is an open source cryptography library tailored for specific security levels with emphasis on efficiency and flexi-
bility. The MySQL database is set up for static and non-static records. The cloud server database is processed using
xSQL Lite which is the third party tool for data synchronization. With respect to the cryptographic primitives and to
make a fair comparison, we followed similar cipher suites as employed in the most recently proposed authentication
and authorization architecture for IP-based IoT17. In this regard, we utilize elliptic curve NIST-256 for public-key
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including implantable or wearable medical sensor nodes that are integrated into a tiny wireless module to collect
contextual and medical data. (2) Fog Layer, the middle layer consists of a network of interconnected smart gateways.
A smart gateway receives data from different sub-networks, performs protocol conversion, and provides other higher
level services. It acts as repository (local database) to temporarily store sensors’ and users’ information, and provides
intelligence at the edge of the network. (3) Cloud Layer, the cloud layer includes broadcasting, data warehousing
and big data analysis servers, and a hospital local database that periodically performs data synchronization with the
remote healthcare database server in the cloud.
4. Healthcare IoT Security Solutions
As we comprehensively discussed in1, key security requirements for healthcare IoT systems consist of three main
phases: (i) secure and efficient cryptographic key generation for healthcare IoT devices, (ii) authentication and au-
thorization of each healthcare IoT component, and (iii) and robust and secure end-to-end communication between
medical sensor nodes and health caregivers. In the following, we briefly present our healthcare IoT security solutions.
4.1. ECG Feature-Based Cryptographic Key Generation
Since medical sensor nodes deal with patients’ vital health data, securing their communication is an absolute ne-
cessity. Without robust security features not only patients’ privacy can be breached but also adversaries can potentially
manipulate actual health data resulting in inaccurate diagnosis and treatment. Medical sensor nodes rely on cryptog-
raphy to secure their communications9. Proper application of cryptography requires the use of secure keys and robust
key generation methods. Key generation approaches that are proposed for wireless networks in general are not directly
applicable to tiny medical sensors as they are highly resource-constrained and demand a higher security level. Given
the constrained nature of medical sensor nodes used in healthcare Iot systems, conventional key generation approaches
may potentially involve reasonable computations as well as latency during network or any subsequent adjustments,
due to their need for pre-deployment. In10, we presented two different ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approaches. The first approach is integrating interpulse interval (IPI) sequence of ECG signal with pseudorandom
number that is generated using Fibonacci linear feedback shift register. The generated key is called IPI-PRNG. An al-
ternative key generation approach that utilized the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm and IPI sequences
as the seed generator for the AES, called IPI-AES. IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES offer higher security levels compared to
conventional key generation approaches. In11, we further improved the ECG-based key generation approach by in-
troducing the use of several ECG Features (SEF) that reduce the key generation execution time overhead significantly
while preserving the achieved high security levels. The proposed approach is applied to both normal and abnormal
ECG signals. The SEF approach uses 4 main reference-free 1 features of the ECG signal (being extracted from every
ECG heartbeat cycle) along with consecutive IPI sequences to generate ECG-based cryptographic keys. To reinforce
and enhance the security level of our approach, we consolidate the SEF key generation approach with two different
cryptographically secured pseudo random number generators, called, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES. We evaluated the
efficiency of our IPI-PRNG, IPI-AES, SEF, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches by simulations on real ECG data
from different subjects having various heart health conditions.
4.2. Mutual Authentication and Authorization of Healthcare IoT Components
In the paradigms of healthcare IoT, not only data can be collected by medical sensor nodes and transmitted to
end-users, but end-users can also access, control, and manage medical sensors through the Internet. As a result,
mutual authentication and authorization of end-users and devices used in healthcare IoT systems is a crucial task.
Our proposed architecture, called SEA, exploits the role of smart e-health gateways in the fog layer to perform the
1 In this context, the reference-free property indicates a dynamic technique in which no ECG fiducial point is fixed as reference.
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authentication and authorization of remote end-users securely and efficiently on behalf of the medical sensors12. SEA
focuses on a fact that the smart e-health gateway and the remote end-user have sufficient resources to perform various
heavy-weight security protocols as well as certificate validation. By providing the established connection context to
the medical sensor nodes, these devices no longer need to authenticate and authorize a remote caregiver. It is supposed
that within the certificate-based DTLS handshake, from one hand, the smart gateway authenticates the remote end-
user through certificates. In this regard, similar to current web browsers, smart gateways hold a pool of trusted
certificates. On the other hand, the smart gateway either authenticates to the remote end-user through certificates
within the DTLS handshake or based on an application-level password once the handshake is terminated. Once the
mutual authentication between the end-user and the smart gateway is done successfully, the end-user authorizes as a
trusted entity so that a data query from the end-users’ side is transmitted to the medical sensor nodes through the smart
gateway. To facilitate the security and authorization of communication, it is required that both entities, the constrained
medical sensor node and the smart gateway, also mutually authenticate one another during the initialization phase.
4.3. Secure End-to-End Communication for Mobility Enabled Healthcare IoT
In1, we enabled secure end-to-end communication between end-points of a healthcare IoT system by developing
a session resumption-based scheme which oﬄoads the encrypted session states of DTLS towards a non-resource-
constrained end-user. The main motivation to employ the DTLS session resumption is to mitigate the overhead on
resource-constrained medical sensors. The session resumption technique is an extended form of the DTLS hand-
shake which enables a client/server to continue the communication with a previously established session state without
compromising the security properties. The major advantages offered by our scheme compared to the conventional
end-to-end security solution can be found in1. We applied our proposed session resumption-based end-to-end secu-
rity scheme for healthcare IoT to the full system architecture shown in Figure 1. Providing patients with the possibility
to walk around the hospital wards knowing that the monitoring of their health condition is not interrupted is an es-
sential feature. To achieve a continuous monitoring of patients considering the mobility support, in1 , we developed
self-configuration/handover mechanisms which are capable of handling secure and efficient data transfers among dif-
ferent medical sensor networks. A fog layer-based data handover mechanism is defined as the process of changing
or updating the registration of a mobile sensor from its associated base MSN to the visited MSN, for example, when
moving across the hospital’s wards. Data handover solutions should enable the ubiquity when they need to work au-
tonomously without human intervention. The handover mechanism should also offer medical sensor nodes continuous
connectivity, if there exist several gateways in the hospital or nursing/home environments.
Table 1: Execution time comparison of different ECG-based key generation approaches to produce 128-bit cryptographic keys
Approach Execution Time Execution Time Energy Consumption Energy Consumption
Single Iteration (ms) Total (s) Single Iteration (µJ) Total (mJ)
IPI 9,13 181.3 2.9 9507.1 527.6
IPI-PRNG 198.6 3.2 11022.3 611.7
IPI-AES 244 3.9 13542 751.5
SEF 104.3 0.9 5788.6 321.2
SEF-PRNG 136.9 1.1 7598 421.6
SEF-AES 168.1 1.3 9884.5 548.5
5. Implementation and Performance Analysis
The system architecture illustrated in Figure 1 is implemented for experimental evaluation for two different sce-
narios: in-home and hospital room(s). To Implement the proposed healthcare IoT system architecture, we setup a
platform that consists of medical sensor nodes, UT-GATE smart e-health gateways, a remote server, and end-users.
UT-GATE is constructed from the combination of a Pandaboard and a Texas Instruments (TI) SmartRF06 board that
is integrated with a CC2538 module14. In our configuration, UT-GATE uses 8GB of external memory and is powered
by Ubuntu OS which allows to control devices and services such as local storage and notification. To investigate the
feasibility of our proposed architecture, the Wismote15 platform, which is a common resource-limited sensor nodes,
is utilized in Contiki’s network simulation tool Cooja3. For the evaluation, we use the open source tool OpenSSL
version 1.0.1.j to create elliptic curve public and private keys from the NIST P-256 and X.509 certificates. The server
association to the end-user is created using OpenSSL API which provides all necessary functions related to end-users
including configuration, certificate, handshake, session state, and cipher suites to support session resumption. Tiny-
DTLS 16 is used as the code-base of the proposed scheme. For the public-key functions, we utilize the Relic-toolkit 17
that is an open source cryptography library tailored for specific security levels with emphasis on efficiency and flexi-
bility. The MySQL database is set up for static and non-static records. The cloud server database is processed using
xSQL Lite which is the third party tool for data synchronization. With respect to the cryptographic primitives and to
make a fair comparison, we followed similar cipher suites as employed in the most recently proposed authentication
and authorization architecture for IP-based IoT17. In this regard, we utilize elliptic curve NIST-256 for public-key
436 Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi  et al. / Procedia Computer Science 130 (2018) 432–439
Sanaz Rahimi Moosavi et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2018) 000–000 5
operations, AES 128 CCM 8 (with an IV of 8 bytes) for symmetric-key, and SHA256 for hashing operations. To
asses the performance of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation approaches in terms of execution time,
we conduct the experiments on ECG signals of 48 subjects with Arrhythmia obtained from the publicly available
database, that is, Physiobank18. The recordings are digitized at 360 samples per second with 11-bit resolution over a
10 mV range per patient with 16 bit resolution over a range of 16 mV. We have captured 100 different samples of 5
minute long ECG data for each subject. We have implemented the key generation approaches utilizing MATLAB.
5.1. Cryptographic Key Generation Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze and compare the performance of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approaches to produce 128-bit cryptographic keys from the execution time and energy consumption point of views.
5.1.1. Cryptographic Key Generation Execution Time
To investigate the generation execution overhead of our approaches compared to the conventional IPI approach,
we have examined the execution time required to generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptography keys. For this purpose,
we utilized the Wismote15 platform, which is equipped with a 16MHz MSP430 micro-controller, an IEEE 802.15.4
radio transceiver, 128KB of ROM, 16KB of RAM, and supports 20-bit addressing. Our experiments are carried out
on ECG recordings obtained from the MIT-BIH Arrhythmia dataset, sampled at 360 Hz.
Table 1 presents the computed key generation execution times of our IPI-PRNG, IPI-AES, SEF, SEF-PRNG, and
SEF-AES approaches as well as the conventional IPI approach. The execution times are presented in both single
iteration and total times. Single iteration execution time indicates the time required to produce an 8-bit binary sequence
from one heartbeat cycle. Total execution time means the sum of single iteration execution times until successive
iterations of the operations yields the desired result, that is, generates the desired 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic
keys. Considering a subject with the ECG heartrate of 60 bpm, the specific MSP430 micro-controller requires about
181 ms, 198 ms and 244 ms execution times per iteration for the IPI, IPI-PRNG, and IPI-AES approaches, respectively.
These are the times these three approaches require to produce an 8-bit binary sequence from one ECG heartbeat cycle.
To generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys, it is required for IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches to
compute 16 heartbeat cycles from a subject’s ECG signal. The same microcontroller requires about 104.3 ms, 136.9
ms, and 178.1 ms execution times for the SEF, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches to produce 16-bits binary
sequences from one ECG heartbeat cycle. To generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys, the SEF, SEF-PRNG
and SEF-AES approaches need to compute 8 heartbeat cycles from a subject’s ECG signal. As a result, the total
key generation execution times of SEF, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches are calculated as 104.3 * 8=0.9 (s),
136.9 * 8=1.1 (s), and 168.1 * 8=1.3 (s), respectively, which are considerably lower than their counterparts. The
key generation execution times of SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES are in average 1.8 times times faster than IPI,
IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches. This is due to the fact that in IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES in total 8 bits can be
extracted from one ECG heartbeat cycle, while in SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES approaches in total 16 bits can be
extracted from the same heartbeat cycle. Thus, by utilizing additional ECG features, the latency of ECG-based key
generation approaches can be significantly reduced. It should be mentioned that, generating these cryptographic keys
are performed in an on-demand way and not in every message transaction, for example, once the key is revoked.
5.1.2. Energy Consumption Due to ECG-based Key Generation
To measure the consumed energy of each Wismote sensor node due to key generation, we utilize the following
equation: E = U× I× t where U represents the supply voltage in Volt (V), I is the current draw of the hardware in mil-
liAmperes (mA) , and t is the key generation execution time in milliseconds (ms). According to the Wismote datasheet
that is available in15, the Wismote sensor node has a current consumption of 18.5 mA and a supply voltage of 3 V.
The energy consumption comparison of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation approaches are presented
in Table 1. According to the results, SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES have in average better energy consumption than
IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches. This is due the fact that SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES approaches require
lower execution time. Hence, the energy consumption of the Wismote sensor nodes can be considerably reduced.
5.2. Mutual Authentication and Authorization Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of different mutual authentication and authorization approaches from
the transmission overhead and latency points of views.
5.2.1. Transmission Overhead
The required number of packet fragments has a direct impact on energy consumption of the healthcare IoT devices.
In the following, we analyze the transmission overhead in more detail. As we presented in10, to perform the certificate-
based DTLS handshake, all 15 messages are needed to establish a DTLS connection. When transmitted over size-
constrained IEEE 802.15.4 radio links, these messages must additionally be split into several packet fragments due
to their extensive message size3. As Table 2 presents, we compared the transmission overhead of the proposed SEA
approach to the most recent architecture for a successful certificate-based DTLS connection. In delegation-based
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Table 2: Performance comparison with the most recently proposed authentication and authorization approach for IoT
SEA Approach (This Work) Hummen et al. 3 SEA Approach Improvements (%)
Transmission-overhead (byte) 1190 1609 26
6LoWPAN Fragments (#) 18 24 26
Latency-GE (s) ∼ 15 ∼ 15 0
Latency-NG (s) 5.001 6.08 5
Latency-NE (Total) (s) 20.001 21.08 5
architecture, the measured transmission overhead of the certificate-based DTLS handshake is 1609 bytes which cause
in total 24 fragments for the transmission of all handshake messages from the delegation server to the end-user3. In
contrast, our purposed architecture requires transmission of 1190 bytes and it cause 18 fragments totally. As a result,
the transmission overhead in our architecture reduces by 26% compared to the delegation-based architecture.
5.2.2. Authentication and Authorization Latency
Latency in this context is defined as the time required from sending a request to confirming the shared session
key between two peers. To estimate the authentication and authorization latency, the processing time which is spent
from sensor node to the end-user, that is, NE is calculated. This processing time is deduced from the summation of
communication latency from sensor node to smart gateway, that is, NG and smart gateway to end-user which can
be written as: LatencyNE(s) = LatencyNG(s) + LatencyGE(s). To compute the communication latency from the UT-
Gate to the end-user, a proxy server is adjoined to the network. The proposed SEA approach achieves an almost
equivalent NG processing time to the delegation-based architecture3, which takes up to 15 s for the certificate-based
DTLS. However, the proposed SEA approach considerably reduces the processing time required for GE compared to
the delegation-based architecture. As shown in Table 2, in SEA, the processing time required for GE is about 5.001
s whereas this time increases to about 6.08 s in the delegation-based architecture. Regarding the latency from the
gateway to the end-user, the proposed SEA architecture obtains about 16% improvement compared to the delegation-
based architecture. When utilizing public keys, the certificate-related processing overhead is no longer available. This
is a remarkable advantage as the certificate-related overhead increases linearly with the depth of certificate hierarchy.
5.3. End-to-End Communication Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of different end-to-end security schemes for mobility enabled healthcare IoT from (i)
sensor-side processing time, (ii) sensor-side energy consumption, (iii) data handover latency between gateways, (iv)
client-side processing time, (v) client-side run-time performance, and (vi) memory footprint point of views.
5.3.1. Sensor-side Processing Time
The total sensor-side processing time and energy consumption of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end
security is presented in Table 3. For the evaluation, in Cooja, we configured two Wismotes as a client and a server.
When the booting process is performed, the client initiates the handshake by sending the ClientHello message. After
a successful handshake, we measured the total processing time at the sensor-side. Results demonstrated that the
symmetric key-based DTLS mode4 and our session resumption-based scheme require almost similar processing time.
The proposed scheme requires 20 ms less processing time than the symmetric key-based mode. This is due to the
Table 3: Client-side and sensor-side performance analysis of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end security
Sensor-side Sensor-side Client-side Client-side
Processing Time Energy Consumption Processing Time Run-time
(ms) (mJ) (ms) (ms)
DTLS Session Resumption Without Server-side State
(DTLS S ession Resumption WITH AES 128) (This Work) 160 8.87 45 205
Certificate-Based DTLS7
(DTLS ECDHE ECDS A WITH AES 128 CCM SHA 256) 5690 315.79 3744 9434
Symmetric key-Based DTLS4
(DTLS PS K WITH AES 128 CCM 8) 180 9.99 49 229
fewer message flights needed to be exchanged in the session resumption, resulting in less computations at the sensor-
side. The processing time for the certificate-based DTLS handshake7 is considerably higher than both the symmetric
key-based and the session resumption-based modes. The certificate-based DTLS requires about 5690 ms at the sensor-
side which is mainly due to the expensive public key-based operations. Public key-related operations are the main
contributor of sensor-side processing. In this work, there are three classes of public key-related computations. Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), the key agreement protocol. ECDH is a key agreement protocol which allows two
parties, each having a publicprivate key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. ECDH requires
in average 437 ms and the deriving of a shared key point requires with 863.2 ms. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) is used for signing the server key exchange message and verifying the certificate message. The
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operations, AES 128 CCM 8 (with an IV of 8 bytes) for symmetric-key, and SHA256 for hashing operations. To
asses the performance of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation approaches in terms of execution time,
we conduct the experiments on ECG signals of 48 subjects with Arrhythmia obtained from the publicly available
database, that is, Physiobank18. The recordings are digitized at 360 samples per second with 11-bit resolution over a
10 mV range per patient with 16 bit resolution over a range of 16 mV. We have captured 100 different samples of 5
minute long ECG data for each subject. We have implemented the key generation approaches utilizing MATLAB.
5.1. Cryptographic Key Generation Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze and compare the performance of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation
approaches to produce 128-bit cryptographic keys from the execution time and energy consumption point of views.
5.1.1. Cryptographic Key Generation Execution Time
To investigate the generation execution overhead of our approaches compared to the conventional IPI approach,
we have examined the execution time required to generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptography keys. For this purpose,
we utilized the Wismote15 platform, which is equipped with a 16MHz MSP430 micro-controller, an IEEE 802.15.4
radio transceiver, 128KB of ROM, 16KB of RAM, and supports 20-bit addressing. Our experiments are carried out
on ECG recordings obtained from the MIT-BIH Arrhythmia dataset, sampled at 360 Hz.
Table 1 presents the computed key generation execution times of our IPI-PRNG, IPI-AES, SEF, SEF-PRNG, and
SEF-AES approaches as well as the conventional IPI approach. The execution times are presented in both single
iteration and total times. Single iteration execution time indicates the time required to produce an 8-bit binary sequence
from one heartbeat cycle. Total execution time means the sum of single iteration execution times until successive
iterations of the operations yields the desired result, that is, generates the desired 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic
keys. Considering a subject with the ECG heartrate of 60 bpm, the specific MSP430 micro-controller requires about
181 ms, 198 ms and 244 ms execution times per iteration for the IPI, IPI-PRNG, and IPI-AES approaches, respectively.
These are the times these three approaches require to produce an 8-bit binary sequence from one ECG heartbeat cycle.
To generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys, it is required for IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches to
compute 16 heartbeat cycles from a subject’s ECG signal. The same microcontroller requires about 104.3 ms, 136.9
ms, and 178.1 ms execution times for the SEF, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches to produce 16-bits binary
sequences from one ECG heartbeat cycle. To generate 128-bit ECG-based cryptographic keys, the SEF, SEF-PRNG
and SEF-AES approaches need to compute 8 heartbeat cycles from a subject’s ECG signal. As a result, the total
key generation execution times of SEF, SEF-PRNG, and SEF-AES approaches are calculated as 104.3 * 8=0.9 (s),
136.9 * 8=1.1 (s), and 168.1 * 8=1.3 (s), respectively, which are considerably lower than their counterparts. The
key generation execution times of SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES are in average 1.8 times times faster than IPI,
IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches. This is due to the fact that in IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES in total 8 bits can be
extracted from one ECG heartbeat cycle, while in SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES approaches in total 16 bits can be
extracted from the same heartbeat cycle. Thus, by utilizing additional ECG features, the latency of ECG-based key
generation approaches can be significantly reduced. It should be mentioned that, generating these cryptographic keys
are performed in an on-demand way and not in every message transaction, for example, once the key is revoked.
5.1.2. Energy Consumption Due to ECG-based Key Generation
To measure the consumed energy of each Wismote sensor node due to key generation, we utilize the following
equation: E = U× I× t where U represents the supply voltage in Volt (V), I is the current draw of the hardware in mil-
liAmperes (mA) , and t is the key generation execution time in milliseconds (ms). According to the Wismote datasheet
that is available in15, the Wismote sensor node has a current consumption of 18.5 mA and a supply voltage of 3 V.
The energy consumption comparison of different ECG-based cryptographic key generation approaches are presented
in Table 1. According to the results, SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES have in average better energy consumption than
IPI, IPI-PRNG and IPI-AES approaches. This is due the fact that SEF, SEF-PRNG and SEF-AES approaches require
lower execution time. Hence, the energy consumption of the Wismote sensor nodes can be considerably reduced.
5.2. Mutual Authentication and Authorization Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the performance of different mutual authentication and authorization approaches from
the transmission overhead and latency points of views.
5.2.1. Transmission Overhead
The required number of packet fragments has a direct impact on energy consumption of the healthcare IoT devices.
In the following, we analyze the transmission overhead in more detail. As we presented in10, to perform the certificate-
based DTLS handshake, all 15 messages are needed to establish a DTLS connection. When transmitted over size-
constrained IEEE 802.15.4 radio links, these messages must additionally be split into several packet fragments due
to their extensive message size3. As Table 2 presents, we compared the transmission overhead of the proposed SEA
approach to the most recent architecture for a successful certificate-based DTLS connection. In delegation-based
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Table 2: Performance comparison with the most recently proposed authentication and authorization approach for IoT
SEA Approach (This Work) Hummen et al. 3 SEA Approach Improvements (%)
Transmission-overhead (byte) 1190 1609 26
6LoWPAN Fragments (#) 18 24 26
Latency-GE (s) ∼ 15 ∼ 15 0
Latency-NG (s) 5.001 6.08 5
Latency-NE (Total) (s) 20.001 21.08 5
architecture, the measured transmission overhead of the certificate-based DTLS handshake is 1609 bytes which cause
in total 24 fragments for the transmission of all handshake messages from the delegation server to the end-user3. In
contrast, our purposed architecture requires transmission of 1190 bytes and it cause 18 fragments totally. As a result,
the transmission overhead in our architecture reduces by 26% compared to the delegation-based architecture.
5.2.2. Authentication and Authorization Latency
Latency in this context is defined as the time required from sending a request to confirming the shared session
key between two peers. To estimate the authentication and authorization latency, the processing time which is spent
from sensor node to the end-user, that is, NE is calculated. This processing time is deduced from the summation of
communication latency from sensor node to smart gateway, that is, NG and smart gateway to end-user which can
be written as: LatencyNE(s) = LatencyNG(s) + LatencyGE(s). To compute the communication latency from the UT-
Gate to the end-user, a proxy server is adjoined to the network. The proposed SEA approach achieves an almost
equivalent NG processing time to the delegation-based architecture3, which takes up to 15 s for the certificate-based
DTLS. However, the proposed SEA approach considerably reduces the processing time required for GE compared to
the delegation-based architecture. As shown in Table 2, in SEA, the processing time required for GE is about 5.001
s whereas this time increases to about 6.08 s in the delegation-based architecture. Regarding the latency from the
gateway to the end-user, the proposed SEA architecture obtains about 16% improvement compared to the delegation-
based architecture. When utilizing public keys, the certificate-related processing overhead is no longer available. This
is a remarkable advantage as the certificate-related overhead increases linearly with the depth of certificate hierarchy.
5.3. End-to-End Communication Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of different end-to-end security schemes for mobility enabled healthcare IoT from (i)
sensor-side processing time, (ii) sensor-side energy consumption, (iii) data handover latency between gateways, (iv)
client-side processing time, (v) client-side run-time performance, and (vi) memory footprint point of views.
5.3.1. Sensor-side Processing Time
The total sensor-side processing time and energy consumption of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end
security is presented in Table 3. For the evaluation, in Cooja, we configured two Wismotes as a client and a server.
When the booting process is performed, the client initiates the handshake by sending the ClientHello message. After
a successful handshake, we measured the total processing time at the sensor-side. Results demonstrated that the
symmetric key-based DTLS mode4 and our session resumption-based scheme require almost similar processing time.
The proposed scheme requires 20 ms less processing time than the symmetric key-based mode. This is due to the
Table 3: Client-side and sensor-side performance analysis of different DTLS modes to provide end-to-end security
Sensor-side Sensor-side Client-side Client-side
Processing Time Energy Consumption Processing Time Run-time
(ms) (mJ) (ms) (ms)
DTLS Session Resumption Without Server-side State
(DTLS S ession Resumption WITH AES 128) (This Work) 160 8.87 45 205
Certificate-Based DTLS7
(DTLS ECDHE ECDS A WITH AES 128 CCM SHA 256) 5690 315.79 3744 9434
Symmetric key-Based DTLS4
(DTLS PS K WITH AES 128 CCM 8) 180 9.99 49 229
fewer message flights needed to be exchanged in the session resumption, resulting in less computations at the sensor-
side. The processing time for the certificate-based DTLS handshake7 is considerably higher than both the symmetric
key-based and the session resumption-based modes. The certificate-based DTLS requires about 5690 ms at the sensor-
side which is mainly due to the expensive public key-based operations. Public key-related operations are the main
contributor of sensor-side processing. In this work, there are three classes of public key-related computations. Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), the key agreement protocol. ECDH is a key agreement protocol which allows two
parties, each having a publicprivate key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. ECDH requires
in average 437 ms and the deriving of a shared key point requires with 863.2 ms. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) is used for signing the server key exchange message and verifying the certificate message. The
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Table 4: Data handover latency between smart gateways with different packet size
Packet Size (byte) Data Handover Latency (ms)
10 2.288
50 2.517
100 2.884
500 3.342
1K 3.685
5K 4.588
ECDSA signature requires in average 508.3 ms, whereas the ECDSA signature verification requires with in average
1896.5 ms. This shows how important it is to delegate such expensive operations through session resumption.
5.3.2. Sensor-side Energy Consumption
Similar to the previous section, energy consumption of each Wismote sensor node when performing end-to-end
communication is computed using the aforementioned equation. We calculate the energy consumption of the Wismote
sensor when performing the DTLS session resumption, the symmetric key-based DTLS, and the certificate-based
DTLS. Results presented in Table 3 show that our techniques are considerably more energy efficient in comparison to
the certificate-based DTLS7 technique. It saves 11% of energy compared to the symmetric key-based DTLS4.
5.3.3. Client-Side Processing Time
The total processing time at the client-side (end-user) using three different approaches is shown in Table 3. For the
client-side, we used a machine with IntelCoreTMi5− 4570 CPU operating at 2.2 GHz and having 6 GB of RAM. The
processing time of our scheme using DTLS session resumption is 45 ms, where as the conventional symmetric key-
based4 requires 49 ms. This is due to the lesser number of control messages needed for session resumption, compared
to the full symmetric key-based DTLS. The processing time for certificate-based DTLS handshake7, is considerably
higher than both the symmetric key-based and the session resumption-based modes. The certificate-based DTLS
requires approximately 3744ms at the client-side which is mainly due to the expensive public key-based operations.
Compared to symmetric key-based and certificate-based DTLS, our session resumption-based scheme has 8.1% and
98.7% improvements in terms of client-side processing time, respectively.
5.3.4. Client-Side Run-time Performance
Run-time refers to the time it takes for the handshake between the medical sensor node and the end-user to be
done successfully. To provide end-to-end security, we calculate the total run-time of three different DTLS modes. As
can be seen from Table 3, our scheme which exploits the DTLS session resumption technique is about 97% and 10%
faster than certificate-based7 and symmetric key-based DTLS handshake4, respectively.
5.3.5. Data Handover Latency Between Two Smart Gateways
To demonstrate how our end-to-end security scheme enables mobility, we implemented a real system in which two
UT-GATE gateways are employed. It is assumed that these gateways are connected through the fog layer where one of
the gateways acts as a client and the other one acts as a server. In the experiments, we created a 100-byte lookup table
for each gateway that consists of: i) Control data including the DTLS session resumption state, information about
the authorized caregivers, medical sensors’ IDs, and patients’ IDs, ii) Patients’ health data We computed the latency
of the data handover process between the gateways. To show the scalability of our method, we considered messages
with different sizes which may need to be exchanged between the gateways for the data handover process. As Table
4 presents, data handover latency between two gateways is negligible and mobility is supported in an agile way. In
addition, by increasing the packet size, latency marginally increases showing the scalability of our scheme.
5.3.6. Memory Footprint
The memory footprint for symmetric key based DTLS, DTLS session resumption and certificate-based DTLS
approaches are analyzed using msp430-size tool. For a more detailed information regarding the contribution of each
components to static RAM and ROM the tool msp430-objdump is used. The results of our evaluation show that the
certificate-based DTLS handshake is very expensive for resource-constrained sensor nodes. While, our DTLS session
resumption approach requires similar resources as the symmetric key-based DTLSmode. Symmetric key-based DTLS
requires 7.79 KB of RAM and 47.23 KB of ROM and our DTLS session resumption approach requires 8.25 KB
of RAM and 47.86 KB of ROM. In DTLS session resumption approach, the RAM is just about 0.46 KB higher
than symmetric key-based DTLS. This is due to a somewhat larger packet buffer size of DTLS session resumption
approach. The certificate-based DTLS approach has the highest memory footprint With 12.32 KB of RAM, that is,
4.53 KB higher than symmetric key-based DTLS mode and 75.98 KB of ROM. This additional value is composed
of more RAM requirements for larger packet buffers, session security parameters, certificate and buffering ECDSA
signature values. Relic, requires 20.82 KB byte of ROM and and 1.49 KB of RAM. Relic cryptographic toolkit only
appears in the certificate-based DTLS approach which makes it the major ROM and RAM contributor of this approach.
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Table 5: Detailed Memory footprint of the three different DTLS approaches
Symmetric Key-Based DTLS4 DTLS Session Resumption (This
Work)
Certificate-Based DTLS7
Modules RAM (KB) ROM (KB) RAM (KB) ROM (KB) RAM (KB) ROM (KB)
Relic Toolkit - - - - 1.49 20.82
AES-CCM 0 3.79 0 3.79 0 3.79
SHA2 0.29 2.48 0.29 2.48 0.29 2.48
DTLS-Client 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.6 0.27
DTLS-Server 0.008 0.21 0.171 0.21 0.42 0.21
Certificate Handler - - - - 0.02 1.46
DTLS 2.11 9.71 2.75 10.34 5.14 15.91
Symmetric cryptographic primitives of the three approaches that comprises of AES-CCM and SHA2 requires for 6.27
byte of ROM and 0.29 KB of RAM. The similarity is due to the fact that all the three approaches, employ the same
symmetric primitives without further modifications. The portion labeled as DTLS in Table 5 is comprises of DTLS
handler, state machine and re-transmission modules. As for the DTLS, symmetric key-based DTLS requires 9.71 KB
of ROM and 2.11 KB of RAM, our session resumption approach requires 10.34 KB of ROM and 2.75 KB of RAM
and 15.91 KB of ROM and 5.14 KB of RAM are required in the certificate-based DTLS, respectively. Certificate
handler also appears only in the certificate-based DTLS approach which requires 1.46 KB byte of ROM and and 0.02
KB of RAM. Finally, the rest of RAM and ROM memories are dedicated to stack sizes and the Contiki OS.
6. Conclusions
We analyzed the performance of end-to-end security schemes in healthcare IoT systems. Based on the analysis,
we distinguished that our scheme has the most extensive set of performance features in comparison to state-of-the-art
end-to-end security schemes. Our end-to-end security scheme was designed by generating ECG-based cryptographic
keys for medical sensor devices, certificate-based DTLS handshake between end-users and smart gateways as well
as employing the session resumption technique for the communications between medical sensor devices and end-
users. Our performance evaluation revealed that, the ECG signal based cryptographic key generation method that
is employed in our end-to-end security scheme is on average 1.8 times faster than existing similar key generation
approaches while being more energy-efficient. Compared to existing end-to-end security approaches, our scheme
reduces the communication overhead by 26% and the communication latency between smart gateways and end users
by 16%. Our scheme performed approximately 97% faster than certificate-based and 10% faster than symmetric key-
based DTLS. In terms of memory requirements, certificate-based DTLS needs about 2.9 times more ROM and 2.2
times more RAM resources than our approach. In fact, the ROM and RAM requirements of our scheme are almost
as low as in symmetric key-based DTLS. Our scheme is a very promising solution for ensuring secure end-to-end
communications for healthcare IoT systems with low overhead. Our future work focuses on the trade-off analysis
between security level and cost of the end-to-end security schemes in terms of latency and energy consumption.
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Table 4: Data handover latency between smart gateways with different packet size
Packet Size (byte) Data Handover Latency (ms)
10 2.288
50 2.517
100 2.884
500 3.342
1K 3.685
5K 4.588
ECDSA signature requires in average 508.3 ms, whereas the ECDSA signature verification requires with in average
1896.5 ms. This shows how important it is to delegate such expensive operations through session resumption.
5.3.2. Sensor-side Energy Consumption
Similar to the previous section, energy consumption of each Wismote sensor node when performing end-to-end
communication is computed using the aforementioned equation. We calculate the energy consumption of the Wismote
sensor when performing the DTLS session resumption, the symmetric key-based DTLS, and the certificate-based
DTLS. Results presented in Table 3 show that our techniques are considerably more energy efficient in comparison to
the certificate-based DTLS7 technique. It saves 11% of energy compared to the symmetric key-based DTLS4.
5.3.3. Client-Side Processing Time
The total processing time at the client-side (end-user) using three different approaches is shown in Table 3. For the
client-side, we used a machine with IntelCoreTMi5− 4570 CPU operating at 2.2 GHz and having 6 GB of RAM. The
processing time of our scheme using DTLS session resumption is 45 ms, where as the conventional symmetric key-
based4 requires 49 ms. This is due to the lesser number of control messages needed for session resumption, compared
to the full symmetric key-based DTLS. The processing time for certificate-based DTLS handshake7, is considerably
higher than both the symmetric key-based and the session resumption-based modes. The certificate-based DTLS
requires approximately 3744ms at the client-side which is mainly due to the expensive public key-based operations.
Compared to symmetric key-based and certificate-based DTLS, our session resumption-based scheme has 8.1% and
98.7% improvements in terms of client-side processing time, respectively.
5.3.4. Client-Side Run-time Performance
Run-time refers to the time it takes for the handshake between the medical sensor node and the end-user to be
done successfully. To provide end-to-end security, we calculate the total run-time of three different DTLS modes. As
can be seen from Table 3, our scheme which exploits the DTLS session resumption technique is about 97% and 10%
faster than certificate-based7 and symmetric key-based DTLS handshake4, respectively.
5.3.5. Data Handover Latency Between Two Smart Gateways
To demonstrate how our end-to-end security scheme enables mobility, we implemented a real system in which two
UT-GATE gateways are employed. It is assumed that these gateways are connected through the fog layer where one of
the gateways acts as a client and the other one acts as a server. In the experiments, we created a 100-byte lookup table
for each gateway that consists of: i) Control data including the DTLS session resumption state, information about
the authorized caregivers, medical sensors’ IDs, and patients’ IDs, ii) Patients’ health data We computed the latency
of the data handover process between the gateways. To show the scalability of our method, we considered messages
with different sizes which may need to be exchanged between the gateways for the data handover process. As Table
4 presents, data handover latency between two gateways is negligible and mobility is supported in an agile way. In
addition, by increasing the packet size, latency marginally increases showing the scalability of our scheme.
5.3.6. Memory Footprint
The memory footprint for symmetric key based DTLS, DTLS session resumption and certificate-based DTLS
approaches are analyzed using msp430-size tool. For a more detailed information regarding the contribution of each
components to static RAM and ROM the tool msp430-objdump is used. The results of our evaluation show that the
certificate-based DTLS handshake is very expensive for resource-constrained sensor nodes. While, our DTLS session
resumption approach requires similar resources as the symmetric key-based DTLSmode. Symmetric key-based DTLS
requires 7.79 KB of RAM and 47.23 KB of ROM and our DTLS session resumption approach requires 8.25 KB
of RAM and 47.86 KB of ROM. In DTLS session resumption approach, the RAM is just about 0.46 KB higher
than symmetric key-based DTLS. This is due to a somewhat larger packet buffer size of DTLS session resumption
approach. The certificate-based DTLS approach has the highest memory footprint With 12.32 KB of RAM, that is,
4.53 KB higher than symmetric key-based DTLS mode and 75.98 KB of ROM. This additional value is composed
of more RAM requirements for larger packet buffers, session security parameters, certificate and buffering ECDSA
signature values. Relic, requires 20.82 KB byte of ROM and and 1.49 KB of RAM. Relic cryptographic toolkit only
appears in the certificate-based DTLS approach which makes it the major ROM and RAM contributor of this approach.
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Table 5: Detailed Memory footprint of the three different DTLS approaches
Symmetric Key-Based DTLS4 DTLS Session Resumption (This
Work)
Certificate-Based DTLS7
Modules RAM (KB) ROM (KB) RAM (KB) ROM (KB) RAM (KB) ROM (KB)
Relic Toolkit - - - - 1.49 20.82
AES-CCM 0 3.79 0 3.79 0 3.79
SHA2 0.29 2.48 0.29 2.48 0.29 2.48
DTLS-Client 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.6 0.27
DTLS-Server 0.008 0.21 0.171 0.21 0.42 0.21
Certificate Handler - - - - 0.02 1.46
DTLS 2.11 9.71 2.75 10.34 5.14 15.91
Symmetric cryptographic primitives of the three approaches that comprises of AES-CCM and SHA2 requires for 6.27
byte of ROM and 0.29 KB of RAM. The similarity is due to the fact that all the three approaches, employ the same
symmetric primitives without further modifications. The portion labeled as DTLS in Table 5 is comprises of DTLS
handler, state machine and re-transmission modules. As for the DTLS, symmetric key-based DTLS requires 9.71 KB
of ROM and 2.11 KB of RAM, our session resumption approach requires 10.34 KB of ROM and 2.75 KB of RAM
and 15.91 KB of ROM and 5.14 KB of RAM are required in the certificate-based DTLS, respectively. Certificate
handler also appears only in the certificate-based DTLS approach which requires 1.46 KB byte of ROM and and 0.02
KB of RAM. Finally, the rest of RAM and ROM memories are dedicated to stack sizes and the Contiki OS.
6. Conclusions
We analyzed the performance of end-to-end security schemes in healthcare IoT systems. Based on the analysis,
we distinguished that our scheme has the most extensive set of performance features in comparison to state-of-the-art
end-to-end security schemes. Our end-to-end security scheme was designed by generating ECG-based cryptographic
keys for medical sensor devices, certificate-based DTLS handshake between end-users and smart gateways as well
as employing the session resumption technique for the communications between medical sensor devices and end-
users. Our performance evaluation revealed that, the ECG signal based cryptographic key generation method that
is employed in our end-to-end security scheme is on average 1.8 times faster than existing similar key generation
approaches while being more energy-efficient. Compared to existing end-to-end security approaches, our scheme
reduces the communication overhead by 26% and the communication latency between smart gateways and end users
by 16%. Our scheme performed approximately 97% faster than certificate-based and 10% faster than symmetric key-
based DTLS. In terms of memory requirements, certificate-based DTLS needs about 2.9 times more ROM and 2.2
times more RAM resources than our approach. In fact, the ROM and RAM requirements of our scheme are almost
as low as in symmetric key-based DTLS. Our scheme is a very promising solution for ensuring secure end-to-end
communications for healthcare IoT systems with low overhead. Our future work focuses on the trade-off analysis
between security level and cost of the end-to-end security schemes in terms of latency and energy consumption.
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